

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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ART. I.—UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

1. *The Natural History of Man ; comprising inquiries into the modifying influence of physical and moral agencies on the different tribes of the human family.* By JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, M. D., &c., &c. Third edition, enlarged, with fifty coloured and five plain illustrations on steel, and ninety-seven engravings on wood. Royal 8vo., pp. 677. London : H. Bailliere. 1848.
2. *The Unity of the Human Races, proved to be the Doctrine of Scripture, Reason, and Science, with a Review of the Present Position and Theory of Professor Agassiz.* By the Rev. THOMAS SMYTH, D. D. 12mo., pp. 404. New-York : George P. Putnam. 1850.
3. *The Doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race Examined on the Principles of Science.* By JOHN BACHMAN, D. D. 8vo., pp. 312. Charleston, S. C. : C. Canning. 1850.
4. *Philological Proofs of the Original Unity and Recent Origin of the Human Race.* By ARTHUR JAMES JOHNES, Esq. London. 1846.
5. *An Investigation of the Theories of the Natural History of Man.* By WILLIAM FREDERIC VAN ARMINGE. New-York. 1848.
6. *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany ;* March, 1850. *On the Geographical Distribution of Animals ;* July, 1850. *On the Diversity of Origin of the Human Races.* By PROFESSOR LOUIS AGASSIZ.

THE question whether man may not after all be the second cousin of the monkeys, is one which most plain people will not think worthy of elaborate discussion. But as the Bible had had the temerity to assert that he is not, Voltaire and the French school of infidelity, flinging down the glove for the slandered baboons, maintained that the Bible in this, as in so many other matters, was wholly in the dark. Now, had they limited the investigation to mere researches into personal genealogy, we should not have been so impolite—either to the Frenchmen or the monkeys—as to have meddled with their family matters, but would have allowed them to settle the question of consanguinity as best pleased them. But with a magnanimity and abnegation of self highly characteristic of that school, they

generously disclaim the honour of this simial relationship, and benevolently bestow it upon poor Quashee, in consideration, perhaps, of the fact that he had been somewhat neglected in their previous benefactions. Now, as neither Quashee nor the baboons were allowed to appear in the *Encyclopædia*, any more than the Bible or Christianity, it became necessary that others should examine their claim to the heraldic honours thus bestowed upon them by the *savants* of the Academy. Such was the origin of the question as to the Unity of the Human Race.

The question thus raised, and discussed, at times, ever since, has recently awakened fresh interest in the scientific world. Commerce, travel, exploring expeditions, researches in natural history, and other causes, have accumulated such a mass of evidence bearing on this point, that a hope has arisen that it may speedily and finally be settled as a ruled case in science. Hence the number and ability of books and essays that have lately appeared on both sides of this question. And it is not without a feeling of national pride that we observe the fact that some of the ablest treatises on the subject are from American pens. Some of these we propose briefly to notice before presenting a rapid *résumé* of the argument, as we believe it to stand at present.

First in order we place Prichard, as the most laborious, voluminous, and accurate writer in our language, on the general physical phenomena of the human races. In his *Physical Researches*, we have a vast repository of facts drawn from every available source that was trustworthy. His *Natural History of Man* is an extensive and laborious induction of particulars in regard to the unity of the different races. The edition now before us is enriched with extensive appendixes, presenting the latest results of scientific research in the departments of philology and ethnography, especially in regard to the African races. The costliness of the work, however, arising from its elegant coloured plates, must prevent its extensive circulation in this country. This is, however, the less to be regretted, as we have in some treatises of native origin, an equally satisfactory discussion of the subject.

Dr. Bachman's book is one of the very best that has ever been written on this question. One of the first naturalists of our age, his opinions on the questions of science involved would be of great value, even if he had given no special attention to this particular controversy. But his professional studies having early directed his mind to this subject, he has given all the points involved the most sifting and thorough examination. With very rare powers of observation, he has carried on a series of experiments for many years,

has visited the best museums and cabinets of this country and Europe, has consulted every accessible source of information, and collected an immense mass of facts, by means of which he has placed the doctrines of the intransitive permanence of species, the barrenness of hybrids, and the consequent unity of the races of men, on a basis of inductive proof which we think is absolutely immovable. He has subjected the showy but shallow generalizations of Dr. Morton to a most searching and exhaustive analysis, and shown that in not a single case alleged is the fruitfulness of hybrid races sustained by the facts. The dogged and persevering manner in which the veteran naturalist scents out and runs down the alleged facts, dragging them to the light, and showing their irrelevancy, or their establishment of the opposite doctrine, is really amusing. One cannot help feeling some compassion for a theory so completely and mercilessly used up. After demolishing the frost-work of Dr. Morton, he discusses the direct question with a clearness, originality, and force, which we have rarely seen equalled.

Dr. Smyth's book is a faithful and laborious summary of the argument in all its ramifications. Like Dr. Bachman's, it had its origin in the discussions of a literary club in Charleston, and first appeared in the columns of several of our religious newspapers. Possessing one of the finest private libraries in the country, and knowing well how to use its treasures, Dr. Smyth has enjoyed rare facilities for presenting a complete bird's-eye view of the controversy. This accordingly he has done in the work before us. Like all his other writings, it displays vigorous thinking, patient research, extensive erudition, and a high tone of moral and religious feeling. He first takes up the Scriptural argument and discusses it with special reference to the recent speculations of Professor Agassiz. Here his professional training gives him great advantage over the distinguished naturalist. He then proves, by an extensive induction of facts from ancient history and literature, the former civilization of the black races. Next he grapples directly with the question of the varieties of the human species, suggests their probable origin, and shows their entire consistency with the unity of the different races. Then, after discussing the nature and philosophy of species, he proves the unity of the *races* from the unity of the species. He then presents the philological, ethnological, and, what may be termed the psychological, arguments. After this he carries the war into Africa, attacks the theory of diversity of origin, and urges objections to the latest views of Agassiz. Several useful papers are added in an appendix, and the whole work made convenient and valuable as a book of reference, by a Scriptural and general index.

It is, perhaps, hardly to be expected that a work of this kind, made up amidst the multifarious engagements of a laborious pastoral charge, should possess all the logical arrangement, and digested method, of a treatise prepared in the scholarly leisure of a life devoted entirely to a single branch of science. The wonder is, that a book prepared amidst the pressure of so many duties, should evince so thorough an exploration of the whole ground, and so complete a mastery of the argument, rather than that it should lack that compact and organic unity which we see in works more technically scientific. As it is, we are furnished with the bibliography of the subject more completely than it can be found in any other book we have seen, and with an accumulation of argument in favour of the unity of the races, which must be satisfactory to most fair and un-biassed minds.

There is another work, which we have not seen, by a Dr. Nott of Mobile, but the quotations from which evince a rancour against the Bible and a coarse brutality of feeling, that is exceedingly loathsome. If he be not some Alabama negro-trader, who has found it more profitable to sell men's bodies than to cure them, and who wishes to write his trade into respectability, his book at least emits the odour of that delectable class so strongly as to make any nearer approach to it neither pleasant nor necessary.

That this is a question on which the Bible has clearly and definitely pronounced, we do not think it needful to show at any greater length than we shall necessarily do, in noticing the position of Professor Agassiz; as most of our readers are already thoroughly convinced and informed on that point. It will be more profitable to present a condensed view of the argument for the unity of the races, as a question of natural history, and, to some extent, of ethnography. In doing this, we shall draw indiscriminately on all the sources of information within our reach, without referring in each case to the precise authority on which we make our statements, or cumbering our pages with details that are appropriate only to the extended treatise.

That there are varieties in the races of men of the most diverse character, is a fact that stands out palpably to universal observation. The fair-skinned, energetic Anglo-Saxon, the black-skinned, indolent Negro, and the saffron and copper-coloured races of Asia, Australia, and America, present permanent types of the widest diversities of physical characteristics. The question then arises, Are these diversities so wide and impassable as to prove that the different races of men are different species, having a different origin; or are they of such a character as only to prove that they are different

varieties of the same species? Man, being an animal, under the same physical laws as to his physical economy with the lower tribes, must be considered, in discussing this question, as subjected to the same principles of classification that are adopted in other departments of animated nature. We are willing, then, to submit this question as one purely of natural history, and discuss it on those principles which are recognised in that branch of natural science.

The word species is often loosely used to mean any class of individuals possessing characteristics in common. In Zoology, however, it has a fixed and definite sense. This sense is not an arbitrary invention in the nomenclature of science, but a permanent fact ordained in the very constitution of organic life. A species is simply a tribe of living things descended originally, either from the same common parentage, or from a parentage in every respect precisely similar. The fact that puts them in the same species, is, descent from the same original stock. Now, as this fact cannot always be ascertained historically, Nature, (by which term in this paper we always mean the God of Nature,) has left a mark by which this can always be ascertained. This mark is the power of permanent reproduction. Like always produces like, and not unlike. That, therefore, which proves the descent of the offspring from the parentage, is the power of producing and perpetuating an offspring in all essential respects similar to that parentage.

There are two great facts that characterize the actions of Nature in regard to the different families of living things: the one is the great flexibility and adaptability of the law of resemblance within certain limits; the other is, the rigid, inflexible permanence of that law beyond these limits. The final causes of these facts or laws will be obvious on a moment's reflection.

The first law is essential to the very existence and advancement of human society. The earth contains many varieties of climate, soil, and surface, and the precise physical constitution adapted to one place would be very unsuitable to another. Hence, either the more useful races of animals and plants must be confined to their original locality; or a new creation must take place whenever a new country is to be settled; or there must be in organic life a power of adaptation by which it shall conform to the new circumstances in which the possessors of it may be placed. The necessities of man, however, demand that certain animals and plants should be domesticated, and trained to the various uses for which they may be needed, and that they be capable of transportation with him in his various migrations. Now, if the peculiarities of each species were unchangeable, domesticity and migration would be impossible. The

dog, the horse, the sheep, and the hog, must remain in their original wildness, and the many useful varieties of these important races be unknown. The plants, fruits, and grains, must be confined to the countries to which they were indigenous, and be incapable of improvement by cultivation. The incentives and rewards of human industry and skill, arising from the wonderful improvements that may be made by cultivation, and acting so powerfully upon the civilization and advancement of the world, would be wholly wanting. Therefore, to accomplish the obvious purposes of God in peopling the earth, there must be this *nisus formativus* in organic life, by which the various tribes of living things may be adapted to the circumstances of their position and the wants of man, and by which a stimulus may be given to the active and inventive faculties of social and civilized life. It is this fact, or tendency in organic life, which gives rise to those endless varieties of different species which we find everywhere existing, especially in the more settled and advanced states of society.

But the second law is equally important. If this capability of variation were unlimited, the peculiarities of each species must at last be wholly obliterated. If the different species could amalgamate without limit, and produce new species partaking of the characteristics of both races thus commingled, in process of time the existing species must become hopelessly confounded, the peculiarities that fit them for their various positions in the scale of living things be lost, and the earth become a scene of organic confusion. Indeed, had this law not been always in existence, the various species of domestic animals, at least, would long since have disappeared and become completely blended into some strange and nondescript monstrosity, as wild as a sick man's dream. To prevent such a calamity Nature has set up an impassable barrier between the different species, so as to prevent their permanent intermixture. It is this fact that establishes the conditions of hybridity. A hybrid individual may be produced between two different species, but never a hybrid species, for the hybrid is barren, and cannot perpetuate its kind. And although, in two or perhaps three cases, (those of the buffalo and cow, the China and common goose, and some species of ducks,) where the species are nearly related, the power of reproduction existed in the hybrid, it is so feeble as not to extend beyond the second or third generation. The race becomes extinct, and hence the hybrid is incapable of establishing a new species. Recent anatomical investigations show that an actual barrier is produced in the hybrid, making the power of propagation impossible. And universal observation shows that there is between different species

an invincible repugnance to union, so that death is often the result of attempts to bring them together. No new species then can be produced by art or accident, for the attempt to produce it will always end in barrenness. The law of organic life is, that each creature shall propagate its own kind and not any other. It is also a significant indication of the strength of this law, that mules, or hybrid plants and animals, very rarely occur in a wild state. They are usually the result of domesticity or specific culture, in which the action of Nature is forced by man, and in such cases her displeasure is evinced by the sterility of the unnatural product. Were it necessary, we could give a page of hybrids between different species, which, in spite of every effort to the contrary, have been found absolutely sterile. The fact, then, that hybrid individuals are barren, and hence, that hybrid species or races can never be formed, furnishes us with a clear and certain criterion of species and varieties. If we find the power of permanent reproduction existing between any two classes, we know that they are only varieties, and belong to the same species. If they belong to the same species we infer that they had the same origin, for we have seen that the production of a new species is impossible.

The application of these views to the question before us is obvious. We know that the different races of men freely and permanently amalgamate. This phenomenon has frequently been seen, and new races possessing the power of permanent reproduction have frequently been formed, and are now in actual process of formation. The fertility of the mixed races of men, therefore, proves them to belong to the same species; and, unless man be an exception to all other races of living things, or unless there is specific historical testimony to establish the contrary, proves that these races have had a common and a single origin.

The most strenuous attack that has ever been made on this long-established doctrine of natural history, has been by Dr. Morton of Philadelphia. In an essay on the hybridity of animals in its relation to the unity of the human races, he affirms that hybrid races, with the power of permanent reproduction, are capable of being formed; and hence that this is not the criterion to determine separate species. He brings together an imposing array of alleged facts to sustain this position. But this array has not imposed on Dr. Bachman, however it may have on Dr. Morton. With a far wider knowledge of both the science and the literature of the subject than even his learned opponent, Dr. Bachman has taken up these facts *seriatim*, and shown with the clearness of demonstration, that some of his statements are not authentic; that others are disproved by

positive countervailing testimony; that others are so vague and indefinite as to establish nothing with certainty; that others prove the very position which he attacks; and that in no case has it been proven that a hybrid race or species has been produced or perpetuated. This is done with a searching thoroughness and minuteness of refutation that leaves literally no ground for the theory to rest upon, and establishes the sterility of hybrids and the impossibility of hybrid races beyond all successful contradiction.

The views that Professor Agassiz has recently thrown out, are only in partial conflict with this general doctrine, and hence need not be examined in this immediate connexion.

Here then we might rest the argument for the unity of the races, as an established point of natural history, and demand proof that man was an exception to the rest of the animated creation. But we are willing to waive this advantage, and investigate those difficulties that lie in our path, which however are not peculiarly pressing upon our theory.

The great difficulty in the way of admitting the unity of the human races, is the number and marked character of their varieties. It is alleged that these varieties are so broad, so permanent, and so ancient, that we are forced to the conclusion that the different races had different origins. Let us then examine the law of varieties as it exists in the other forms of organic life, and ascertain whether it leads us to this conclusion. If we find that no such widely-marked and permanent varieties appear in them, this difficulty will be formidable to the theory of unity. But if we find in tribes that are known to belong to the same species and to have the same origin, varieties appearing as broadly marked, and as indelible as those of the human races—varieties which when once produced put on the permanence of species in their characteristics,—then it will follow that the existence of similar varieties, similarly marked, in the human race, can be no valid proof of either diversity of species or diversity of origin.

We have already remarked that it is a law of Nature that varieties be produced within the same species, and that to this beneficent law we owe much of the comfort and improvement of our race. These varieties are sometimes accidental, originating without any known cause. A striking instance of this law of accidental origin is found in the otter breed of sheep. In 1791 one ewe, on the farm of Seth Wright, in Massachusetts, gave birth to a male lamb, which, without any known cause, had a longer body and shorter legs than the rest of the breed, with the fore-legs crooked. This peculiar form rendering it unable to leap fences, it was resolved if possible to

propagate this accidental variety. This was accordingly done, and the breed received its name from the resemblance of its bodily form to that of the otter. A race of swine with solid hoofs arose in Hungary, in the same way, and recently the same singular variety has made its appearance along the banks of the Red river in our own country, without any assignable cause.

But varieties are more frequently formed from causes acting uniformly and regularly, such as climate, food, habits of life, etc., in the states of wildness and domesticity. Whilst we are unable to say what the precise mode of action is, the general fact is clear, that where animals are subjected to any new circumstances such as these, there is an instant effort in Nature to accommodate herself to these circumstances, and if there is sufficient constitutional energy to endure this struggle, the result is a change in the physical peculiarities which are adapted to the change in the outward circumstances. This is the great law of compensation that runs through all organic life, and is one of the most mysterious and beautiful in the economy of Nature. It is the great analogue to the adaptive courtesies and kindnesses of the social world, which illustrate the wonderful correspondences that we find running through all the manifestations of that dread and glorious mystery—*LIFE*.

It is difficult to trace our domestic animals to their original stocks, owing to the remoteness of the period of their subjugation by man. The original types, in many cases, seem to have disappeared, the necessity for their continued existence no longer remaining. The oxen, horses, goats, etc., which we now find wild, are more frequently derivations from the domesticated varieties, than types from which those varieties were originally derived. But the transition from domesticity to wildness furnishes us with a standard by which to judge of the changes effected in the contrary transition; and although it is doubtful whether the original type is ever restored in such cases, yet we have, at least, an illustration of the law of variations, and the tendency in organic life to put on new characteristics when subjected to new influences.

Happily for our purpose we have a series of authentic experiments, made on a scale sufficiently extended to afford us the finest possible illustration of this great law. The Spaniards, when they discovered this country, found none of the domestic animals existing here which were used in Europe. They were accordingly introduced, and escaping and straying from their owners, they have run wild in our vast forests for several centuries. The result has been the obliteration of the characteristics of the domesticated animals, and a reappearance of some of the typical marks of the wild state;

and a generation of new and striking characteristics in accommodation to these new circumstances.

The wild hog of our forests bears a striking likeness to the wild boar of the old world. The hog of the high mountains of Paramos resembles the wild boar of France. Instead of being covered with bristles, however, as the domestic breed from which he sprang, he has a thick fur, often crisp, and sometimes an under-coat of wool. Instead of being generally white or spotted, they are uniformly black, except in some warmer regions, where they are red, like the young pecari. The anatomical structure has changed, adapting itself to the new habits of the animal, in an elongation of the snout, a vaulting of the forehead, a lengthening of the hind legs, and in the case of those left on the island of Cubagua, a monstrous elongation of the toes to half a span.

The ox has undergone the same changes. In some of the provinces of South America a variety has been produced called "pelones," having a very rare and fine fur. In other provinces a variety is produced with an entirely naked skin, like the dog of Mexico or of Guinea. In Colombia, owing to the immense size of farms and other causes, the practice of milking was laid aside, and the result has been that the secretion of milk in the cows is, like the same function in other animals of this class, only an occasional phenomenon, and confined strictly to the period of suckling the calf. As soon as the calf is removed, the milk ceases to flow, as in the case of other mammals.

The same changes have taken place in other animals. The wild dog of the Pampas never barks as the domestic animal does, but howls like the wolf. The wild cat has lost the musical accomplishments of her civilized sisterhood, and gives none of those delectable concerts of caterwauling that so often make night hideous, and call down, from irritable listeners, curses, if not something heavier, on the whole feline race. The wild horse of the higher plains of South America, becomes covered with a long, shaggy fur, and is of an uniform chestnut-colour. The sheep of the Central Cordilleras, if not shorn, produces a thick, matted, woolly fleece, which gradually breaks off in shaggy tufts, and leaves underneath a short, fine hair, shining and smooth, like that of the goat, and the wool never reappears. The goat has lost her large teats, and produces two or three kids annually. The same changes have been produced in geese and gallinaceous fowls. A variety has sprung up, called rumpless fowls, which want from one to six of the caudal vertebrae.

The same varieties have sprung up in other parts of the world. The fat-tailed sheep of Tartary loses its posterior mass of fat, when

removed to the Steppes of Siberia, whose scant and bitter herbage is less favourable to the secretion of adipose matter. The African sheep has become large like a goat, and exchanged its wool for hair. The Wallachian sheep has put on large, perpendicular, spiral horns, and in like manner become clothed with hair. Some also have four, and even six horns. The wild horses of eastern Siberia have the same anatomical differences from the tame ones that we noticed in the case of the swine; and culture, climate, and other causes, have produced the widest varieties—from the little, shaggy pony of the Shetlands, that scrambles up the Highland crags like a goat, to the gigantic steed of Flanders, or the Conestoga of Pennsylvania, which will sometimes drag a load of four tons on the level ground. Whether the dog and the wolf are of the same species, is a question about which there is some difference of opinion among naturalists; but there is a very general agreement that all varieties of the dog must be referred to one species. Between these there is the widest difference—from the gigantic St. Bernard that will carry a frozen traveller to the convent, the shaggy Newfoundland with his webbed feet and his aquatic habits, and the scentless and almost tongueless greyhound; to the little lap-dog that nestles in a lady's arms, the nosing foxhound whose scent is almost a miracle, the ratting terrier, and the naked Mexican dog that has an additional toe. The cow presents the most diverse varieties—from the little Surat ox, not larger than a dog, to the humped and long-eared Brahmin cow, and the gigantic prize ox that will weigh two tons. The domesticated fowls and pigeons have assumed varieties enough to fill a page, some of them of the most diverse character, varying from the largest size to the most dwarfish, and possessing every peculiarity compatible with the preservation of the species, in the feathers, the form, the wattles, and the psychological traits and habits.

From this brief summary of facts, which might be indefinitely extended, we may infer the law of variation in animal life, as to its extent. Within the limits of the preservation of the type of the species, the widest variations may occur in anatomical structure; in external properties, in the colour of the skin, in the colour and texture of the hair, in the features, and in the psychological habits; and these peculiarities once produced may pass into permanent varieties, which shall assume all the indelibility of species. And this remarkable fact may be observed, that the nearer the animal approaches to man in its associations and habits, the wider the range of variation. The dog, who is man's companion and imitator, more nearly than any other animal,—who hunts with him in the forest, watches with him over the flock, lies down by his fireside,

and shares his food,—has, perhaps, the widest range of variety. So the roots and grains that are most used by man have the most varieties. The potato has more than one hundred varieties; and Dr. Bachman relates that he saw at one warehouse, more than one hundred kinds of wheat. The fact then stands broadly out, that the widest varieties may occur among animals that are known to belong to the same species. Hence, when we come to man himself, and find varieties existing that are widely different from each other, we see in the range and extent of these varieties nothing which this law of variation in the lower tribes declares to be at variance with the position that these races all belong to the same species and possess the same origin.

But the law of variation we find as clearly marked in its permanence, as we have found it in its extent. The general fact is, that varieties, when once formed, never return to their original type, if left to themselves. They may be changed into new varieties, by being subjected to new circumstances; but if let alone, they will perpetuate their own characteristics, and not those from which they have departed. The motto of Nature is *nulla vestigia retrorsum*. The stream never flows backward to the fountain. The variety may have been produced by accident; but once produced, it puts on the unyielding tenacity of a species. It may pass into a new variety, but this will rarely if ever be the exact type of the original species. Some varieties of the dog have been in existence for centuries, and their precise origin is lost in the past. These varieties have necessarily assumed all the tenacious permanence of species, to have maintained for so many years a distinct existence. The final cause of the permanence of varieties is identical with that of the permanence of species. The same beneficent reasons which demand that the valuable properties of a species should not be lost by the extinction or amalgamation of that species, also require that, when a variety has been called forth by peculiar circumstances, that variety should be permanent.

If, therefore, we find that the varieties of the human race remain permanent, although the climatic or other influences under which we find them may be changed; if we find that the black, red, and white races continue to propagate their peculiarities, although their original geographical positions should be exchanged, we find in this fact nothing which is at variance with the law of varieties, as we have just found it to exist in the lower tribes.

Having thus learned the law of variation, within the limit of species, as to the lower families of animated nature, we turn to the varieties of the human race, and inquire whether there is anything

in them, as to their extent or permanence, inconsistent with unity of origin and unity of species.

When we come to examine these varieties in detail, we find them to be neither so many, nor so great, as we find them in other animals confessedly of the same species, and of the same parentage. The difference between the fairest Caucasian and the sootiest African, is not nearly so great as that between the little, shaggy, Shetland pony, and the gigantic dray-horse of London; or between the soft and silky lap-dog, and the majestic St. Bernard. The differences we have already noted between the oxen, hogs, horses and goats that run wild in our forests, and the breeds from which they are known to have sprung, are far greater than we find between any two races of men on earth.

It is by means of the number, importance, and permanence of the resemblances between individuals; and, also, by the fact of their capability to unite and produce fertile progeny, that we are enabled to class them in the same species. This is the rule adopted as to all other departments of natural history, and hence the rule that should govern us here. Now, when we examine the various races of men we find that they agree among themselves and differ from all other animals in many marked characteristics. They resemble each other in the number, the length, the position, the growth, and the shedding of the teeth; in the shortness of the lower jaw, and the want of the intermaxillary bone; in the number of bones in the skeleton; in an erect stature; in the articulation of the head with the spinal column by the middle of its basis; in the possession of two hands, and they of the most exquisite mechanism; in a smooth skin, and the head covered with hair; in the number and arrangement of the muscles, the digestive and other organs; in the great development of the cerebral hemispheres, and the size of the brain compared with the nerves connected with it; in the organs of speech, and the power of singing and laughing; in being omnivorous and using cooked food, and therefore fire; in the capability of inhabiting all climates; in a long infancy, slow growth, and late puberty; in a peculiar structure of the physical constitution of the female, in the incurvation of the *sacrum* and *os coccygis*, and consequent forward direction of the organs connected with them; in the period of gestation; in the number of young at a birth; in the times and seasons of procreation; in liability to the same diseases, the same parasitical insects and worms; and above all, in the possession of mental, moral and religious faculties, which make them subjects of the government of God, and responsible to his law, as well as capable of organized society, and the various phenomena of civilization.

Now if these momentous resemblances and peculiarities do not classify the human races into one species, how can a case of species ever be made out? If all these essential resemblances, together with the capability of blending the different races and producing fertile varieties, do not prove unity of species, and, therefore, by the admitted rules of natural history, unity of origin, what conceivable facts could establish it?

But if the varieties of the human race were much more widely marked than we see them, there would be in this no insuperable objection to their original and specific unity. The same general reasons that require varieties to exist in organic life at all, demand a wider margin for them in man than in any other animal. His range of being is wider; his circumstances and necessities more varied and numerous; his destinies higher in the event of obedience, and lower in the event of disobedience, to the laws under which he is placed; his capabilities of self-culture are more expansive, that a stronger stimulus might be applied to his active powers, and hence, as a correlative fact, his liability to degeneracy, if that culture be neglected, is proportionally wide in its range; and his entire position as the responsible head of the creation demands a broader scope for change to the better, and hence by possibility to the worse, than any other animal on earth. We would therefore naturally expect a wider variation in all those characteristics that are affected by the outward circumstances in which he is placed. He inhabits every climate—from the frozen snows of the Arctics, where the reindeer perishes with cold, to the burning sands of Sahara, and the steaming jungles of the Carnatic. He subsists on every species of food—from the dripping blubber and train-oil of the Esquimaux, to the cooling fruits and simple cereals of the naked dweller in the tropics. He adopts every mode of life—from that of the lean and hungry hunter who scours the forest and plain for his daily food, or the wandering herdsman who tends his vast flocks by day and by night on the boundless Steppe and beneath the silent stars that looked down on the Chaldean shepherds, to the peaceful tiller of the soil, the moiling artisan of the shop, and the luxurious inmate of the princely mansion. He is subjected to the extremes of civilization and barbarism—influences the most potent, as facts before our eyes demonstrate, where a few families are left for a generation or two in ignorance, isolation and poverty; and influences which cannot to any very great extent be brought to bear on the lower tribes. If then we should find the varieties of the human races broader and more indelible than those of other animals, we would find nothing, in this fact, which the causes just alluded to would not have led us to anticipate.

But, great as these influences are, we are by no means certain that yet greater may not have existed in a former age of our world's history. That the climate of different portions of the earth's surface is not now what it once was, is rendered almost certain by some of the earth's geological records. And that this change of climate has taken place since the creation of man, is also a fact of the highest probability. Whatever was the extent of the Noachic deluge, the physical conditions that affect the human race must have been seriously modified by it. And if in these early ages of the history of the race, when it was in the yielding condition of its infancy, there was a quicker susceptibility in forming varieties, and a stronger tenacity in retaining them, than afterwards,—if the forming state of the race, like the clay in the potter's hand, had a capability of receiving and retaining impressions then, which it did not have at a later stage,—there is in this nothing at variance with what the soundest philosophy would sanction. And the same reasons that required a dispersion of men, and the confusion of their tongues at Babel, would also seem to require their separation by physical features as broad and indelible as the distinctions of language. If then there was even an extraordinary operation of Divine agencies tending to produce diversity of physical features, as the Bible assures us there was to produce diversity of languages; if these original diversities were propagated and made permanent, by isolation and restrictive intermarriage of the respective families thus separated; and if the general purposes of God, and destinies of the race, were to be advanced by nations separated in their features as well as their language, there is nothing unscriptural or unreasonable in the hypothesis that thus some of these widest diversities may have originated. Hence, if we should be unable to state historically the precise origin of all these varieties; if there should be no known causes operating at present to produce new races, more than to produce new languages; if existing causes should be clearly ascertained to be insufficient to account for the appearance of the different races of men so early as we find them noticed in history,—there would be nothing in this state of facts to shake the doctrine of the original unity of these races. If we must assert an interposition of Divine power, as our opponents contend, the rules of hypothesis require us not to assume a higher cause or interposition if a lower is sufficient to explain the effect. Now, if instead of admitting, as they assert, a creative interposition of God, calling these varieties into existence from nonentity, we simply assert a directive interposition, causing different families already in existence to assume certain peculiarities which should be permanent, our hypothesis, presenting

a lower, yet a sufficient cause, is obviously the more philosophical and reasonable. Hence, were it clearly proven, (which it has not been,) that existing causes, or natural causes once acting more powerfully than they do at present, could not explain these effects, then, on the supposition that our race is a fallen one, and that great problems of ontology are slowly evolving in its various families; and that, like the river that went out from Eden, this mighty stream of life, though originally one, has been separated into great heads, each of which has itself become a broad river, and gone forth to compass the earth,—the position that this separation and division, like that of Babel, was caused by specific Divine interpositions no longer needed and no longer exerted, is, of the two demanded, the more reasonable, philosophical, and Scriptural.

But whilst we believe this hypothesis to be a legitimate one in the discussion, should existing causes be demonstrated inadequate to account for the varieties, we need not take any special advantage of it. It has not been demonstrated that these causes are insufficient, but on the contrary many facts exist which tend to prove the opposite position. The law of variations, which we saw existing in the lower tribes, is found to exist in the human constitution, as clearly as in the other departments of animal life. Permanent causes are in constant operation, and accidental peculiarities arise, from both of which sources varieties appear whose characters are deep and permanent.

It is impossible for us, in the present state of our physiological knowledge, to explain the precise mode in which changes are produced in the physical constitution, by a change of geographical location. But the fact is, that there is in the constitution of man a tendency, such as we saw in that of the lower tribes, to put on certain changes of colour, hair, form, etc., when removed from one climate and locality to another, or when subjected to any great change of social habits. Whether the external condition of these changes be the chemical solar rays; the altitude or depression of the general level; the difference of geological formations; the varying agencies of magnetism and electricity; atmospheric peculiarities; miasmatic exhalations from vegetable or mineral matter; difference of soils; proximity to the ocean; variety of food, habits of life and exposure—all of which perhaps at times come in play—or other causes yet more occult,—there can be no question about the fact that such causes are at work. The general fact is, that when the other physical conditions are the same, tribes living nearest the equator are marked with the darkest skin, and the crispest hair. Thus, we make a gradual ascent from the jetty negro of the line to the olive-coloured Arab,

the brown Moor, the swarthy Italian, the dusky Spaniard, the dark-skinned Frenchman, the ruddy Englishman, and the pallid Scandinavian. When we reach the Arctic regions we find a dark tint re-appearing, owing probably to the intensity of the summer's sun, the exposure of the natives, and the blackening effect of the winter's smoke in their dim and greasy burrows. When the white races are transferred to a tropical climate, there is a gradual darkening of the complexion and crisping of the hair. There is not so immediate and perceptible a change in the removal of the dark races to a cooler climate, because this deposition of a colouring pigment in the *rete mucosum* is a positive peculiarity; and the law of varieties, as we have ascertained it, is, that these peculiarities once produced become tenacious and permanent, even though the original conditions of their production should be changed. The white races are more immediately affected because their colour is a negative peculiarity, and hence more readily affected by the action of positive agencies. Dough may readily be changed into bread by subjecting it to heat, but bread cannot so readily be changed into dough by reversing the process,—yet no man would from this fact affirm that a lump of dough and a loaf of bread may not have had the same origin. But even on these races a bleaching effect is seen after the lapse of a considerable time. The negroes of this country, where the race has been unmixed, are undoubtedly lighter in colour than their kinsmen in Africa. And the Gipsies, in spite of their exposure and nomade habits, have gradually assumed a lighter tint in the cooler parts of Europe. So in the opposite direction Bishop Heber declares that three centuries of residence in India have made the Portuguese nearly as black as the Caffres.

These agencies we find acting independently of any relations of race. Races that are known historically to have the same origin, by exposure to these influences have assumed every shade of colour, and the other peculiarities that are supposed to indicate a distinct origin in the different varieties. The children of Abraham are found of every hue, from the ruddy tints of the Polish and German, through the dusky hue of the Moorish and Syrian, to the jetty melanism of the black Jews of India. The American nations vary—from the fair tribes of the upper Orinoco, mentioned by Humboldt, to the chocolate-coloured Charruas, and the black races of California, mentioned by Dr. Morton. The great Arian race includes the Affghan, Kurd, Armenian, and Indo-European of the fairest complexion, and the Hindoo, whose skin rivals in jettiness that of the negro. And the Hindoos themselves present every variety of complexion—from the fair-skinned Rajpoot, whose cheek is fanned by the cool breezes of

the Himmalayas, to the swart coolies, and the coal-black fishermen, who swarm on the burning banks of the Hoogly. The Chinese Mongolians—compared among themselves, and also with the same race in adjacent countries—present the same results. The African races display the same varieties—from the red Fulahs and the yellow Bushmen, to the genuine negro of Guinea, and the broad-faced Hot-tentot of the southern plains. Many of the Caffres are stated by Professor Lichtenstein to be as light-coloured as the Portuguese. The Gallas, a large and powerful race that inhabits north-eastern Africa, and the Häusan people of Central Soudan, have physical features resembling those of the negroes, whilst their language and history indicate a Shemitish origin. A tribe also of the Berber Tuaryk—that have long been isolated in the oasis Wadreag, an island of green, in the great African desert—have not only assumed the black hue which we find in many Arabs, but even the features and hair of the negro race. This has resulted, as the history of the tribe proves, not from any intermixture of races,—a result against which their haughty pride of blood were a sufficient guarantee,—but from the physical causes that glow and sweep over those oceans of burning sand. A similar fact is mentioned by Mr. Buckingham in regard to an Arab family of the Häuran, all of whom, except the father, had negro features and hair, although it was matter of proof that no negro blood had ever mingled with that of the family. Mr. B. referred it to that tropical sultriness that broods over the valley of the Jordan, giving the tribes of that region flatter features, darker skins, and coarser hair, than others of the same family.

If we are asked what it is in the climate that produces these peculiarities, we cannot tell, any more than we can tell what it is in the climate of Africa that has made the hog black, stripped the sheep of its wool and clothed it with black hair, caused the hog and dog to lose their hair and have nothing but a black, oily skin, and made the feathers and bones of a variety of the gallinaceous fowl to become black, whilst its skin and wattles are purple. We know too little of the mysterious chemistry of the great laboratory of Nature to say how these changes are wrought; but the facts—that they are going on in the lower tribes before our eyes, and that they have occurred and are now occurring in tribes that are known to have the same origin—prove that the existence of such diversities, where we are ignorant of their rise, cannot prove a diversity of origin in the races where they appear.

But aside from these general causes, which act uniformly and universally, there are particular agencies at work, whose action produces varieties of the most permanent kind. Prichard suggests that

the races of men as to their physical characteristics, fall into three general types, found respectively in the savage and hunting tribes, the nomadic and pastoral races, and the nations that are subjected to the influences of civilization. The first have a form of skull called prognathous, indicated by a forward prolongation of the jaws, and other features; the second, a pyramidal form of skull with a broad face; and the third, an oval or elliptical skull. When a race passes from the one mode of life to the other, there is a corresponding change in its physical features. Thus the Turks, since their encampment on the Bosphorus, have exchanged the Tartar peculiarities for those of the Europeans; and the negroes, during their residence in this country, have undergone a decided change of skull and physical conformation.

Other races are arising from intermixtures of existing ones. The Griquas in Southern Africa have arisen from a union of the Dutch boors of the Cape with the aboriginal Hottentots, and are now a clearly-marked and permanent variety. The Cafusos in Brazil have sprung from a mixture of the native Indian race with the negroes. These varieties, though of such recent origin, have all the tenacity of other and older races. Even accidental features and malformations may be long transmitted in particular cases. A peculiar nose, mouth, or chin, will often pass through several generations of a family. A striking illustration of this is presented in the celebrated porcupine family of England, the members of which, for several generations, had their bodies covered with bony excrescences, like the quills of a porcupine, which were yearly shed, and yearly renewed. Although they intermarried with those who had no such peculiarity, yet so tenacious is Nature of a property which has once appeared, that this singular kind of cuticle did not disappear for several generations. Mr. Poinsett also testifies to the existence of a spotted race of men in Mexico, a whole regiment of whom he saw, that is known to have arisen from a mixture of Spanish and Indian blood. Albinism is a further illustration of this law. It occurs in man, and the lower animals, without any known cause, and in the healthiest individuals. Its phenomena in the lower animals prove that it is not to be regarded as among the morbid manifestations of the physical system, but a mere accidental variety. An Albino rabbit, commonly called the English rabbit, has spread all over this country, without any variation or tendency to disease. White mice, rats, racoons, and ferrets, are also in existence. In the human races, Albinoes appear who are prolific and healthy to an extent which proves, that if they were isolated and mated together, there would be an Albino race of men, as we have of rabbits and other animals.

Had any of these accidental peculiarities been isolated, we would have had races of men differing from the rest more widely than any we now see, which would yet not have warranted an inference that they had an independent creation. If then these greater differences would not have warranted the inference that the diverse races were of diverse origins, it is hard to see how smaller differences can demand a conclusion which would not have been warranted by the greater.

But when we examine these diversities more closely, we find the argument drawn from them against the unity of the race to be hopelessly encumbered. If they prove anything in regard to the origin of the races, they prove too much, for they would prove fifty races as readily as five. There is no one feature that can be fixed upon as a test of species. Colour, hair, form of skull, etc., all exist in their widest variety among those who are known to belong to the same race, and run into each other by shades so gradual that it is impossible to draw any clear line of demarcation. Hence scarcely any two great writers on this subject have been able to agree as to the number of races—some making but three; some five; whilst some make twelve or fifteen. Hence no dividing line can be drawn. But if such a line could be drawn clearly, it would carry confusion, as to the doctrine of species, into every department of natural history. There are as wide and permanent varieties of cows, hogs, dogs, etc., known to have sprung from the same origin, as we find in the human races; and if, for these reasons, we insist on different species of men, we must, also, on different species of these animals. This, however, would bring utter and hopeless confusion into every department of natural history, and disregard those clear and impassable marks, which nature has placed, to distinguish one species from another. As a question then of mere natural history, the unity of the human race is clearly the doctrine of science. Unity of species infers unity of origin, by consent of nearly all great naturalists. Unity of species is indicated by the power of mutual and permanent reproduction, and is perfectly consistent with wide and tenacious varieties. As therefore the human races have this power of mutual and permanent reproduction, and as their varieties are neither as many nor as great as we find in the lower tribes of the same species, nor as we see accidentally appearing as sporadic cases in different races of men, we are at liberty to infer their original unity of species and hence their original unity of origin.

The only other objections presenting any difficulty are those drawn from the distribution of the races, and their isolation in countries and islands that are separated by wide and formidable barriers.

Our limits will not allow us to go at length into this branch of the subject; nor is it necessary, for, after all, it is only an *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. That we are unable to state with historical precision how America and the Polynesian Islands were peopled, is the natural result of the remoteness of the period when the migrations occurred; and what is known cannot be set aside by unanswered queries about what is unknown. The utmost that can be demanded of us is, to suggest a possible mode by which these migrations might have occurred; and if there be any such possibility, the objection falls, for it assumes an impossibility as the only ground on which it can rest.

That there may have been a connection by land across Bhering's Straits, in former times, is a fact that the geological indications of the region, and changes now going on, render, at least, not at all improbable. But even if this were not the case, the drifting of Japanese and Polynesian canoes, with their bewildered mariners, to lands many hundred miles—in one instance, fifteen hundred—from their starting-place, suggests the mode in which the Pacific islands, and then the American continent, may have been peopled. And when to this we add, that the traces of a higher civilization in ancient times, which are found in Central America, indicate the probability of superior skill and facilities in navigation among these early nations, the likelihood of such a migration, either by accident or design, becomes yet more probable. That there were nomade rovers of the sea—who passed from island to island, with their wives and domestic animals, just as the wandering races of the desert pass from oasis to oasis, and from pasturage to pasturage, on land—is a fact by no means improbable. And that some of these Bedouins of the ocean may have been driven to distant shores by the great westwardly currents of the Pacific, is a supposition which the facts already alluded to render highly probable. If it be said that all this is only an appeal to our ignorance, we answer, that so is the objection to which we reply, and the one appeal is surely as fair as the other. The objection demands an impossibility which these suppositions show does not exist in the case, and hence as an argument against our position it must fall.

These conjectures are greatly strengthened by the fact, that all tradition and history point to Central Asia as the cradle of the human race. There we find what is confessedly the most perfect type of physical feature and development, whether we term it the Caucasian, the Circassian, or the Iranian race; and as we trace the natural channels of population, we find, except where civilization has interposed, a steady deterioration until we find the physiological

extremes almost to coincide with the geographical, in the Negro of Africa, the Australian of Polynesia, and the Esquimaux of America. Another fact that bears irresistibly in the same direction is, that this same spot is the native country of nearly all of the animals, grains, vegetables, and fruits, that have accompanied man in all his wanderings. It is the native country of rice, wheat, maize, the vine, and nearly all of the products of the earth that man has used for his food. There also we find in their wild state, the ass, goat, sheep, cow, horse, dog, hog, cat, camel, etc., the companions and servants of men the earth over. And as we trace these animals in their dispersions, we find them assuming the same variations of form and appearance that we find in the human races, nearly in exact proportion to the nearness of their association and companionship with man. There are the same Asiatic pointings in the affinities and resemblances of language. The science of comparative glottology is yet in its infancy, but sufficient advance has been made to show the most remarkable relations; and as the evidence is positive, it is reliable as far as it goes, to render it probable that all existing languages have had, to some extent, a common origin. But for the elucidation of this point we must refer to the excellent work of Mr. Johnes, and others, in which it is discussed at length. Inasmuch, then, as the dispersion of the families of the earth from a single spot, is neither impossible nor improbable; as tradition points to a locality in Asia as that spot; as we find in that locality what seem to be the primitive types of man, and the animals and vegetables he has domesticated,—we submit that there is nothing in the present distribution or isolation of the races, to set aside the evidence of natural history already given, that these races belong to the same species and have had the same origin.

But the most signal indication that could perhaps be given of the strength of the argument we have thus been developing, is, the recent position of Professor Agassiz, as detailed in the essays at the head of this article. Perceiving the unanswerable mass of evidence in favour of the specific identity of the races of men, he takes a new position, and whilst admitting an unity of species, he asserts a diversity of origin. He endeavours to establish in his first article the preliminary position; that there are certain definite zoological provinces, the fauna and flora in each of which must have been created in the province itself, and not distributed thither by migration from a central point. He then maintains that each province has its own race of men, which could not have come from a single pair, but must have been created each in the province where we find it. These positions he thinks fully consistent with the Bible, which

only gives the origin and history of the white race, and alludes to none other.

Now, this is really an abandonment of the whole ground in dispute, as a question of science. The uniform doctrine of natural history is, that unity of species implies unity of origin, because permanent reproduction is the mark and test of species. If then this law is to be abandoned as to the human races, it is a tacit confession, that by the ordinary principles of natural history the original unity of the human races is settled; and that to unsettle it, new principles of science must be asserted. This is a most triumphant concession to the impregnable strength of the scientific grounds on which our doctrine rests. But we apprehend that the new position will be found as untenable as the old one; and if so, we hope that the question will then be allowed to rest as a *res adjudicata* in science. Let us then briefly examine the learned Professor's new hypothesis.

His views when analyzed resolve themselves into the following positions, namely: (1.) That animals are geographically distributed in distinct and separate zoological provinces; (2.) That they are so isolated in these provinces as to make it impossible that they could have come forth from a common centre; (3.) That they must therefore have been separately created in these provinces; (4.) That man is found distributed in the same provinces; (5.) That therefore, like the fauna and flora of these provinces, each race must have been created in the locality it occupies, and could not possibly have been distributed from a common centre, or originated from a single pair. The weakness of his general position may be perceived, when it is thus drawn out in logical method; and it will be seen at a glance that the conclusion rests on a chain of assumptions, any one of which being disproved, the chain is broken, and the conclusion falls to the ground. Let us then test the strength of these successive links, and see whether his theories rest on facts, or his facts warrant his conclusions.

It might seem presumptuous in us to challenge such high authority as that of Agassiz, who is confessedly the Neptune of modern zoology: but we may venture to suggest that the presumption is in the other direction—that even Neptune himself could not be allowed to sway his trident over the domains of other authorities; and that a man may be a peerless ichthyologist who is neither a profound logician nor a safe interpreter; and as he has discarded all authority in taking his position, he will be the last to demand a submission to his own mere authority, however great it may be. We shall therefore freely canvass his views, whilst, at the same time, we cheerfully

recognise his eminence as a naturalist, and the manly reverence with which he speaks of the Bible, and what he deems to be its teachings.

His preliminary position is, that animals are geographically distributed in separate provinces, in which the same species appears in different provinces and in different parts of the same province, at intervals that preclude the hypothesis of a common origin, and demand that of a separate creation. There is nothing in this position that necessarily infringes on any Bible truth or assertion, and our sole objection to it is, that there is no sufficient difficulty that demands it as a hypothesis, and no sufficient evidence that sustains it as a fact. The simple question to which it is at last resolved, is, whether the geographical distribution of animals may be accounted for by natural agencies dispersing them from a common centre, or whether a miracle must be assumed to account for it; and if so, whether the only miracle that meets the case, is that of a separate creation of the inhabitants of each separate province.

We are not prepared to deny that there are great zoological centres, each having its surrounding province whose fauna and flora are peculiar, but the sense in which this is true does not avail the new theory, and the sense in which it asserts these provinces is one in which they do not exist. The sense in which this is true, is, that there are different regions of the earth whose species are distinct and peculiar, or whose varieties are so marked as to indicate the action of local and provincial agencies. In this sense however it is of no avail to support the position that unity of species may consist with diversity of origin, for the species are diverse, and the varieties indicative of local action alone, and not separate creation. The sense in which the theory asserts such provinces, is that in which the species are the same; but so far as they are the same, the provinces are the same, and not different. And if the few facts on which the theory rests were multiplied to such an extent as to make all the species of all the provinces the same, it is plain that there would be no distinct provinces at all, and the theory must perish by the very completeness of its success. Its entire force then depends on the confounding of these two facts, which are totally distinct. Had exactly the same species been found in all the provinces there would have been no provinces, except in regard to the topographical lines of separation; and had the species of all the provinces been different, it would not have availed in this argument, where the species of the races is conceded to be the same. Let us then examine whether there are these broad and clear lines of topographical separation. It is obvious that no such lines exist,

from the fact that no two naturalists have been able to agree in their identification. The provinces overlap and interpenetrate one another to such an extent as to show that the cause is to be sought, not in the creation of separate races, but in the action of local and physical causes on races already created.

The same species we grant occurs in very different localities; but in almost every case, in such localities alone as could be reached by ordinary migration. Thus we know that the domestic animals have been spread. When America was discovered none of them were found here but the dog, whose use for draught in the Polar regions suggests the reason and mode of his introduction in that direction. The lion, tiger, elephant, etc., are found in Asia and Africa, but not in America, Australia or Polynesia, in the same climates, because they are separated from these regions by barriers impassable to them, and man has no motive to introduce them by artificial means. The vermin that accompany man, as his scavengers—such as rats, mice, cockroaches, flies, fleas, etc.—are never found in newly-discovered islands until after they have been visited by ships; showing the mode of their introduction. Certain provinces are found equally or more favourable to certain animals than those in which man first discovered them: if then each species was created in the locality it occupies, why were not these localities peopled with them? Why was not the camel created in Northern Africa, the reindeer in Iceland, the horse in Flanders, and the hog in Berkshire, where they are found so admirably to thrive; and where we know that they have been artificially introduced? These questions are unanswerable on this theory.

But facts show that animals are distributed precisely in the way which is denied by this theory. Dr. Bachman gives some curious and forcible illustrations of this point. The opossum occurs in the warmer parts of North America, west of the Hudson, but in no case east of it, for it is unable to swim, and dreads the cold too much to pass round the head waters of this stream, or cross it on the ice. The gofer is found on the southern bank of the Savannah, but not on the northern, with precisely the same soil and food, because it cannot swim. The soft-shelled turtle is found in all the streams and lakes connected with the Mississippi, even to the Mohawk and Hudson, but in none south of these until we reach the Savannah, because it travels only by water, and the streams on that part of the Atlantic slope do not connect with the northern or western waters. No eels were found in Lake Erie until the opening of the Erie Canal, which gave them an inlet; they are now plenty. The red fox, which is an arctic animal, was only found as low as Pennsylvania forty

years ago, then it appeared in Virginia, then in the Carolinas, and now it is more common than the gray fox. The latter, which is a southern animal, has, in like manner, migrated north until it has reached Canada. These facts show conclusively that such migrations are going on, and suggest the most easy and natural means to account for the geographical distribution of animals. The same process is going on in regard to vegetables and plants, for whose distribution, as they have not the power of voluntary locomotion, Nature has furnished the most elaborate provision. Some seeds are furnished with wings to be carried by the wind; others with hooks to fasten upon the passing animal and thus be transported; others are carried by water thousands of miles, as tropical productions have been stranded by the Gulf Stream on the shores of Iceland; whilst others are carried in the stomachs of birds and beasts many leagues from their native locality. No sooner does the coral reef become capable of sustaining vegetable life than it is supplied by some of these seed-carriers of nature. Facts on this point exist by the hundred. What conceivable need then exists for the hypothesis of a new creation, when we see the same species repeated in new localities!

The only difficulty that remains is, the occurrence of arctic plants and animals in the Alpine regions, cut off from their natural kindred. But it curiously happens that in the same review that contains the essay we are answering, there is a complete solution to this difficulty, unconsciously suggested by Professor Agassiz himself, when speaking on a different subject. In his scientific tour to Lake Superior he gave a very ingenious, and, as far as we can see, a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of boulders, by referring them to a glacial origin. Now, where is the difficulty of giving the same account of the existence of these Alpine fauna and flora? As the glacial sea receded to the pole, the arctic animals and plants that co-existed with it, would naturally remain on these Alpine heights, which were congenial to them, since they would have no inducements to change their locality. Hence where this recession of the ice-line left them isolated on these arctic islands, they would of course remain and propagate just as their kindred which receded with the glaciers to the pole. Hence, there is nothing in this requiring a new creation of lynxes, marmots, and chamois, in the regions where they are now found.

Hence if we concede the existence of clearly-marked zoological provinces, as contended for by Professor Agassiz, the facts that they run into one another by insensible gradations, that migrations are going on from one region to another, that arrangements for this

mode of distribution are now in operation, suggest the likelihood that the same arrangements existed in former times, and actually effected the distribution which we find. The very same principle that requires us to suppose that the geological distribution of rocks was made by natural causes such as we now see in operation, demands that we should hold the same supposition in regard to the zoological distribution of animals. But even if it were demonstrated that these causes, in any conceivable mode of their operation, are insufficient to account for the effects, it will not follow that a separate creation in each locality is demanded as the only alternative. Some extraordinary agency must be supposed; but is this the only one? If a miracle must be assumed, may it not as readily have been in the distribution of these races to their present localities, as in their creation within them? Does not universal observation show that direct creation is usually the last expedient resorted to, in the attainment of any end? Now what is there to demand it as the only alternative here? We submit then that there is nothing in the distribution of animals requiring a miracle at all; and that if any such unusual interposition of Divine power was needed, it is much more likely to have been in the distribution of races already created, than in their separate and distinct creation.

But suppose these three links of the chain mended, the fourth breaks with the weight that is hung upon it. Grant that there are distinct zoological provinces; that they are so isolated from each other that their fauna and flora could not have come forth from a common centre; and that a separate creation in each province is the only mode of overcoming the difficulty,—we find that the races of men are not co-extensive and identical with these alleged zoological provinces.

One would think, from the confidence with which the learned Professor asserts the identity in the two cases, that not only the zoological provinces were clearly made out, but the limits of the races also plainly and universally ascertained. But there is no point in natural history more undetermined than this. Some make but three races, others five, others eleven, others still more; but the most remarkable fact is, that Professor Agassiz does not positively determine this point *himself*. He enumerates about a dozen zoological provinces, but not more than half that number of races. Why this significant silence? If his theory is really true, why did he not tell us what the races are, that inhabit these provinces? We shall perhaps see the reason as we examine the relations of the two distributions. This examination our limits will only allow us to make in one or two of these provinces which he has mapped out.

His first province is the arctic, with the Samoyedes, the Laplanders, and the Esquimaux. But can any one suppose that an animal so helpless as man, so destitute of natural covering, protection, and food, could originate in the bleak and inhospitable regions of the pole, where he could obtain neither clothing, fire, nor food? If we suppose him to have originated in a warmer region, and migrated thither, with his acquired knowledge and habits, these difficulties vanish; but if we suppose him created, a naked, shivering Troglo-dyte, amidst the eternal snows, we must pile miracle on miracle to account for his continued existence. But even if this difficulty were overcome, the Esquimaux of America are as widely separate from the arctic races of Asia, in distance, difficulty of communication, and physical features, as the latter are from the adjacent tribes of the Mongolians, or the former from the northern tribes of Indians. Why not make an Asian arctic, and an American arctic, on the same grounds that a distinction is drawn between the southern arctic and the northern Mongolian? There is absolutely no ground in the one case that does not exist as broadly in the other. The Malay race he assigns to a natural zoological province; but what it is, he does not inform us. It cannot be limited to his tropical Asiatic province, for it extends through Polynesia to western America, by the testimony of the most accurate observers, even those who deny the original unity of the races. The same difficulty exists in the provinces of New-Holland and Africa. The Tasmanian and Alforian races of the New-Holland province differ far more widely than the Malay and the Mongolian; and we have shown that Africa presents the widest extremes of variety, with every intermediate shade, from the fair races of Abyssinia to the genuine Dahomey negro. But when we come to the American provinces, the theory breaks utterly and hopelessly down. He makes four such provinces: one east, and one west of the Rocky Mountains; one in tropical America, and one in temperate South America. But where are the four races corresponding to them? Do not all recognise the same physical type in all our aboriginal tribes? Has even Professor Agassiz dissented from this? How then can the facts be cut up to fit the theory? But if we had the four races that have been created on this continent, what will we do with the Patagonians? The same questions might be asked in regard to the Papuan, Feejee, and other races, which though clearly and strongly marked cannot be referred to any distinct or definite zoological provinces.

It is abundantly evident from this brief enumeration of facts that there is no such coincidence in the geographical distribution of the races and that of the plants and animals, such as is asserted by this

theory. But suppose all these difficulties removed, and yet the last step could not legitimately be taken. If the races and zoological provinces were identical, that fact clearly could not prove that each race was created in its province. All that it could prove would be, that the human races, and the fauna and flora of each province, were subjected to the same or similar influences, giving them this identity of limitation. What these influences were, would not be determined by this coincidence of boundary, and would therefore remain matter for further investigation. Whether they were natural or supernatural would not be determined by such identity of circumscription. And if we must assume a supernatural agency, it by no means follows, that creation is the only one. The Divine power might as readily have been exerted in causing these peculiarities, or in distributing these races, as in their direct creation; and if we must assert its interposition to account for the varieties, we have at least the same right to affirm the smaller and more ordinary exercise of it, that he has to affirm the greater and more extraordinary.

The fact on which he lays so much stress, that climatic conditions are not exactly coincident with the various races, will prove that climatic conditions are not the only agencies at work in producing these varieties; and nothing more. What these other agencies are, and whether distinct creation is the only conceivable one, is wholly undetermined by this fact. His remark, that the adaptations of man to his various localities must have been intentional, is true; but it does not follow from this, that separate creation of each race was the only way in which this intention could be carried into effect. We grant that these adaptations were intentional, and simply affirm that they were brought about by an original susceptibility to such adaptations impressed by God on man's physical constitution; and that the same reasons for its existence at first require its existence now, and undoubted facts prove that it actually does exist. Designing man to be a cosmopolite, and to subdue the earth, he impressed him with this susceptibility, and the result is, the varieties we find in the races of the world. So far then is this designed adaptation of man to the various localities in which he is found, from proving that the varieties were separately created, it is the very fact that makes this supposition unnecessary.

We thus find this chain of assumptions to break at every link. Whilst there are zoological provinces, they are not such as to forbid their occupancy by natural and existing causes; or if supernatural agency were required it is not necessitated to be in the form of creation; and if these points were reached, they would not avail us,

for the races of men are not identical with these provinces; and if they were, this identity would be explicable by that adaptive susceptibility of the human constitution to conform itself to the varying conditions in which it is placed, with which man, as the destined conqueror of the earth has been furnished; and if some direct and unusual interposition of Divine power must be supposed, it was much more likely to be in producing these varieties from a race already existing than in calling new ones into existence. Hence in every part of this new theory we find it more completely untenable than the old one.

We have neither the space nor the heart to follow the Professor into all his random utterances. It were cruel to take advantage of all the exposed points he presents to an opponent. Thus, in tossing aside the philological argument, he says, that it is as natural for men to talk, as it is for dogs to bark, or asses to bray, and that one bird does not learn its song from another; and hence we could not from the phenomena of language infer unity of origin. Now, if one bird does not learn its song from another, does this prove that one human being does not learn its language from another? And aside from the fact that it is not natural for dogs to bark, as they never do it in their wild state, is there no difference between an inarticulate cry, and the use of a set of conventional sounds to designate certain thoughts? Does not the one imply previous arrangement and agreement, where the sounds are the same, whilst the other does not? If we argued man's original unity from his instinctive cries, it were pertinent to refer us to the instinctive cries of animals; but when, from the fact that the same or similar collocations of syllabic sounds are applied by different races to the same natural objects, we argue that there must have been a previous agreement that these sounds should designate these objects, the reference to the braying of asses, etc., looks really like trifling.

But his exegesis is as curious as his logic. He asserts triumphantly, that the Bible is solely an account of the white race, and makes no reference at all to the other, and, as he terms them, the non-historical races. We would be glad to know how he has discovered that Adam and Noah belonged to the white race at all. The best critics have been unable to discover any evidence for it from Scripture; and scientific grounds, we are disposed to think, indicate the primitive type as intermediate between the white and the black. But, however this may be, the assertion that the Bible sanctions the original plurality of the races is amazing. Is it not expressly affirmed, that before the creation of Adam there was not a man to till the ground? That when he was created, man (the

generic term always used to denote the whole human race) was created? That he was the head of the human race—the one by whom sin and death entered the world? If then the non-historical races sin and die, have they not these proofs of their connexion with Adam? Is not Eve called the mother of *all* living? And did Moses know of no other living races but the white one? Does he not expressly declare (Deut. xxxii, 8,) that the divided nations of the earth are the sons of Adam? Does he not refer the Ethiopian and Egyptian races to Noah through his sons Cush and Mizraim? Is not the physical characteristic of the Cushite unequivocally intimated when it is said that he cannot change his skin? Did not Christ expressly endorse this when he taught monogamy from the original unity of the race in Adam and Eve; and when, to fulfil the prophecies respecting Ethiopia, China, (Sinim,) and the islands of the Sea, he commanded his disciples to go and preach the Gospel to every creature? And can words declare it, if Paul's did not, when, in opposition to the Athenian doctrine of a separate, autochthonal creation for Attica, he declares that God has made of *one blood* all nations of men to dwell on the face of the whole earth? Is not the entire Bible-teaching about sin, the moral government of God, the fall of man, and redemption in Christ, based on this assumption? If we exclude the non-historic races from all connexion with Adam, must we not, by the express language of Paul, ("as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive,") also exclude them from all connexion with Christ? And if on the contrary they are expressly affirmed to be connected with Christ, does not this also affirm their connection with Adam? Must not a cause that requires such exegesis as this be pressed for support?

That Professor Agassiz was aware how wide and deep was the sweep of his views, is apparent from his fling at mock philanthropy; his assertion of the original and necessary inferiority of the African race; his avowed inability to decide what is the best education that can be given them; and his magisterial denunciation of the injudiciousness of the attempt to force the peculiarities of our present white civilization on all the nations of the world. The plain meaning of all this is, that the benevolent and missionary operations of the Church, in their application to any other than the white race, are foolish and futile attempts to traverse the immutable ordinations of the Creator.

We cannot trust ourselves to speak of sentiments like these as perhaps they really deserve. There is something in this cold-blooded and haughty assignment of more than half the human race to a doom of hopeless, irreversible degradation, for time and eter-

nity, and this by the very act and arrangement of their original creation, from which the Christian heart recoils with indignation and disgust. We thank God that the nations sitting in darkness are not left to the tender mercies of human philosophy, and that its endorsement is not needed to warrant us to go forth into *all the world* and preach the gospel to every creature.

And we know of no more unanswerable argument for the absolute unity of the race than that furnished by the very phenomena that call for and warrant the efforts so sneeringly decried by the learned Professor! Alas! the same sad proofs of brotherhood in sin and sorrow, of common parentage and common fall, of depravity transmitted by universal and hereditary taint, meet us in every race. The same wail of remorseful sorrow comes up in mysterious plaint from all; the same mournful memories of primeval purity now soiled and dishonoured; the same gleaming visions of an Eden innocence that has faded away, leaving only these mute longings after its unforgotten brightness; the same dire and terrific phantoms of guilt that come forth to awe and affright; the same deep yearnings after the unseen and the eternal in the soul's deepest stirrings; and the same sublime hopes that shoot upward to the "high and terrible crystal,"—are found alike in every race of every hue. The unspeakable gift of Christ and him crucified, is as wide in its efficacy as these mournful symptoms of malady. The lofty intellects of a Pascal and a Newton, do not grasp it with a keener relish and a deeper sympathy than the besotted Caffre in the lonely wilds of Africa, or the crouching Pariah in the steaming jungles of India. The Cross is that wondrous talisman that calls forth from every adventitious guise the universal manhood and brotherhood of the races. And when the lowliest African is "born again," in that heavenly birth that links into a new and holier unity the fallen descendants of the first Adam, he is found to exult with as pure a gladness as the honoured heir of the proudest and noblest blood. O! it is this blessed fact that stands in lofty and indignant rebuke of that cold and cruel philosophy that would wrest from the humble and the oppressed the only boon that is beyond the grasp of an unfeeling avarice. It is for this reason that we contend so earnestly against this vamping up of the old infidel theories of Voltaire. It is because we believe that its general reception will not only undermine the authority of the Bible, but also cut the sinews of the noblest charities and the purest pieties of our age; sink the unfortunate and degraded into a deeper and more hopeless degradation; give a plausible plea to cruelty and avarice to rivet tighter the fetters of oppression; and fling a pall of despairing gloom over the brightest

visions of the future, unfolded on the canvass of prophecy: it is for these reasons that we oppose this theory with such earnestness and warmth.

But having shown, as we think unanswerably, that the old and admitted principles of natural history require us to regard the varieties of the human race as belonging to the same species, and having shown that the last and most ingenious evasion of this argument is an utter failure, we may sit down content with what the word of God has clearly asserted, and the vast majority of the first naturalists of the world have believed—that men were not the offspring of diverse origins, but that God has made of *one blood* all nations of men to dwell on the face of the whole earth.

ART. II.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS IN THE INTRODUCTION TO JOHN'S GOSPEL, CHAP. I, 1-18.

[FIRST PAPER.]

WE have read, with much satisfaction, the investigation of this interesting but difficult passage, by Professor Stuart, in the January and April numbers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1850. We had, some time before, formed our own opinion of the interpretation to be assigned these verses, by a careful study of their scope as well as phraseology; and are gratified to find so many of the results of our inquiries confirmed by the views of so eminent an expositor and critic. How far we are following in his wake, and where we deviate from it or pursue a cross track, those who may feel interested to know, can best ascertain by a collation of the dissertations above referred to with our own lucubrations, exhibited in a simple and independent manner. These we now commit to our readers, not with the presumptuous thought of arraying ourselves against a veteran scholar of so vastly superior erudition; but with the humbler aim, partly of propagating and partly of reviewing some of the conclusions to which he has arrived.

We may premise that we can see no good reason for supposing that John borrows the term *Λόγος* in this peculiar application, either from the nomenclature of oriental Gnosticism or the dialectics of Alexandrian Platonism. The writings of Philo he can scarcely have ever read, or if he had, he would have more distinctly referred to them; and the Gnostic heresy was not yet sufficiently developed to

call forth a direct confutation, nor were its speculations much more within the range of the Evangelist's reading. Neither can we think that he adopts the Rabbinical usage of the phrase, "Word of Jehovah:" for this class of literature has little more to do with the New Testament than the two former; and the impersonation of the Divine attribute of wisdom in the Proverbs, and other passages of the Old Testament and Apocrypha, is totally diverse from this setting forth of a real distinctive Being. Yet the general impress of all these appropriations of this term, indistinctly and remotely operating upon the mingled tenets and dialect of Ephesus, may have unconsciously inclined the Evangelist to its employment, and especially would assist his readers in apprehending its meaning, as an epithet already familiar to them in similar theosophical uses. The primordial distinctions of semi-divine emanations, in particular, had long been current in the east, and were in fact the germ from which Gnosticism soon became evolved as a system. These incipient dogmas could hardly have failed of circulation to some dangerous extent in Asia Minor, at the time of John's writing the Gospel, and the polemical aspect of several passages in it—indeed, of this very introduction, to say nothing of the Apocalypse*—seems to corroborate the statement, made apparently from tradition by Irenæus, that he wrote it with a special view of neutralizing the errors of Cerinthus. These considerations may aid us in the interpretation of this term, as showing the sense in which John would have expected his readers to understand him; but the truer mode of determining the import which *he* wished to convey, is, after all, to fix the exact shade of signification of the *term* itself, under the relations imposed by the circumstances and context. This is peculiarly necessary in treating the phraseology of so *subjective* a writer as John, who speaks so constantly from the deep-toned suggestions of his own vividly spiritual mind, that the chief difficulty in appreciating his pointed, sententious language lies in placing one's self distinctly in his own commanding point of view. The legitimate signification of the word, in itself considered, moreover, must have been the actual basis of all these secondary applications; and therefore, at this distance of time, and removal of

* Rev. ii, 6, 15. Compare 1 John ii, 22; iv, 3; 2 John 7. The Apocalypse is probably the first in point of time, and the Gospel the last, of John's writings. Davidson's conclusion on this subject (Introduction to the New Testament, i, 330,) seems about the true one, that "an anti-gnostic spirit pervades this Gospel, not [so much] because John's design was to furnish a *direct* antidote to it [the false gnosis,] but because his object was so general as naturally to include it." The term *Λόγος* occurs in this sense only here and in 1 John i, 1; [v, 7;] Rev. xix, 13.

association, this alone can furnish us with a correct guide in developing them. Without investigating the more recondite etymology, the word *λόγος*, as a pure verbal noun from the root *λέγω* (*I speak*) in its *middle* form, means precisely *speech*, both in its subjective capability and objective exercise—the *ratio et oratio* of the Latins. From this endowment and function, the distinguishing attribute of man, the sense passed over naturally into the result or product of the faculty; namely, a *word*, or articulate sign of thought, and thence was extended to the general signification of a symbol of some idea, whether spoken or written. In this particular instance of its adoption, we are obviously not to look for anything other than a *metaphorical* acceptance of the word; namely, as denoting some exterior representation, which should serve the same purpose between the speaker and the addressed, as the ordinary vehicle of thought does between man and man. But as it is also employed in an *emphatic* sense, and with express reference to the Godhead, it can only mean by a strict grammatical and rhetorical interpretation, some great medium of communication on the part of God with his creatures. The *incarnation* that follows, further limits this sense to some *personality*, in distinction from the mere objective revelation contained in the Bible; making it, as Professor Stuart aptly renders, *Θεὸς Λόγος*, *God revealed*, to which might be added actively, that it is *God revealing himself*. To sum up the meaning of *Λόγος*, then, as here required, it may be expressed in one word as the Divine MANIFESTATION; not merely the *exponent* of the Divine character and will to others, but the very *bodying forth* of the Divine nature in himself. This is precisely John's conception of Christ, and his whole introduction and Gospel are constructed with the sole view of exhibiting and illustrating his Master in this aspect. From this comprehensive fundamental import, too, all the particular significations above referred to, are immediately and obviously derived, and this in a way that neither makes them interfere with each other, nor detract from the sublimity of the theme. With these preliminary remarks, we pass to the consideration of the passage in detail.

Verse 1. *Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος.*] The assertion *ἐν ἀρχῇ* is placed first in the sentence, as being the *emphatic* point in a declaration which ushers in an express statement of the *eternity* of the Logos; it evidently corresponds to the *אֶתְרִיּוּת* of Gen. i, 1, and refers to the same period. That it is a translation of that adverbial phrase, may be one reason for the omission of the article; but a better one is, that the article would make the time too *definite*, the meaning being, not *at the origin* of the present mundane order of

things merely, but *aboriginally*, in the widest sense that the mind can take in. The imperfect ἦν can hardly be relied upon as proof of Christ's pre-existence, for no other tense could have been used; the verb denotes simple existence as predicated of him at that period; it is the ἐν rather which implies that he did not then begin to be—had ἐπὶ been used, the idea would have been at least ambiguous; with ἀπό the notion of priority must have ceased, even had ἦν continued in use.

Καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν,] Καί is used universally by John as a simple *continuative*, the ו of the Hebrew; whether the meaning be adversative or otherwise, must generally be gathered from the context. Those are rather hasty, who make πρὸς here equivalent to παρὰ; it may justly be doubted whether such an interchange of prepositions, especially with a different *case*, ever takes place in Greek, even in the New Testament; and an intentional selection of πρὸς in this instance is shown by its repetition in verse 2, as well as by εἰς in the parallel expression of verse 18. The predominant idea undoubtedly is παρὰ; but as this would be obvious, and included in the collateral notion of εἰς (in the sense of *erga*), πρὸς is used to combine them. Glorified *saints* are παρὰ τῶ Θεῷ, *angels* may be said to be παρὰ τὸν Θεόν, but the *Logos* only is πρὸς τὸν Θεόν; within this interior circle of proximity and *interpenetration* no finite being can enter. The meaning then, as we think, is the personal and intimate association or *intercourse* enjoyed by the Logos with the Father, previous to the incarnation. Παρὰ denotes mere *juxtaposition*; even with the accusative it could only have intimated an *approach* to the Deity, with the dative it would have made the proximity too remote and quiescent, and with the genitive (as Prof. Stuart suggests) it might have been perverted to countenance the emanation system. On the contrary, πρὸς at once signifies closeness of connection, and at the same time shows that it is an actively assumed relation, a permanent flowing in of one essence upon the other in the harmonious consociation of the distinctive persons of the Godhead, yet not an infusion or commingling of the two beings, as εἰς might have been mistaken to denote.*

* The interpretation of Lücke (in loc.) comes nearest to this. After quoting analogous expressions from Proverbs, the Apocrypha, and Philo, leading to "the presumption that John, by the phrase πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, would express the inmost consociation (*gemeinschaft*) of the Λόγος with God, his very existence near (*bei*) God," he proceeds to refer to Fritzsche and Winer as noting the same idiom in classic Greek, and then adduces Matt. xxvi, 55; Mark vi, 3; ix, 19; 1 Cor. xvi, 6, 7; Gal. i, 18; iv, 18, as sustaining "the usual exposition of the expression πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, that it denotes the being of the Logos with (*bei*) God, in his im-

Καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος.] The Evangelist has just shown the exterior relations of the Logos,—namely, in respect to *time*, his duration as compared with that of this world, and his *place*, a residence with the Deity; he now brings to view his inmost *nature*, which is expressed by a comparison with that of the Deity himself. For this reason Θεός is placed first as the important unknown element. Many think the article requisite to make this word expressive of strict Divinity; but to have said ὁ Λόγος ἦν ὁ Θεός, would have been to assert the absolute *identity* of the two beings, rather than to distinguish one by a comparison with the other. The word θεός with the Greeks was not synonymous with the English word *God*,—their ideas on this subject were different from ours; its usage was precisely analogous to that of our word *deity*,—for that was what the ancients meant. Thus when we speak of an idolatrous or mythological personage, we say *a deity*, in distinction from the true God, whom alone we style *the Deity*; but when we wish to speak of Divinity independently of any such distinction, we express our meaning very pertinently and forcibly by omitting either article,—as in the phrase “Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is Deity.” Who does not see that the symmetry of such a sentence would be marred, and its meaning impaired, were it expressed thus: “Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is the Deity;” the idea in this form is too specific, or not sufficiently abstract to suit the predication of a Divine character in the general sense intended. Yet no one would understand the sentence containing no article before “deity,” as equivalent to the following: “Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is a deity;” here the *indefinite* article really becomes *definite*, by limiting the idea to a single particular Divine personage. The omission of any article whatever is thus seen to generalize an idea more fully than any other form of phraseology. This sentence of John, therefore, is constructed in the best manner to express the idea intended; and is in accordance

mediate society (*gemeinschaft*).” It seems to us, however, that the exalted character of the present case intensifies the connexion intimated by the πρὸς in those passages; so that we should translate this *gemeinschaft bei* into a *communion* of sentiment and agency in active intercourse, whereas Lücke doubtless rather designed it passively to express a *community* of residence, or at most of sphere, as a privilege. The idea of *equality*, although not directly intended by this clause, results necessarily from the statement of this intimacy, especially if it be one actively exercised toward God on the part of the Logos by inherent right, and not merely received or enjoyed as with a superior. It is precisely this distinction that πρὸς with the accusative is here fitted to intimate.—It is not a little remarkable that the same construction (πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα) recurs in the parallel declaration of 1 John i, 2.

with true grammatical principles, which are found even in our own language. For instance, this sentence is a very appropriate one: "The question has often been raised, whether *the ape is man*;" but to say "the ape is *a* man," would be absurd, and to say, "the ape is *the* man," would be utter nonsense. Every noun thus employed contains a generic idea—that is, is descriptive of intrinsic character; and it is this peculiarity that qualifies it to stand in this unlimited manner, as distinct, *per se*, from all other objects. Now, this is exactly the case with the Greek word *θεός*; it denotes that which possesses Divine attributes. With the article, it indicates some particular deity—for example, Jehovah, the God of the Jews; and by using the article, therefore, John would have confounded the Son with the Father, and made nonsense. Without the article, *θεός* may mean either of two things—a god, or simply, Deity; it is here only that the true issue of the present question lies. We make no account of the fact that frequently in the New Testament *θεός* stands alone for *ὁ Θεός*: because, in the first place, we do not believe that so great a difference exists as many suppose in the *rationale* of diction between the classic and Hebraistic idioms; and in the second place, to make *θεός* here equivalent to *ὁ θεός* would destroy the peculiar sense intended, by confounding *ὁ Λόγος* with *ὁ Θεός*. The peculiarities of the New Testament Greek arise from three causes: first, a leaning to Hebraistic constructions of words with respect to *syntax*; secondly, their combination into certain *phrases*, which may be regarded as translations of their Hebrew formulæ; and, thirdly, the accommodation of words current in Greek literature in a general or naturalistic meaning, to kindred but more specific elements of Christianity—for example, *πίστις*, *ἀλήθεια*, *Λόγος*. Now, the word *θεός* obviously comes under this last category of terms, which necessarily received a modification of their meaning when applied to the Jewish-Christian religion. No Jew, certainly no Christian, could possibly mean the same thing by it as a heathen, because he had not the same conceptions on the subject to express. With John and his readers, *ὁ Λόγος ἦν* (*τις*) *θεός*, could only have asserted that *Christ was an idolatrous object of worship*; whilst from saying *ὁ Λόγος ἦν* (*ὁ*) *θεός*, would have resulted the mistake that *Christ constituted the Godhead*. The word was therefore properly left without any such limitation, because the idea was to be taken in the widest sense, which is applicable of course only to the three persons of the one true Godhead.

In this form, we have said, it can mean only *a god*, or simply, *Deity*. There is no middle *demi-god* sense tolerable or even conceivable to Jewish minds. They had no deified heroes, or celestial mythology;

they knew no *tertium quid* between the finite and the Infinite. They would have shuddered at the thought of predicating such a term in any sense, however subordinate, even to Moses; and our Saviour's assumption of kinship with this title was to them unpardonable blasphemy. The only *philological* circumstance which we can perceive in the sentence under consideration, that would determine which mode of rendering is the correct one here, is the *position* of the word in the clause. We know not whether this argument would be conclusive with those who reject the other evidence of a moral character, but it certainly seems to us that Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος is not an equivalent sentence for ὁ Λόγος ἦν Θεός. If so, the latter would surely have been the more natural arrangement, and at the same time, if we mistake not, smoother and better Greek. But we think we can see a reason for the inversion, which makes it far more expressive than the usual position of the predicate-noun after the verb. The Greek, it is true, does not employ that arrangement of words which may be called the *inverted* (as compared with the English mode of sequence in the order of grammatical dependence), so extensively and systematically as the Latin, and yet it has its rules for the order of words,—they are less mechanical, and more the result of taste, a *je ne sais quoi* of internal sense of beauty and harmony, peculiar to the Greek mind,—which frequently impart great force and vividness to an idea that would otherwise be tame and vague.

The essential rule that prevails in the Greek (as is more fully seen in Latin) is to introduce the most important words as early in the sentence as possible, thus really following the order in which the thoughts naturally arise. Hence, "the usual arrangement in simple sentences, is that the *subject* occupies the *first* place, and the *predicate* (that is, verb or adjective [or descriptive noun] with *εἶναι*) the *last* place," (Kühner's Ausführliche Griech. Grammatik, § 862, 3.) The same general principle obtains with the New Testament writers, (Winer's Idioms, § 65, 2.) The regular succession of words in the sentence under consideration would therefore be the same as in English, namely, ὁ Λόγος ἦν Θεός, *the Word was God*. In this way, the introducing and closing terms of a sentence became its most important members, and the very assignment of these locations to a word indicated the stress intended by the writer to be laid upon it. For this reason, to have said ὁ Λόγος Θεὸς ἦν, would not have been so proper, as it would either have made ἦν too prominent, instead of Θεός, or else interfered with another meaning presently to be noticed. But when they wished to throw still more emphasis upon a word, the Greeks employed the figure *hyperbaton*, *trajectio*, or *inversion* of these members, by which they changed places with

respect to each other; this transposition to an unusual order, attracted the attention of the reader, and intimated the special significance. This additional emphasis, so far as Θεός is concerned, might have been partially obtained by transposing its normal arrangement after ἦν, and writing ὁ Λόγος Θεός ἦν, as above, like the emphatic declaration in 1 John iv, 16, ὁ Θεός ἀγάπη ἐστὶ; but in this form, no emphasis would be thrown upon Λόγος. This very sentence, it may be observed, is an excellent illustration of the *usus loquendi* in question with respect to an omission of the article before the predicated noun. Had this statement been ὁ Θεός ἡ ἀγάπη ἐστὶ, it would have been uncertain which noun was the subject, because both would have the same extension, whereas the rules of logic require that in every such *particular affirmative* proposition, the predicate must be more general than the subject, so as to include it. Just so, to have said, ὁ Λόγος ἦν ὁ Θεός, in any arrangement of the terms, would have changed the proposition from a *singular* one, in which the individual ὁ Λόγος was defined by referring it to the species Θεός, into an *identical* one, which either makes nonsense by confounding two objects at the same time that they are distinguished by their names, or could only be true by a quibbling double sense in the word Θεός, unworthy the sacred theme and inspired writer. The only way, then, in which this assertion of John could be made with the requisite emphasis, and the predicate Θεός receive the prominence suited to its peculiar generic sense, was that actually adopted. The transposition of both members secures the antitheses of Λόγος and Θεός, and the leading place of the latter marks the introduction of a new feature in the development of the topic. This is in fact the genuine Greek usage under such circumstances; for "when in the inverted arrangement *two* words in the same simple sentence are to be rendered prominent by their position, one passes to the *head of the clause*, while the other occupies the *last place*," (Kühner, *ut supra*, § 863, 3.) This phraseology of John, therefore, is strictly correct, according to the most precise rules of grammar and logic; and, if we mistake not, its rhetorical form imparts a truer and higher theological sense than could otherwise have been couched within it. We have dwelt thus largely upon this point, because of its important bearing upon the doctrine of Christ's proper Divinity, and especially because it has been so frequently wrested by even critical interpreters to discountenance that vital tenet. Indeed, most orthodox critics have contented themselves with appealing to other proofs and passages to sustain the requisite interpretation of this sentence, and have scarcely claimed more than that Θεός must here be allowed to pass

for an equivalent to ὁ Θεός, thus at once misconceiving the idiom, and placing their argument in the disadvantageous attitude of an apology. Professor Stuart is the first we have met with on this text, who has struck the right vein of interpretation, by regarding Θεός as having the attributive force of an adjective, nearly, *q. d.*, ὁ Λόγος ἦν θεῖος, the Logos was truly Divine in himself; but we think the above philological consideration necessary to vindicate completely the Evangelist's language, and to show its entire propriety and even felicity,—the same Logos was God. The question as to whether Θεός is subject or predicate in this sentence, is also determined by this view; for the omission of the article, by giving it greater *extension*, shows that it is generically predicated of Λόγος, which has the article. If to this it be said that as Θεός in the Christian sense is after all an individual term, it can have no greater extension than Λόγος, we answer that it is only an accidental circumstance that in this case the individual absorbs the species, but the logical distinction of *superiority* in Θεός compared with Λόγος is still proved by the comparatively less *comprehension* of the former, which always indicates (conceptually, at least) an inverse ratio of extension. As this argument, however, is liable to be set aside by the assumption that Θεός stands for ὁ Θεός,—yet the logical truth of the proposition would even then require that one of the terms be taken subordinated to the other, and Θεός alone is consistently eligible to the wider sphere of the predicate,—we should prefer (what has always and readily decided the matter with general readers) to regard the relation of Λόγος as subject ultimately settled by the fact of its repetition in that capacity from the preceding clauses, the idea obviously being, so far as the construction is concerned, ὁ Λόγος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ἦν Θεός, (*Deus ipsissimus.*) It is the emphasis that caused the repetition and peculiar position of the subject.

Verse 2. Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.] The first two statements of verse 1 are here emphatically repeated in one, lest the assertion just preceding of the actual Divinity of the Logos should after all be misconstrued either into a denial of any ontological distinction, (οὗτος ἦν *vero* *apud* τὸν Θεόν,) or on the other hand as favouring the notion of a procession or evolution at some particular epoch, (ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς.) Thus far we have, subjectively, the relations of the Logos in his Divine sphere; next follow, objectively, those under which he has exhibited himself to mortals. First, the great fact of the production of this latter sphere for manifesting his character, hinted at in ἀρχῇ above.

Verse 3. Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο,] Thus are exploded at once,

the pagan axiom of the eternity of matter, the deep-rooted notion—variously modified in different ages and countries—of the spontaneous germination of terrene things from some ill-defined βύθος of possible forms; and the Oriental theory of demiurgic creation in the process of celestial emanation. Πάντα, *all* finite objects, rather than classically τὸ πᾶν, *the universe* as a whole, which might have been true of the world in a chaotic state. The same individuality of meaning is further guarded by the more explicit repetition that follows in a negative form.

Καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν, δ γέγονεν.] Χωρὶς is here to be explained as the opposite of διὰ in the foregoing clause. This latter preposition appropriately designates the medium or instrumental agent in the work of creation, yet so as to involve his independent volition: compare the striking parallel and amplified declaration of Paul in Col. i, 16, where Christ is exhibited as constituting at once the *model* (ἐν), the *efficient* (διὰ) and the *final* cause (εἰς) of the creation (κτίσις.) Had John made this great act or series of acts to have taken place ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου, he would have merged the principal in the colleague; and how such a resolution of the attribute of omnipotence is at all possible, can only be explained by his own distinction just made, ὁ Λόγος ἦν Θεός. It is obvious also that διὰ does not here conflict with the doctrine of secondary natural causes, provided the original conception and continual potentiality be vested in the Godhead. In οὐδὲ ἐν there is a speciality and exclusiveness not to be attained by the usual οὐδέν. The verb γίνομαι has no reference to *formation* or construction, nor does it of itself imply *creation* or production; it properly signifies, the *coming to be* a certain thing or in a certain relation, either from internal development or outward influence.* In the present instance, however, it amounts to the significance of proper creation; for as the collateral notion of a particular state or relation is omitted, the comparatively abstract idea of pure existence as a result is left to the word, and the mode by which this fact came to pass is stated to

* In the July Number of the Bibliotheca Sacra for 1850, p. 471, Professor Stowe endeavours, for a particular purpose, to show by quotations from lexicographers that the proper sense of γίνομαι is to *begin to be*; but he falls into a misconception as to the inceptive force of this rendering. The idea of *procreation* seems to lie at the foundation of γίνομαι, as the affinity of its root with gigno, γεννάω, *gender*, γένος, *genus*, κῆν, (*begin?*) etc., intimates; the verb, therefore, properly means to *start into existence* for the first time and thereafter continue to be. But this dating of existence as a particular fact (which, by-the-way, indicates the difference between γίνομαι and the absolute substantive force of εἶμι) is a very different thing from a gradual development of being; in short, γίνομαι simply means to appear on the stage of action, to *occur* as an event.

be by the causality of the Logos. The use of the aorist (ἐγένετο) shows that this was an actual definite occurrence, but does not oblige us to refer the whole of the particulars included in it to the same point of time; the *enihilation* of the primordial elements is required to have been an instantaneous fact ἐν ἀρχῇ, and the details followed under the action of the laws then originated. The perfect γέγονε indicates that the universality of objects stated to be thus existent is brought down to the present moment. Thus far the Logos has been contemplated in his superhuman relations; first, in his original state within the bosom of the Godhead, (verses 1, 2,) and, secondly, in the exhibition of his Divinity in the works of creation, (verse 3;) the way is thus prepared for the elucidation of his still more external relation which as Messiah he sustains with the human race, the crowning feature of that creation. In the treatment of this portion of his design, John pursues his usual method of developing the objective from the subjective; he has just shown (by the attribution of Divinity) how Christ could be the creator, and he now expands this same element of originative vitality into the recuperative functions of his office,—the *vis vitæ* that first organized the moral frame of man, is seen to be competent to supply any decay and repair every lesion.

Verse 4. 'Εν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν,] 'Εν does not here denote merely the instrumental cause, but the *seat* and *origin*, as included in the preceding statement of creatorship; the use of ἦν carries the same idea of permanent inherence,—had the *production* of animation alone been intended, it would have been expressed by ἐγένετο. The context, it is thus perceived, requires ζωὴ to be understood of animated existence, as an essential principle developed in the works of creation,—the *vis efficitrix* of the whole circle of nature, in all its laws and formations, is lodged in the central being of the Logos. Precisely parallel are Christ's asseverations of this his essential attribute in that its most marked exercise, the *resurrection* power, John v, 21, 26; xi, 25. The higher "life" of the *soul* must not be excluded from this thought, for it is but the healthy and vigorous action of all the moral powers that constitutes this life. The article is omitted before ζωὴ for the sake of wider generalization. It is not unlikely that some of the terms employed in this *apocalypse* of the Logos, were adopted partially with reference to their use in the systems of Gnosticism, especially ζωὴ, φῶς and πλῆρωμα, which held a prominent place in some of those theories. Compare 1 John i, 2.

Καὶ ἡ Ζωὴ ἦν τὸ Φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων] The ζωὴ has now become an individual, and therefore takes the article, which has here a demonstrative force=*this same*. There is evidently a progression of

thought in this sentence; but as $\eta\nu$ is still employed, we must construe it as expressing a potential and germinal existence of the $\zeta\omega\eta$ in the character of $\phi\omega\varsigma$, which afterwards assumed an actual and developed type. This is also in keeping with the scope of this introduction, which in its first portion treats of the *contents* of Christ's character, and only touches upon his terrestrial history by way of illustrating the principles discovered. The connection of $\phi\omega\varsigma$ with $\zeta\omega\eta$ is not at first clear: logically, the statement only is that the Logos constituted at once the life and the light of the human race; but this, although easily seen to be true, neither exhausts the meaning, nor conveys it with precision. The true link of thought appears to run through the imagination—an indispensable guide in threading John's propositions,—which seizes upon the affinity between these two elements in the sun's vivifying beams, as an illustration of the moral illumination poured upon the mind of man by Him who first called it into existence with all its conscious activities. The figure of a *light* to express spiritual direction is too frequent in the Scriptures, to allow a doubt of this interpretation; but in all the passages where it occurs, (so far as we are aware,) it is used with respect to some personal teacher of religious truth, (compare especially Christ's marked application of it to himself in his earthly mission in John viii, 12; ix, 5.) For this reason we incline to refer $\tau\omega\nu \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omega\nu$ to the then existing race, particularly the Jewish nation. It is not true that Christ instructed the world at large, except by his Apostles after the termination of his personal career; and to understand this enlightenment to allude to the general light of conscience in the human breast, is not only too narrow and far-fetched an interpretation of so emphatic a declaration, but involves an utter confusion of natural with revealed religion. It is true the statement is apparently general as to $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omega\nu$, and the clause with which it is connected is intended to be of the widest application; but it must be observed that the generic $\zeta\omega\eta$ of that proposition has here become individualized into a personality, and the article before $\phi\omega\varsigma$ indicates a distinct embodiment that can well be identified only in the Great Teacher. If there be a seeming advantage for such a general acceptance in $\eta\nu$, it is more than neutralized by the present $\phi\alpha\iota\nu\epsilon\iota$ that follows; and the plea, that the context assigns the reason of the feebleness of the light of heathenism in the resistance it encounters, is defeated by the tense of $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon$, which points to some particular struggle. The whole tenor of this introduction, moreover, shows that the illumination of the Gospel is here meant. As to the countenance derived from verse 9, in favour of the opposite view, it is sufficient here to say that the phraseology

of that verse, when properly examined, will be found to confirm decidedly the interpretation we have adopted of this passage. No other explanation of its meaning would probably have ever been insisted on, but for a mistaken view of certain passages deemed to be parallel, such as 1 Cor. xii, 7, "But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal," (*πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον*, for some useful purpose, *sc.* to the Church;) where the slightest examination of the context will show that Paul is directly speaking of the distribution (not of general moral perceptions, but) of the special ability, such as the gift of prophecy, languages, healing, etc., with which the various members of the early Christian societies were endowed through the miraculous influences of the Holy Spirit. Still less to the point is the doctrine of Paul respecting heathens destitute of a revelation, which is often appealed to for the purpose of proving their Divine enlightenment through the medium of conscience; for their being "a law unto themselves," (Rom. ii, 14,) certainly makes them independent of all guidance external to their own mental powers, and it is from their own reflection upon the works of the Creator that they derive their only knowledge of "his eternal power and Godhead," (Rom. i, 20.) No, it is the Gospel (in proportion to its successive stages) that brings the only true light to the human soul, and universal history presents but too melancholy a picture of man's spiritual benightedness without the Bible's "light of life."

Verse 5. *Καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει,*] Here a simile is instituted between the action of religious and natural light; without some such allusion, the statements of this clause would be a mere truism: as it is the inherent property of light to render itself conspicuous in the dark, so this spiritual luminary cannot but shed its beams on the face of a benighted society. The objective relation of the *φῶς* is thus more fully developed than in the preceding clause; hence the present tense is used to express an actual phenomenon, (the fact of Christ's tuition,) as the product of what was then only contemplated as a latent characteristic or native tendency. By *ἐν* is intimated the embosoming of this light in the very midst of darkness; and in no position could an illuminator have been more completely environed with it, than was Christ as "manifested in the flesh." The *σκοτία* is of course the opposite of the *φῶς*, that is, moral ignorance, with its consequent depravity; it here (with the article) specially denotes the degenerate Jewish community.

Καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν.] The interpretation of this clause depends chiefly upon the meaning of *κατέλαβε*; this has been much disputed. Some understand it, as in John xii, 35, of an *over-*

taking, closing in upon and consequent overwhelming of the light by the dense darkness around it: this would make the figure correct, for no darkness, however opaque, can thus quench a simple taper; but on the other hand, it would throw too triumphant an air about the efforts of Christ's ministry, and directly contradict the statements of verses 10 and 11 on this subject. Most interpreters have retained the more general signification of *seizing* as with eagerness, which is the prevailing one of this verb, especially its metaphorical acceptance of seizing with the mind, or *comprehending* as our version has it; but this is a very awkward metaphor—for what is the *mind* of darkness?—and reflects but little honour on the teaching, as incomprehensible. It is true, Christ's hearers did generally fail to appreciate his doctrines, and the misapprehension may be attributed to the perversity of the affections, rather than to an error of the judgment, as in the interpretation of *ἔγνων* in verse 10; but this after all leaves the simple idea of *rejection* as a matter of volition, which may be at once reached without this circumlocutory signification of *καταλαμβάνω*. The prefixed preposition is here usually said to be *intensive*, denoting avidity or violence; but this is a very vague and incorrect mode of disposing of such adjuncts. As *κατά* radically implies *descending motion*, the compound essentially signifies to *take down*, and in a reflexive acceptance, to take something down into itself, that is, *embosom* or hold in one's embrace. This is precisely the sense here required; the moral antagonism depicted in the preceding clause, has reached its crisis, the genial rays that strove to infuse themselves through the dark mass around and dissipate the gloom, are refused an entrance, and spurned from within it. The very peculiarity of the term employed contains a conclusive confirmation of this interpretation, in a way that seems to have escaped the notice of critics. The use of the same verb *λαμβάνω* with *κατά* in this verse, with *παρά* in verse 11, and uncompounded in verse 12, is not, we think, an accidental circumstance, but designed to express a sort of *κατάβασις* or descending climax in this respect: the *κατά* here answers to the *ἐν* of the preceding clause, the *παρά* below to the *ἦλθεν εἰς* of the same verse, and the simple verb of verse 12 requires no correlative term: the darkness refuses to harbour the light that already beams *within* it, or, more directly but less profoundly expressed, Christ's kindred disdain even to admit him to their friendly circle as he approaches, while only a few strangers invite his honouring visit. The violation of the metaphor here (darkness expelling light) heightens the description of the rejection, which is even more astonishingly melancholy than that of verses 10

and 11; and on account of this abrupt reversing of the figure, or almost *catachresis*, the tense is changed,—the present would contradict the figure of the preceding clause, and in its literal application would have implied a continued opposition to Christianity not consistent with facts, but the aorist indicates a definite purpose of resistance which reached its highest expression in the act of the crucifixion. *Kaí*, as it here connects two tenses of variant time, may with some propriety be termed a “disjunctive conjunction,” equivalent to *and yet*; it is more adversative than in verse 15, where it joins two *primary* or similar tenses.

Verse 6.—*Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος, ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ*.] Here begins a parenthetical transition, intended as a *caveat*, perhaps, to some sect of the Baptist’s followers, who were numerous in Ephesus (Acts xix, 1-3,) and were liable to entertain an undue opinion of their Master’s character, (compare John iii, 25, 26.) The caution is suggested by the epithet *Φῶς*, (see the same title—apparently a proverbial one—of the Baptist in John v, 35,) and confirms the acceptance given above to that term. *Ἐγένετο* marks the introduction of a new topic; it is not to be joined in construction with *ἀπεσταλμένος* as a periphrase for *ἀπεστάλη*, the participle being here equivalent to a noun, *q. d.* *ἀπόστολος* in its primitive sense. *Παρά* implies his intimacy with the Divine purposes, as a special commissioner for authoritative negotiations; compare Matt. xi, 11. *Θεός* is here *Jehovah*; without the article, because not liable to be misunderstood.

Ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης.] A construction too common to require special notice. The name of course was necessary to identify the person.

Verse 7. *Οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν*.] *Οὗτος*, in contrast with the *οὗτος* of verse 2. *ἦλθε* refers to his public ministry. *Παρὰ Θεοῦ* is implied from verse 6. *Μαρτυρία* denotes the general object of his mission, and therefore has no article; it is left thus extensive for a stronger antithesis with the work of *τὸ Φῶς*.

Ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ Φωτός.] An explanation of *μαρτυρία* preceding, which required limitation. *Περὶ* shows that *τὸ Φῶς* was his *theme*: of his mode of *μαρτυρία* a specimen is given in verse 15.

Ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσι δι’ αὐτοῦ.] The preceding clause contains the object of John’s mission on the part of himself, this gives the ulterior design on the part of God. *Πάντες* primarily refers to his hearers the Jews, and *πιστεύσωσι* to saving faith in Christ, to which *διὰ* indicates that the purport of his communications was calculated to lead them.

Verse 8. *Οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ Φῶς*.] This is the guarding clause;

note the emphatic position of οὐκ, and the strongly demonstrative use of ἐκεῖνος = *iste*.

Ἄλλ' ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ Φωτός.] After ἀλλά must be supplied ἡλθε from the preceding context. Mark the strongly adverbative force of ἀλλά. The Baptist's character has just been given negatively; it is now necessary, in order to complete the sentence, to state positively, that although he was distinct from τὸ Φῶς, he yet held a subordinate relation to it, which is done by an emphatic repetition of his office.

Verse 9. Ἦν τὸ Φῶς.] The existence of this being in the person of John has been denied, his real existence is here maintained nevertheless, and is attributed to a different personage. To construe ἦν with ἐρχόμενον as equivalent to ἦρχετο, as many eminent philologists do, would be too harsh, and also injure the meaning; the emphatic position of ἦν moreover forbids this merging of it into a mere auxiliary. It is designed to assert the absolute and independent existence of τὸ Φῶς, in the face of the previous negation, and the clause may therefore without violence be translated directly as it stands, "*The Light* EXISTED nevertheless;" but the sentence may be made smooth without losing any of its force, by supplying an ellipsis after ἦν, and making Φῶς follow as a descriptive predicate, in some such way as this: ἦν [δὲ ἄλλος] τὸ Φῶς, "*still there was another who constituted the Light.*" The common version, "*that was the true Light,*" hits the meaning, (except that it suppresses the repetition of τὸ,) but its construction would require a different position of ἦν.

Τὸ ἀληθινόν.] After denying the identity of John and the Light, it was proper to show the particulars wherein they differed: the first point is a subjective one, as usual, and respects their comparative *authenticity*. Ἀληθινόν must not here be understood of mere genuineness as opposed to deception, for that would have involved a *petitio principii* in the Evangelist's argument. It rather denotes that intrinsic quality of nature upon which external unity depends—that veritableness of air which assures beholders *à priori* of a person's irrefragable truth. But it has a higher significance when viewed from the intensely subjective stand-point of "the beloved disciple," who glances with an intuitive ken into the depths of the Redeemer's soul, and throws into the scale of evidence the *Divinity* that is seen to lie at the basis of his character. It is the majestic fact that Christ must needs have been the Light he was, by the very force of his own interior being's attributes, that constitutes the *truthful* element here intended. Other explanations of this term sink into unmeaning equivocations before this lofty conception, which may be

expressed for distinct apprehension by the emphatic rendering, *he was THE Light*,—such *per se*, the source and final cause of the Baptist's rays, transcending infinitely in dignity and importance all other teachers, "*velut inter ignes Luna minores.*"

[Ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον.] Here is given another distinctive trait of Christ, which is chiefly couched in *πάντα*; John's mission was limited to a particular generation of Jews, Christ's is universal, for the whole human race in all coming time. Φωτίζει, as to its tense, is expressive of the *design* of the Gospel, rather than its actual propagation at the time, and certainly cannot be intended to be confined to our Saviour's personal ministry. It corresponds to φαίνει of verse 5, and has a similar extent of application; the comparison with John does not require any reference to the light of natural reason, which would also clash with the succeeding phrase.

[Ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.—] Our English translators and many other interpreters have mistaken the construction here, by referring ἐρχόμενον to ἄνθρωπον instead of Φῶς; but several considerations render it nearly certain that the latter is the true meaning. In the first place, this whole latter clause, under the former construction, is quite useless and even tautological, for πάντα ἄνθρωπον is as general an expression as could be desired; and, moreover, γινόμενον would then have been the proper term, rather than ἐρχόμενον, which carries the idea that this illumination is connected with the *introduction* of each human being into the world,—an idea that cannot have been intended. But a more conclusive argument against this view is the fact, that ὁ Ἐρχόμενος, is a proverbial name for the Messiah, as may be seen in Matt. xi, 3; John xii, 13, and numerous kindred passages. John himself in two instances employs precisely the full form ὁ ἐρχόμενος εἰς τὸν κόσμον, to denote the advent of the Redeemer, chap. vi, 14; xi, 27. It is true, the article is prefixed in these instances, but that is because it is used as a name to designate an individual, while here it is a collateral particular in the description of one who has been specified by other more definite terms. John, indeed, appeared among men, but it was not in a Messianic character; his birth and acts had none of the tokens of that personage, and in his doctrine he expressly disclaimed this very title (see verse 27.) This clause is added to show how it was that the Φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων actually, φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον—it is the mode of development. Having thus disposed of the objection likely to arise from an unjust comparison of the Baptist's mission with that of Christ, the Evangelist now proceeds with the development of this latter, which was his main topic.

Verse 10. Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν.] For this remark the way had been

prepared by the statements of verses 4 and 5, and it here naturally connects itself with the language of the preceding clause, the meaning of which it serves to confirm as relating to Christ, who must obviously be made the subject of ἦν: there is also an advance in the thought; the Messiah not only entered the world but remained there for a time, ἦν=ἐσκήνωσε of verse 14. In κόσμος are implied also its residents.

Καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο,] The relation of creatorship (verse 13) is assigned as the ground of a claim to respect and service, implied in this statement.

Καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω.] This unparalleled act of base impiety is exhibited as one of the immediate effects of the Messiah's embassy. It is an illustration of the οὐ κατέλαβε of verse 5. Truly said the Redeemer of his murderers, "They know not what they do!" Ἐγνώ is here used in the Hebraistic sense of publicly recognising with suitable sentiments, as an act of the will.

Verse 11. Εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθε,] Ἠλθε is synchronous with ἐρχόμενον in verse 9, which it illustrates: note that the first advances are made by Christ. The general κόσμον of that verse, is here brought down to the specific ἴδια, sc. οἰκήματα, home, as in chap. xix, 27; it here metaphorically represents Palestine, Christ's birth-place, residence, and exclusive scene of personal ministrations.

Καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον.] This is a second illustration, still more definite and aggravated, of the strange treatment experienced by the Redeemer from his beneficiaries; his very family (ἴδιοι, the inmates of τὰ ἴδια) turn him from the door! Παρά, radically signifying near, here denotes a refusal to take their kinsman close to them,—by the hand, in their arms, and to their society. His countrymen, to whom he had long been promised, disowned him when arrived, and in turn were cast off in his last memorable words of mournful despair and warning, Matt. xxiii, 38, 39.

Verse 12. Ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν,] There were some exceptions to this seemingly hopeless rejection of their Messiah on the part of the Jews; δὲ intimates a transition to this opposite side of the picture. The fact of a contrary conduct on the part of some, is not directly stated, however, lest it should interfere with the impression of (apparently) universal indignity intended to be left upon the mind by the previous statements; it is rather implied by a statement of the privilege acquired by those who acted differently, which is here adduced in order to heighten the view of the irrationality of those ingrates. This whole account of Christ's treatment is here introduced not as a matter of history, but by way of contrasting his character with that of ordinary men; and the blessing of verse

12 is referred to in the light of a *proposal* on his part, its actual accomplishment being specified in verse 16. Some individuals did welcome the Saviour, the chief of whom were the Apostles and the Galilean females; the *spirit* of ἔλαβον is best illustrated by that of Mary, the sister of Lazarus,—it was that of confiding love.

"Ἐδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἑξουσίαν τέκνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι,] 'Ἐξουσία must not be taken as equivalent to δύναμις, the capacity for such a relation, nor yet is it a simple κτήμα or possession of such a blessing; it here retains its prevalent sense of influence and importance as connected with official *rank*, implying all the immunities and enjoyments flowing from such a position. The station here is that of τέκνα Θεοῦ, a relation of honour, authority, and security that might well be coveted by any earthly potentate, and the perquisites are such as are described in Rom. viii, 17; the rank is of such exalted character and blessedness that the Apostle elsewhere (1 John iii, 1, 2) labours in vain to find a more expressive title. Γενέσθαι contains the idea of *investiture* with this spiritual affinity, and implies that the condition is not the original one of its subjects. Τέκνα is destitute of the article because it is here descriptive of character, thus constituting a generic term; and also because its application is not intended to be limited to any favourite class or community, as the Jews held. The omission of the article before ἑξουσία is a little more peculiar, as this is here a special favour: its absence in this case seems to depend upon the common rule of New Testament usage, that where a general term is limited by some express particular application following, it may dispense with the article, (see Stuart's New Testament Grammar, § 89, (3);) thus the clause γενέσθαι τέκνα Θεοῦ becomes equivalent to the article by particularizing ἑξουσία. A similar idiom prevails with the corresponding English words; we regularly say, "He gave them *leave* to do so," although we must in strict propriety say, "He gave them the *privilege* of doing so," while we may say with equal elegance, either "He gave them the *power* (or liberty) of doing so," or "He gave them *power* (or liberty, or the power) to do so."

Τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ.] This more particularly defines the ὅσοι; and by assigning the ground of their selection, it at once illustrates the meaning of ἔλαβον, and the prerequisite to the γενέσθαι τέκνα. By ὄνομα is here meant, by a frequent Hebraistic extension, the Divine character of Christ, and εἰς (as elsewhere) shows that this was the *object* toward which their faith was directed. There seems also to be intimated in this preposition the spiritual union of believers with their Saviour, as the tendency and effect of faith.

(Conclusion in the October Number.)

ART. III.—THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH.

1. *History of the Organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, comprehending all the official proceedings of the General Conference, Southern Annual Conferences, and the General Convention, with such other matters as are necessary to a right understanding of the Case.* Nashville: Compiled and Published by the Editors and Publishers of the South-Western Christian Advocate, for the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. By order of the Louisville Convention. William Cameron, printer. 1845.
2. *Brief Appeal to Public Opinion, in a Series of Exceptions to the Course and Action of the Methodist Episcopal Church, from 1844 to 1848, affecting the Rights and Interests of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.* By H. B. BASCOM, A. L. P. GREENE, C. B. PARSONS, Southern Commissioners for the Settlement of the Property Question between the two Churches. Louisville, Kentucky: published by John Early, Agent of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Morton and Griswold, printers. 1848.

IN our number for April, 1849, we noticed, in part, the first publication at the head of this article. We now add another official publication, containing a number of unfair statements and unsound reasonings with regard to the later action of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

In our former article we found it necessary to justify upon Scripture grounds, the position which the Methodists in this country, both before and after their organization as a Church, had always maintained in regard to the system of slavery, as it existed in the slaveholding States. To do so, it was necessary to show that the omission of any positive command in the New Testament, obliging the converts to Christianity to emancipate their slaves, did not justify, and was not, in the primitive Church, considered as justifying the cruel and inhuman laws of the Roman empire in respect to slavery, which were condemned by the fundamental principles of the moral code proclaimed by our Lord and his apostles; but that the command was omitted in mercy to the slaves themselves, not from any acknowledged moral right in the owners to hold their fellow-men in bondage, reducing them to the condition of cattle or other property. The Roman laws forbade the emancipation of slaves, except to a very limited number, strictly regulated by law. The slave was not a person, and had no personal rights; and if discharged from service by his master, who, by the very act, renounced his right to protect the slave as his property, the slave, so discharged, enjoyed none of the privileges of the freed man. He had no redress for any injury done him, and no security for any property he might acquire. In fact,

any one might slay him with impunity. To kill him was no more a murder, or criminal offence, than to kill an ox. The slave and the ox were alike the property of the owner, who could recover damages for any injury done them; but when the ownership was renounced all protection was taken away.

To have commanded the Christians of the primitive Church to discharge their slaves from service, when they could not secure to them the protection of law, or the rights of freemen, would have been as unjust as unmerciful. But the Christian religion had its origin in the love of God to sinful, helpless man, and all its doctrines and precepts are directed by the same love and compassion. It could not, therefore, impose, as a condition of its covenant mercies, a precept or requirement which went directly, and of necessary consequence, to render any condition of humanity still more miserable. The Christian religion condemned the whole system of slavery, as contrary to the obligations of the universal law of love; while it permitted slaveholding where such relation between owner and servant was essentially necessary to the fulfilment of this very law itself. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," was the law; but "love worketh no ill to its neighbour." To fulfil the law was not to renounce the right to protect the slave, and turn him out to be worried or slain by others; but to retain the power, and exercise it for his benefit—awaiting the changes in the laws which Christianity was calculated and destined to effect, and which it did ultimately effect to the utter extirpation of slavery. These statements we have illustrated and proved in our former article, by the records of antiquity, and need not repeat these proofs here.

We also showed that the Methodists, from the earliest to the latest action taken on the subject, have borne faithful testimony against slavery as a grievous wrong, "contrary to Scripture and natural justice;" and that while they were permitted by the laws to enforce the emancipation of slaves, as a condition of Church-fellowship, they did so, in despite of the offence taken by those whose selfishness and interests held them by strong ties to the iniquitous practice. But when the legislation of the slaveholding States began to be fashioned according to the laws of heathen Rome; when the Christian master could no longer discharge his slaves from his service without subjecting them to be sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder—who, with few exceptions, would be a slave-trader—the merciful spirit of Christianity required a change in the rules of our Discipline; and they were, in obedience to the law of love itself, modified from time to time, until they were nearly reduced to a simple testimony against slavery as a great evil, while slaveholding was necessarily permitted

when the slave could not be manumitted and permitted to enjoy freedom.

Under these circumstances slavery made rapid and fearful encroachment upon the Southern and South-Western portions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Not only did it come to prevail generally among the laity, but the local and travelling preachers became slaveholders with an avidity which seemed to be only restrained by individual inability to acquire such property, which had greatly increased in value by the acquisition of Louisiana and Florida by the United States. Many ministers acquired slaves by marriage, and many by bequest; and as their slaves multiplied by natural increase, they were compelled to sell them, hire them out to others, or to take farms and cultivate them under the direction of an overseer. It may be asked why these itinerant ministers did not avail themselves of the provisions of the Discipline, and apply for transfers to the free States, where their slaves would be free. We answer, some did so; and it would be uncharitable, and perhaps unjust, to allege that those who did not were all influenced by sordid views. The circumstances of their slaves sometimes, and perhaps generally, restrained them. Their slaves might be married to other slaves on neighbouring plantations, whose masters would not release them, and they could not, as Christians, compel or even advise the violation of the marriage tie; for it is written, "whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." For the rest, all had relations and friends, and many had children, who could not accompany them, and they preferred slavery with them, to liberty separated from them. There may have been cases where none of these impediments really existed; but God only can judge the heart, and we must leave motives to the judgment of the great day, when He shall adjudicate, before whom death and hell are without a covering, and how much more the hearts of the children of men. The Church could take no action in the premises. The consequence was, that the section on slavery retained in the Discipline was wholly inoperative in most of the slaveholding States of the Union. Methodists, both lay and clerical, entered, as they alleged, of necessity, into all the practical relations, consequences, and effects of the "domestic institution." They bought and they sold slaves without restraint or scruple; because they could allege that they bought to better the condition of the slave, and they sold from necessity as debtors, or from the impossibility of providing food and raiment for the natural increase of their slaves. Hence, Methodists and Methodist ministers were found in the slave-marts, and in the accursed *barracoons* established in the more northern slaveholding States, where slaves are grown, as

cattle, for a more Southern market.* Some of the travelling preachers in the South had become rich by marriage, and held large farms stocked with slaves. These preachers were often made presiding elders, as their circumstances required appointments to districts which would give them an opportunity, without great personal inconvenience, to visit their estates frequently. Yet the arrangement required that they should be so constantly appointed to the same districts as to frustrate the design of frequent changes in the travelling ministry, and to bring the office of presiding elder into disrespect, if not into contempt. But the bishops could not pursue the evident design and plan of the itinerancy in such cases. These slaveholding, agricultural, presiding elders, or preachers, alleged that they were bound, as Christians, to attend to the religious and moral instruction of their domestics, and hence it was necessary that they should frequently visit them. How much religious and moral instruction was afforded, we do not know, and have no right to guess, or imagine. Yet we fear, that slaves left to the absolute authority of an irreligious and merciless overseer, with only the occasional interference of the owner, would not be very carefully instructed, or be likely to pay much attention to the instructions of one whom they could only look upon as a hireling employed to urge them to incessant labour, for the benefit of their master; especially as all experience shows, "the tender mercies" of a slave-driver "are cruel."

It is, however, matter of rejoicing, that a great number of travelling preachers who were furnished by civil restrictions upon the right of emancipation with all these excuses for slaveholding, did refrain from, and interdict the holding of slaves by the members of their conferences. The Philadelphia, the Baltimore, the Pittsburgh, and the Ohio Conferences, held territory in the slaveholding States, and preachers were annually sent from them to circuits and stations among a community where not only the laws but public feeling were in favour of slavery; yet they preserved themselves from all practical participation in the evil, making the holding of slaves an insuperable objection to the admission of a preacher to their conferences, or to continuance in such relation. The Baltimore Conference, for instance, not only included in its bounds the larger part of the State of Maryland, one of the slaveholding States, but a larger portion of Virginia than belonged to the Virginia Annual Conference. Yet that conference had steadfastly maintained such exclusion, neither admitting nor retaining a slaveholder in their body. Why the Virginia

* At the Conference of 1844, a travelling preacher attended as a visitor, who, on his way, had stopped at Baltimore, and purchased from one of these barbacons a slave, whom he subsequently took on or sent on to the South.

Conference could not, or did not, preserve its ministers from the great evil, we do not now inquire : but whatever was the cause of her defection, it must be a subject of sincere regret, that that conference hastened to avail itself of the impunity which the Discipline had gradually come to allow to slaveholders ; and not only did many of her ministers become owners of slaves, but the most ultra pro-slavery opinions were adopted and advocated by her most influential members. During the session of the General Conference of 1844, no subject which came under discussion, gave more offence than the decision on the appeal of Mr. Harding, of the Baltimore Conference, who had been suspended from the exercise of his ministry, because he had become possessed of slaves by marriage, and refused to manumit them. His advocate was one of the Virginia Conference delegates, who exerted all his powers of rhetoric to procure a reversal of the decision, belabouring the Baltimore Conference without stint or pity. The General Conference affirmed the decision nevertheless ; and the Virginia delegates led the way in the vindictive hostility of the South toward their old friends and neighbours of the Baltimore Annual Conference, for simply maintaining the discipline and usage of Methodism as it had existed from the earliest date of its history in the United States. But of this case we shall have occasion to say more in a coming part of this review.

During the interval between the sessions of the General Conference of 1840 and 1844, much had occurred to disturb the peace of the Church. Many of the preachers, and a still greater number of the laity, in the non-slaveholding States, had for some years been uniting themselves with "Abolition Societies," which, if not absolutely political associations, were decidedly of a political cast, and very clearly indicated a political design. Some of the resolutions and addresses of these societies were, to the utmost degree, fanatical and extravagant ; and their agents, employed to travel through the free States to lecture on slavery, taught principles utterly subversive of the Constitution, and directly tending to rebellion and civil war. The General Conference had, from time to time, earnestly remonstrated with the members of the Church against all participation in the doings of these societies, and exhorted her members wholly to "abstain" from agitating the subjects of slavery and abolition, as no beneficial result could be effected by them in the free States, on a subject over which the slaveholding States only had any control. But this good counsel was rejected : and there were many Methodists who not only continued their connexion with the political abolitionists, but also proceeded to form themselves into "Methodist Anti-Slavery Societies," thereby announcing to the world that the Church

was no longer anti-slavery in doctrine, discipline, or feeling; and that, consequently, it was necessary to organize within it an "*imperium in imperio*"—a sort of Jacobin club, who were to compel the alteration of the rules of Discipline after their own fashion, and expel from the communion of the Church all who did not submit to their dicta, and immediately manumit their slaves. No allowance was made for circumstances. "Slavery was a sin under all circumstances, and all that was required to extirpate slavery was to cease sinning." In vain was it pleaded that such disciplinary law would be ruinous to the slaves themselves; as, while it could not effect their freedom, even if their owners should obey the law, it would subject them to be sold into more distant slavery, accompanied by the sundering of the social ties which constituted their only solace in slavery. All this was nothing to "the men of one idea." The "Methodist Anti-Slavery Society" was formed and organized by a convention of persons claiming to be members, and many of them ministers, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in open defiance of the advice and admonitions of the General Conference. All who did not co-operate with them were denounced as aiders and abettors of slavery; and, to cap the climax of absurdity, they appointed another convention to form a separate missionary society, as it was held to be inconsistent with their principles to mingle their contributions with the "blood money" of a pro-slavery Church.

Finally things came to a crisis. The great body of Methodists, lay and clerical, in the free States, though decidedly and conscientiously opposed to the whole system of slavery, were, nevertheless, as loyal citizens, opposed to any political action which tended to impair the union of the States; and as Methodists, they adhered to the Discipline of the Church, as it had been found necessary to make it, under the circumstances in which the Church found her slaveholding members placed by State legislation. From this position they were not to be moved; and, moreover, they were not disposed to tolerate the fanatical radico-abolitionists in the Church. It was insisted, that to assume the patronymic appellation of 'Methodist' for their association, was deliberate insult to the Church; and that, in point of fact, they had, by uniting themselves to a society which they themselves insisted was a religious society, but which was unknown to, or not recognised by, the Methodist Episcopal Church, and from which all members of the Church who did not subscribe to their dogmas were interdicted, they had withdrawn from the Church, and should be so considered, and dealt with by the Church authorities. Finally the ultra radico-abolitionists withdrew from the Church, and set up for themselves, organizing what they facetiously denominated

"The True Wesleyan Church," without a single attribute peculiar to Wesleyanism in its composition or character. It was found, however, that although the Churches in the New-England States had been long agitated by ultra-abolition movements, they generally remained sound in their attachment to the Methodist Episcopal Church, its doctrines and discipline. The secession was inconsiderable: The storm soon subsided, and since that time the New-England Churches have been essentially conservative, and have greatly prospered. The Eastern conferences sent, on the whole, a peace-loving, and eminently Methodist delegation to the General Conference. From this quarter, therefore, nothing could be apprehended tending to disturb the harmony of the Church. In the other free States but little disturbance was produced by the radico-abolitionary movement. A few, here and there, seceded, without apparent object or aim; and were soon at a loss themselves to know where they were, except that they were without influence or standing anywhere. Thus matters stood in the free States at the time when the General Conference assembled in the city of New-York, in May, 1844. Let us now turn to the Southern department of the Church, and take a view of its position in respect to what might be expected to happen during the coming session of the General Conference.

The result of the agitations in the free States on the subject of slavery, the firm stand taken and maintained against the agitators, and the final deliverance from them by the secession, had restored the brethren in the Southern conferences to a more confiding relation to their brethren in the other portions of the connexion. They had at every step resisted, with moderation, but with firmness and unanimity, as well as with great power of reasoning and argument, any change of disciplinary regulation on the subject of slavery. To require emancipation by our members or ministers, in States where the emancipated would not be allowed to enjoy freedom, was, they alleged, not only unjust to the owners, but a cruelty to the slaves, both in regard to their civil and religious interests. And moreover, in some of the States, any action of the Church interfering with the relation of master and slave, would effectually cut off all access to the slaves by the ministers of the Church. So sensitive were the great planters of the Southern and South-Western States on this subject, that the slightest movement in the direction of abolition, would, it was said, excite such apprehension as to induce them to take effectual measures to exclude Methodist preachers from all access to their slaves; and thus all the benevolent efforts to establish missions for the purpose of carrying the Gospel to the slaves would be frus-

trated by the action of the very Church which, if not "embarrassed by too much regulation," was best calculated by her economy, to furnish the word of life to the millions of poor oppressed Africans, and descendants of Africans, in the extreme South and South-West. And these, of all people, needed most the consolations of the Christian religion.

At the Conference of 1840, conservative counsels prevailed; but there was a small minority, whose influence in future conferences was looked to with some apprehension. Happily this spirit had been extinguished by the late secession, and the South, which proposed no changes—asked for no further accommodation—were gratified and pacified by the now confident expectation, that after the hurricane which had passed over the Northern and Western Churches, the atmosphere was defecated and purified, and no ultra movements were to be apprehended.

But before the General Conference of 1844, there was some indication that the South, departing from her conservative course, would throw an apple of discord into the conference. It was more than intimated in one of the Methodist papers in the South, that the slaveholding conferences would no longer abide the long-established usage and practice of the Church in preserving the episcopacy, or general superintendency, free from all connexion with slavery. It was, it was said, an imputation on the slaveholding preachers of the South, which they could no longer endure; and an exclusion from the episcopacy, which was not warranted by any positive enactment. Hence it was suggested, that at the ensuing General Conference, the Southern delegates, though a minority, would demand the election of, at least, one slaveholder to the episcopal office; and that the South, if not gratified, could not, without degradation, remain in the connexion. This created great alarm in the Church in the free States, and particularly in the border conferences, whose districts included territory in the free, as well as in the slaveholding States. But these fears were allayed by the South itself. The suggestion was rebuked by the common feeling, and Dr. Capers stood prominently among those who condemned it. In a communication to one of the Southern Methodist papers, he deprecated all attempts to innovate upon the usage of the Church, which, for the sake of peace and harmony, had heretofore filled the office of bishop, whenever an occasion for election arose, with an elder selected without regard to the place or the conference in which he had laboured, but always from among those who were not encumbered with slaves. The doctor was even pleased to say, he should doubt the *heart* of any one who would be willing to go to the North as a slaveholding bishop. This rebuke

from a distinguished member of the South Carolina Conference, and who would have been long before in the episcopal office, had he been able to extricate himself from the embarrassment of holding slaves, was like oil poured on the troubled waters. Even those who at first favoured the Southern pretension, gave it up as hopeless, and there was a general understanding that no slaveholder would be nominated by Southern delegates for the episcopate. Assurance of this was explicitly and emphatically given by Bishop Soule during the session of the Baltimore Annual Conference, in the month of March immediately preceding the session of the General Conference in May. Thus this portentous storm passed harmlessly over us, and every heart throbbed with the delightful anticipation of a peaceful and useful session of the great delegated body, to whom the interests of the Church were constitutionally confided. How fatally these hopes were disappointed, is now matter of history.

Soon after the session of the General Conference of 1844 commenced, it was whispered around that Bishop Andrew had become the owner of slaves, by his marriage to a widow lady of Georgia. The report was not credited at first. Bishop Soule being applied to for information on the subject, stated that he had no knowledge of the facts in the case, further than that Mrs. Andrew was in the possession of slaves. Whether she held them in her own right, or for her children, he did not know, but he did not hesitate to say, that if Bishop Andrew was inextricably connected with slavery he would resign. He had heard the bishop often express a wish to resign the episcopal office before the death of his former wife; and the connexion of our episcopacy with slavery, he said, was utterly impracticable. It was ascertained, however, by some of the members, that the slaves had become really the property of Bishop Andrew, by the laws of Georgia, his wife owning them absolutely, without any reversionary right in her children; and the conference, on motion, took the following action in the premises, in order to bring the matter fairly before the body.

On the 20th day of May, the Rev. John A. Collins, of the Baltimore Conference, offered the following preamble and resolution, which was adopted, viz:—

“Whereas it is currently reported, and generally understood, that one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church has become connected with slavery; and whereas it is due to this General Conference to have a proper understanding of the matter; therefore, *Resolved*, that the Committee on the Episcopacy be instructed to ascertain the facts in the case, and report the results of their investigation to this body to-morrow morning.”

Accordingly, Dr. Paine, chairman of the Committee on the Episcopacy, made a report on the following day. The Committee had

ascertained the facts in the case, in respect to which they were instructed to report by the resolution of the preceding day. Bishop Andrew had become "connected with slavery." The Committee had obtained an interview with him, and at their request the Bishop had addressed a written communication to them, in which the facts in relation to his case were stated, and the Committee asked leave to submit the communication as the report they had been instructed to make. In his letter to the Committee, the Bishop fully and explicitly admitted the fact that he had acquired the absolute ownership of a number of slaves by his late marriage, but that he had secured these slaves, by deed of trust, to his wife, after marriage.

Thus it appeared that Bishop Andrew had not only become a slaveholder, but had deliberately placed emancipation out of his power, by conveying his slaves, by a deed of trust, to a third person. It was afterwards learned that the deed created reversionary interests, which could not be legally revoked even if his wife should consent, as the trustees could not relinquish the trust but by a legal process, in which a substitute must be appointed, so as to render the trusteeship perpetual. His slaves and their descendants, as the deed had created contingent reversionary interests, were, therefore, beyond the reach of mercy, even if the legislature of Georgia should at any time thereafter take off all restriction in respect to the manumission of slaves. Rev. J. A. Collins moved, and the motion was adopted, that the report be laid on the table and made the special order for the next day.

On the 22d of May, the Rev. A. Griffith, of the Baltimore Conference, offered the following preamble and resolution:—

"Whereas the Rev. James O. Andrew, one of the bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, has become connected with slavery, as communicated in his statement in reply to the inquiry of the Committee on the Episcopacy, which reply is embodied in their report of yesterday; and whereas it has been from the origin of said Church a settled policy and invariable usage, to elect no person to the office of bishop who was embarrassed with this great evil, as under such circumstances it would be impossible for a bishop to exercise the functions, and perform the duties assigned to a general superintendent, with acceptance, in that large portion of his charge in which slavery does not exist; and whereas Bishop Andrew himself was nominated by our brethren of the slaveholding States, and elected by the General Conference of 1832 as a candidate who, though living among a slaveholding population, was, nevertheless, free from all personal connexion with slavery; and whereas this, is in all periods in our history as a Church, the one least favourable to such an innovation upon the practice and usage of Methodism, as to confide a part of the general itinerant superintendency to a slaveholder; therefore,

"Resolved, That the Rev. James O. Andrew be, and he is hereby affectionately requested to resign his office, as one of the bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church."

After considerable discussion the following substitute was offered

for the Rev. Mr. Griffith's preamble and resolution, by the Rev. James B. Finley, of the Ohio Annual Conference, and seconded by Rev. J. M. Trimble:—

"Whereas the Discipline of our Church forbids the doing anything calculated to destroy our general itinerant superintendency; and whereas Bishop Andrew has become connected with slavery by marriage and otherwise, and this act having drawn after it circumstances which, in the estimation of the General Conference, will greatly embarrass the exercise of his office as an itinerant general superintendent, if not in some places entirely prevent it; therefore,

"*Resolved*, That it is the sense of this General Conference, that he desist from the exercise of this office so long as this impediment remains."

A long and earnest debate upon the above substitute for the original resolution followed, in which great talents and power of argumentation were exhibited, and we are gratified to be able to add that, with few and only incidental exceptions, the courtesy of gentlemen and the law of Christian kindness were constantly preserved throughout the whole struggle. We shall give no synopsis of the speeches on either side, as they were generally published in the Methodist papers of the time, and are preserved in a pamphlet subsequently issued from the Methodist Book Concern. Our purpose is only to review, very briefly, the positions taken in justification of the separation of the conferences in the slaveholding States from the Methodist Episcopal Church, in consequence of the adoption of Mr. Finley's resolution, as these positions are to be found in the statements, documents, and reasoning, contained in the two publications placed at the head of this article.

Before the passage of the Rev. Mr. Finley's resolution, all the bishops, except Bishop Andrew, united in presenting a written proposition, to suspend all action in the case of Bishop Andrew until the next session of the General Conference. But it was evident that such a measure afforded no ground of hope that the peace of the Church would be preserved, or that the agitations which the Bishop's position must occasion would be even postponed. The former recommendation of the General Conference to the Churches throughout the whole connexion, to wholly "abstain" from all agitation of the questions of slavery and abolition would not only be nullified, but the agitation would be extended to conference districts where it had been heretofore either unknown or comparatively harmless. The Southern conferences themselves would be thrown into agitation, as they would be roused into action by the apprehension that at the next session of the General Conference, when the case of Bishop Andrew must again come up, some decisive condemnation of their slaveholding bishop would take place, and delegates must be

chosen who would firmly sustain "southern rights;" and the middle conferences, having both free and slaveholding territory, would find the membership as well as ministry divided in opinion and feeling on the subject. To restrain the liberty of speech or of the press there is no pretension of right, further than the indisputable right of the Church to punish by common expulsion for the licentious abuse of the liberty, in violation of Christian morality. Within these limits, however, what alienation of feeling, what strife and contention might be produced. For the rest, both in the East and West, the ultra-abolitionists, though they had mostly withdrawn from the Church, were nevertheless alive and active, and would rejoice in the opportunity of fastening their oft-repeated charge of pro-slavery upon the Methodist Episcopal Church. They would hasten to ring the changes on the fact that we had taken another step towards sanctioning slavery; the General Conference itself having sanctioned it in the case of one of the general superintendents for, at least, four years to come, and would be compelled at the next session to succumb to it finally and entirely without hope of redemption. With this weapon, furnished by the General Conference itself, the seceders would have been able to renew the conflict in the societies already weakened and crippled by secession, and little short of utter destruction must follow.

But this was not all. Even should all this be endured, there was nothing in the speeches of the Southern delegates to guarantee or even to give ground of hope, that if the decision of the ensuing General Conference should be adverse to Bishop Andrew, they would abide the decision. And in private conversation some of them did not hesitate to say, that if Bishop Andrew "should be touched" at the end of four years' convulsion, the South would withdraw. They would not even agree that he should be left to his own sense of propriety with respect to resigning his office. "He must retain it to test the principle,"—that is, the "principle" upon which they claimed to have slaveholding bishops.

It may be asked, whether the bishops could not foresee these evils when they made the proposition to postpone? We cheerfully and most cordially subscribe to the universal opinion of the Church, that they are men of great sagacity and sound judgment, and no one has intimated a doubt of at least a majority of them being influenced by a sincere and ardent desire to advise what they hoped would tend to the peace and prosperity of the whole Church; but one of them very soon withdrew his name from the recommendation, distinctly admitting that he had, since his signature had been appended, become convinced, by information which had reached him, that the measure

would not produce peace, but multiply agitation; and two more of the bishops only suffered their signatures to remain, the one, because he came into the measure under a train of circumstances which left him little or no option in the premises,—he adopted it as a last resort, and with little hope of success; it did, however, appear to him that it would be better to put “that view before the General Conference, and let it take its course, and, so far as he himself was concerned, he should be perfectly satisfied with the result;” he deprecated protracted discussion, and hoped the communications of the bishops would not produce such effect,—and the other bishop only permitted his signature to remain, that it might show that he had done everything in his power to preserve peace. It is evident, therefore, that a majority of the bishops had, very shortly after the presentation of their proposition, come to doubt of the effect which they had hoped it would produce. But we suspect the bishops were influenced in the presentation of the proposition to postpone action, by reasons which they were not at liberty to state to the conference. Suppose, that, in conversation with his colleagues, Bishop Andrew had said, that “if the conference passed over his case and took no action on the subject, he would get out of the way.” His colleagues would not be at liberty to report this intimation to the conference, but it might very well be supposed to influence their desire for postponement of conference action. Yet as the conference could not be informed of this intention of Bishop Andrew, and as it was very well understood that his original desire to resign at once had been counteracted by the advice of the Southern delegates, in caucus, the conference was compelled to act in the case of the bishop, on the presumption that he would continue to exercise his official functions and prerogatives as a general superintendent, unless the conference gave some decision adverse to his purpose. Such we have reason to believe was the state of the case. The bishops recommended a postponement of action, in confident expectation that Bishop Andrew would resign before the next session of the conference; but they were not at liberty to assign this as the reason for their recommendation. The conference acted upon the conviction to which they had come, from a knowledge of the determination of the Southern delegates, in caucus, that he should not resign, but should “test the principle;” and hence, by a large majority, laid the recommendation of the bishops on the table, and took up and passed the resolution expressing the “sense” of the body, that Bishop Andrew ought to suspend the exercise of his official functions while the impediment remained, which they apprehended would so fatally interfere with his acceptability in the larger portion of the Church.

Subsequently, the bishops having communicated some doubts as to the position in which the resolution of the conference had left Bishop Andrew, the conference voted that his name should remain as heretofore, in the Minutes, Hymn Book, and Discipline; that the rule in reference to the support of a bishop applied to Bishop Andrew; and that "whether in any, and in what work he should be employed, is to be determined by his own decision and action, in relation to the previous action of the conference in his case." Bishop Andrew was thus left to his own conviction of duty, either to disregard the will of the conference, and resume his functions as a bishop, or to comply with its expressed wish, and cease to act as a general superintendent while he remained a slaveholder.

In the mean time some efforts were made to relieve him from his embarrassments. A prominent member of the conference proposed to the friends of the bishop to buy his slaves, at whatever price they would name, and send them to Africa, stating that he was authorized to say the money should be forthcoming within forty-eight hours. No response was made to this proposition. We presume the proposition was not acceptable to a large proportion of the Southern delegates, as it would not have afforded the opportunity "to test the principle." And besides, Bishop Andrew had rendered a compliance with the proposal impracticable, by the trusteeship he had voluntarily created, and which prohibited either the emancipation or the sale of his slaves. If he outlived his wife, they would be his, and he would be at liberty to do as he pleased with them; but if his wife should survive him, they would become her property, and descend to her children. This reversionary interest could not be voided, and hence he could not sell or manumit in advance of the contingency contained in the deed of trust.

The Southern delegations had previously presented "A Declaration," in which they say, that "the continued agitation of the subject of slavery and abolition in a portion of the Church, the frequent action on that subject in the General Conference, and especially the extra-judicial proceedings against Bishop Andrew, which resulted in his virtual suspension from the office of superintendent, must produce a state of things in the South which renders a continuance of the jurisdiction of the General Conference over these conferences inconsistent with the success of the ministry in the slaveholding States."

Upon the reading of this declaration, some exception was taken to the charge of "extra-judicial proceedings" as untrue, and insulting to the conference; but, after some explanation, the paper was referred to a committee, previously appointed to devise a plan of

pacification, who subsequently reported their inability to agree upon any report which they judged likely to meet the approbation of the conference.

There followed this declaration a formal "Protest" against the action of the General Conference in the case of Bishop Andrew, which we may suppose to embody the principal objections to the action of the conference, and the arguments by which these objections are intended to be sustained. The conference appointed a committee to prepare a statement of the facts connected with the proceedings in the case of Bishop Andrew, and to examine the "Protest," who made a report, which, together with the "Protest," was entered upon the journals, and published at the Methodist Episcopal Book Concern. In the "History" under review, the "Protest" is given at length, but the "Reply" was found too unmanageable to appear before the Southern public. It was safer to garble and misrepresent it, and accordingly this work has been performed with admirable dexterity and success.

In conformity with this "Declaration" and "Protest" aforesaid, the Southern delegates issued, immediately after the close of the conference, an "Address to the Ministers and Members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in the slaveholding States and Territories." In this address they explicitly avow their conviction that a division of the Church has been rendered necessary by the action of the late General Conference; yet they condescend to say, "Disposed, however, to defer to the judgment of the Church, we leave this subject with you." But they left it to the Church with the assurance that a separation must inevitably come, sooner or later, and all that remained to be decided was, whether the time had already come. If the annual conferences should agree with them, they proposed a plan of proceeding by which a convention of delegates should assemble at Louisville, Kentucky, to take such measures in the premises as might, to that body, seem necessary. The preliminary steps were taken at the coming annual conferences. The delegates met, and the work of separation was consummated; the new Church adopting the Discipline, doctrines, and ritual, of the Methodist Episcopal Church entire, except with such verbal alterations as might be found necessary to adapt it to a separate and distinct ecclesiastical organization.

The "History of the Organization," etc., contains the proceedings of the slaveholding annual conferences, severally, *in extenso*, as well as those of the Louisville convention. The grievances which impelled to separation are reiterated again and again, but we do not find that they vary materially from those which are enumerated in the Decla-

ration and Protest to which we have referred. These may all be summed up in the alleged violation of what they are pleased to call the "compromise law of the Discipline," contained in the tenth section, in the case of Mr. Harding and Bishop Andrew; the agitations of the questions of slavery and abolition among the Methodists of the free States, and the frequent action on these subjects in the General Conference. To all which it may be, and has been answered, that the tenth section of the Discipline contains nothing in the nature of a compromise law, and has no single attribute of a "treaty" or "compact," as the "Protest" vainly argues; but is simply a rule of discipline, containing all that the General Conference found itself able to do, for "the extirpation of the great evil of slavery," in view of the action of the legislatures of the slaveholding States, restraining the manumission of slaves, with the privilege to the emancipated of enjoying freedom.

But whatever may be the nature of the rule of discipline referred to, whether "compact," "treaty," "compromise," or simple rule of discipline, having the same character as all other rules enacted by the General Conference, it has no connexion with or bearing on the case of Bishop Andrew. The General Conference did not arraign him under it, or justify their action by any application of it to his case. That body looked elsewhere in the Discipline for the justification of the course they took in the premises. They found it written expressly, that a bishop was amenable to the General Conference, "who have power to expel him for improper conduct, if they see it necessary." They deemed it "improper conduct" in Bishop Andrew, to place himself voluntarily in a position which rendered him wholly unavailable to the larger portion of the Church as a general superintendent; but they did not deem it "necessary" to proceed to extremities. They held, as it has always been held, that the rule authorized deposition; but as the position of Bishop Andrew was accompanied by some palliating circumstances, and might possibly be altered, they only advised that he should cease to exercise the functions of a general superintendent, or bishop, until he could do so without disturbing the peace of the Church.

But the minority of the conference, finding it impossible to evade the force or escape the consequences of this rule of discipline, resorted, in their speeches and "Protest," to doctrines, in respect to Methodist episcopacy, which, if not entirely new, had only been attributed by the most bitter enemies of our Church government, and which had been disavowed as a slander by its defenders. The episcopacy, in the view of the minority, was a "co-ordinate branch of the government," which is explained by the writer of the "Protest"

to mean "an independent department, a separate sphere of executive power of action, standing in the same relation to the Constitution that the General Conference does." A bishop, therefore, is not amenable, as such, to the General Conference, but only as a minister. He might be punished or expelled from the Church for immoral conduct, but his episcopal authority could be taken away in no other mode than by trial and conviction of crime. He might become imbecile, offensive in manners, if not criminally so, and produce universal discontent, and the Church could have no relief, even through the action of the General Conference. Why not assume the "Divine right," and the "indelible imprint" at once?

To sustain this view of the episcopacy, its advocates were compelled to take high-Church grounds, bordering upon Puseyism itself. Our episcopacy, they alleged, "in its origin and perpetuation, is derived from Mr. Wesley alone;" and the right of episcopal jurisdiction is communicated in ordination, and not in election by the General Conference. Here is the Divine right of succession with a vengeance, differing from the prelatical pretension only in deriving the succession through presbyters instead of bishops; for Mr. Wesley was only a presbyter. He had expressly denounced the prelatical doctrine of succession as a fable; and we are not to suppose, without some proof, that he held the doctrine of succession through presbyters as a whit more orthodox than through prelates.

But these high-Church notions of episcopal authority, independence, and jurisdiction, had to encounter the well-settled theory of Methodist episcopacy, as stated and explained by the first bishops of the Church, and by Dr. Emory in his "Defence of the Fathers;" and it was crushed and utterly annihilated by the contact. Dr. Coke and Mr. Asbury in their notes, or commentaries, on the Discipline, published by the request of the General Conference, expressly declare "the American bishops are as responsible as any of the preachers. They are *perfectly subject* to the General Conference." The italicising follows the copy. And, again: "They [the bishops] are perfectly dependent upon the General Conference." And yet again: "Among us there is no exception. Our bishops are bound to obey, and submit to the General Conference." There is much more of the same import in these commentaries, but the above quotations may suffice to show that the high-Church notions of episcopal authority and independence assumed in the Protest, constituted no part of primitive American Methodism, or of the opinions of those who instituted Methodist episcopacy.

Nor has there been any change in this respect since the present form of Church government was instituted; Dr. Coke was dispos-

sessed of his episcopal authority, at the General Conference of 1808, by simple resolution, without formal charges or trial. And it is well known that the same body repealed a minute, in which they had, in the exuberance of their gratitude, constituted Mr. Wesley the absolute governor of the Church; and few sessions of the body since that time can be referred to in which its supremacy, within the restrictive articles, is not asserted by direct action in regard to episcopal authority, limiting and controlling it as occasion required, without the least intimation of restraint from any source but the constitutional article which forbids "destroying the episcopacy, or altering the plan of our general itinerant superintendency." The bishops, in their Address to the General Conference of 1844, confirm this view of episcopal subordination, and expressly recommend a jealous supervision of episcopal administration. Dr. Emory, in his "Defence of the Fathers" against the charges of Alexander M'Caine in his "History and Mystery of Methodist Episcopacy," takes the same view of our episcopacy, and his "Defence" was sanctioned by the approbation of the whole Church, North and South.

It would appear, therefore, that this novel doctrine of episcopal authority and jurisdiction was taken up by the delegates from the slaveholding conferences to serve a purpose, and was founded on no just or tenable grounds whatever. The General Conference had a perfect right to hold Bishop Andrew responsible for any act "or conduct" which rendered him, in any degree, unavailable in the discharge of the official duties and prerogatives they had imposed or conferred by his election in 1832 to the office of bishop or superintendent. He had been elected, on the recommendation of Southern delegates, as being in other respects qualified, and as being free from the embarrassment of "slaveholding." It was perfectly well understood that Dr. Capers would have been the choice of the majority had he not frankly stated his inextricable entanglement with this "great evil," and recommended James O. Andrew as being, like himself, a Southern man, but a non-slaveholder. It was, for good reasons, desirable to elevate a Southern man to the office of bishop, though it was impracticable to impose a slaveholder on a large portion of the Church; and hence the Rev. J. O. Andrew was taken up by the delegates from the conferences which had preserved their members from the "evil," although they held much territory in slaveholding States, and he was elected. He was a member of a conference in the extreme South, and the extreme South claimed to be represented in the episcopacy. It was judged to be a matter of expediency and prudence to gratify their wishes,

if it could be done without electing a slaveholder, and the opportunity to do so was found in the Southern recommendation of Mr. Andrew to their choice.

From the first organization of the Church in 1784, to the assembling of the conference of 1844, no slaveholder had been elected to the episcopal office. In 1832 and in 1836, strong claims to a slaveholding bishop were made by the more ultra pro-slavery delegates, and Bishop Andrew's election was opposed by some of his personal friends from the South because he was supported as a candidate by those who objected to a slaveholding bishop. In 1836, the ultraists among the Southern delegates were requested by the Baltimore Conference delegation, to nominate a Southern man for the episcopal office who was not a slaveholder, with a promise to support him; but they replied, that "if they had a hundred men, in every other respect qualified, but not a slaveholder, they would not nominate one." The consequence was, that the Rev. Messrs. Waugh and Morris were elected; and already the intimation came from Southern delegates that a secession had become necessary,—a necessity, however, which they patiently endured until they found a slaveholding bishop made to their hand, and who submitted to their dictum not to resign, but to brave all consequences for the purpose of "testing the principle."

Upon a review of the whole matter, we think no just ground of offence was given to the South at the General Conference of 1844 by the action in the case of Bishop Andrew. The charge of acting without law, above law, and contrary to law, is to the last degree unjust. The conference acted toward him with the greatest delicacy, tenderness, and kindness. They had heard that he had acted improperly; not to the amount of crime or immorality, but, nevertheless, to a degree which rendered him an unsuitable general superintendent of the Church; and they directed the Standing Committee on the episcopacy to inquire into the fact. The committee invited the bishop to meet them. He did so, and agreed to make a statement of the facts in writing. This statement was submitted to the conference as the report of the committee, and upon this, the bishop's own voluntary statement of the case, without calling witness to give even a different colouring of the facts, the conference proceeded to act by resolution, and determined what, in their judgment, it was proper for the bishop to do, in order to prevent the injury which the impediment he had raised to his acceptability and usefulness would inevitably occasion. He was, moreover, heard in his own defence, and the whole subject was discussed for several weeks, chiefly by his advocates, before the decision was had. Surely

no man could desire to be dealt with more respectfully and tenderly than Bishop Andrew was; and yet the proceedings in his case have been denounced in the South with an asperity of condemnation almost unparalleled in ecclesiastical controversy. The principal grievance of the South has really no foundation at all.

The proceedings in the case of Mr. Harding were covered by the tenth section of the Discipline. There is no law in Maryland by which a manumitted slave can be reduced again to slavery. Slaves can be legally set free, and permitted to enjoy freedom in the State, and instances of it are constantly occurring. But it is alleged, and perhaps truly, that the slaves were by law the property of his wife. He admitted, however, that his wife would concur in the manumission if it could be legally executed. But if this had not been the fact, he was inexcusable in not securing the freedom of the slaves before marriage, as he knew he could not be available as an itinerant minister, and would not have been received as such by the Baltimore Conference. That conference has a large district of territory in Pennsylvania, where a slaveholding preacher would not be received; and it is doubtful whether such a preacher could be sent with propriety, or hope of usefulness, to a large proportion of her Maryland territory. The case of Harding served the purpose of the South for the time. We do not suppose he would *now* pass for a "martyr" or a "confessor," even with Dr. Smith.

There remains to be removed only the intolerable grievance of "agitation on the subject of slavery and abolition in the North," and the frequent action of the General Conference on those subjects. Of the last, it is impossible to see how the conference could avoid such action. The South sometimes brought up subjects which necessarily involved such action; and as the conference could not deny the right of petition, some action was demanded, even in respect to the most ultra petitions of the North. They must be received and referred. But it is admitted that no action of the two preceding conferences gave offence to the South. Delegates from the slaveholding conferences repeatedly admitted that they were eminently conservative. And as to the agitations complained of, the South were beyond their reach. All the injury sustained from them fell upon the Northern and Western Churches. It is evident, therefore, that these complaints are only brought in as make weight. The real grievance was, that the established usage of the General Conference excluded slaveholding ministers from the episcopal office.

The Louisville Convention, constituted of delegates elected by the annual conferences wholly in slaveholding States and Territories, assembled in Louisville, Kentucky, on the first day of May, 1845.

A large committee was appointed "to take into consideration, and report on, the propriety and necessity of a Southern organization, according to the Plan of Separation adopted by the late General Conference," &c. But the convention did not await the report of the committee on the propriety and necessity of the measure, but, on motion of Dr. W. A. Smith, determined the matter, instructing the committee to report in favour of separation, if they found there was no reasonable ground of hope that the Northern majority would recede from their ground, &c. How the committee was to ascertain the disposition of the Northern majority of the late General Conference in respect to the subject, does not appear. The committee, nothing loth, reported the "Plan," and it was adopted with very few dissenting votes.

In their "Resolutions," the convention justifies its action by "the Plan of Separation adopted by the General Conference of 1844," though the Report of the Committee, which was adopted, in addition to this ground, enters into an elaborate vindication of the measure from the acknowledged inherent rights of man. How far this act of the convention is justified by the "Plan of Separation," depends upon what a strict interpretation of its provisions imports, and upon the constitutional right of the General Conference to enact it. As to the rights of man, whether moral, social, or political, they are wholly irrelevant, as it is not the right of secession that is claimed, but the right to constitute a part of the Methodist Episcopal Church under a separate organization and independent jurisdiction.

In all fairness we must admit that "the Report of the Committee of Nine," adopted by the General Conference of 1844, did authorize a division of the Church contingently. The contingency which was to justify it was *necessity*, and of this necessity the annual conferences in the slaveholding States were to be the judges. The condition expressed in the first "Resolution" is, "Should the annual conferences in the slaveholding States find it necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical connexion," &c. These conferences did, with all formality, proceed to decide that the contingency had occurred, both in their primary assemblies, and in a convention of delegates, duly elected and instructed by their constituencies. The act, therefore, was justified by the authority given in the "Plan of Separation," if the General Conference of 1844 had the constitutional power to enact it.

We are aware that it has been objected, that the delegates from the South to the General Conference of 1844, anticipated the decision of their annual conferences, and determined the necessity of a

separation, in an "Address to the Ministers and Members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the Slaveholding States and Territories." This is true; and it is also true, that some of these delegates did attend meetings of the societies immediately after their return, called for the purpose of taking into consideration the grievances of the South, and expressing their opinion on the measures necessary to be taken in the premises; and, moreover, that they did, so far from attempting to soothe the asperities which had been awakened, address themselves to the passions of their audiences, appealing to the feelings and sensibilities of the public, as well as the members of the Church, in respect to slavery and abolition, in consequence of which the most violent and abusive resolutions were passed by these meetings. But all this was the unofficial action of individuals, however numerous, and could not affect the validity of the "Plan of Separation," which addressed itself solely to the annual conferences of the slaveholding States. The conduct of the delegates may be justly impugned as a breach of confidence toward the majority of the General Conference of 1844, who, it seems, were misled into the belief that the Southern delegates would only submit to a *necessity* for separation, not create that necessity. They would bear with the action of the General Conference if their people could be persuaded to bear it; but they must go with the people of their pastoral care. All this may have been said by very eminent men among the minority, and intimations to the like effect may have been given in debate; but there is nothing of it in the bond—the official agreement, and therefore the agreement is not violated, or vitiated by it. So much we are compelled to admit; but we do not, therefore, admit that the action of the Louisville Convention was justified by the "Plan of Separation." We contend that the Plan itself could confer no legal authority to divide the Church, as the General Conference had no constitutional right to pass or enact it. Nay, we hold that they were clearly, and in terms, prohibited from doing so by the constitution of the Church; and hence the succeeding General Conference, immediately representing the judgment of their constituent assemblies—the annual conferences, had a right to repeal the unconstitutional enactment, and to declare it null and void, *ab initio*. The General Conference of 1848 did repeal the enactment; and the second publication placed at the head of this article is a "Bill of Exceptions," spread out into more than two hundred pages, against the action of the conference in this regard, as well as against the action of annual conferences, editors, and agents of the Methodist Episcopal Church, antecedently to the session of the conference.

We are sorry we cannot say for the second, what we have said of the first work we are called upon to review, that it is written with as much fairness, perhaps, as could have been reasonably expected under the circumstances. "The Appeal to Public Opinion" and "Exceptions" abound in gross mis-statements and perversion of facts; in coarse and vulgar abuse of official bodies and individuals; and in the ascription of the worst motives to both. The style and language does not affect the dignified, sober manner of argumentative discussion, but assumes the dogmatic, *ipse dixit* style of unquestioned, absolute authority. No matter whether the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the annual conferences, agents, or editors are spoken of, all are either fools or knaves. Nothing else can account for their differing in opinion from the writer—we will not say the writers, for the paternity is well known. The bloated, bombastic style, the overbearing tone and temper, and the bold, unscrupulous assumption of superiority throughout the work, would betray the authorship, even if the name of the writer had not appeared in the title-page. A few specimens out of hundreds which might be given, will afford the reader an opportunity to justly appreciate the work before us. Take the following:—

"We regard Christianity as dishonoured in its claims, and damaged in its influence by all such movements, [anti-slavery movements;] and to the extent any Church may become a pander to such methods of influence and distinction, we decline intercourse; and no array of adverse combinations—no "World's Alliance [Evangelical Alliance] shall ever drive us into such a desecration of the divine claims of Christianity. We leave every Church of this description [innuendo, the Methodist Episcopal Church] alone in its glory and shame. We have no sympathy with its extra Christian optimism."—P. 27.

"We submitted, and went with the Northern portion of the Church for the sake of peace, and on the ground of compromise, until we became perfectly satisfied that they were *off the Bible*, and against the laws and polity of the country on the subject [that is, of slavery]—were ultra and fanatic; impatient of the restraints of truth and right—assailing and attempting to undermine and overthrow civil institutions existing under the full sanction of the national compact—sowing discord, and promoting disunion throughout the different States, as divided upon the question; and then we deemed it time to stop, and informed them distinctly we would no longer submit to such a course."—P. 29.

Now it is of the Methodist Episcopal Church that all this is said, not of individual members. The conference of 1844 did nothing, absolutely nothing on the subjects of abolition or slavery; while at the conferences of 1840 and 1836, all that was done was eminently conservative, the Southern delegates themselves being judges. Upon what ground then do the above denunciations rest? How has the Methodist Episcopal Church got "*off the Bible*," turned "fanatics" and "disturbers" of the public peace? Remember, this is said in

an "appeal to public opinion." Is it any marvel, then, that mobs in the South have forcibly ejected our preachers from their pulpits, and by threats of violence prevented them from preaching the Gospel. Or is it any wonder that with these sentiments and feelings, southern preachers should hasten to take possession of the houses of worship from which our preachers have been thus forcibly and lawlessly ejected? But here is more of it: "The light and darkness of heaven and hell are scarcely in more unyielding contrast than the conduct of the Northern Methodist Church and that of Christ and his apostles, in their action on the subject of slavery."

Again:—

"Here may be seen at once the necessity for separation between the North and the South of the Methodist Church. The whole movement North is a proclamation of notice, that the defective legislation of Heaven on the subject of slavery can be borne no longer, and must be supplemented by 'another Gospel'—the rare interfusions, and superadditions of abolition ethics and anti-slavery propagandism."—P. 30.

Now, although the Methodist Episcopal Church had always firmly resisted the fanaticism of the ultra abolitionists, so that they have nearly all withdrawn from the Church and set up, like our brethren of the South, "a separate ecclesiastical organization," yet we must do them the justice to say, that we have never heard them charged with desiring to add a supplement to the Bible. They only contended that their notions were already in the Bible. But the writer intended only a rhetorical flourish. He would say something bold and strong, in a language far-fetched and recondite. He is ever endeavouring to give us better bread than can be made of wheat. Who can fail to recognise in these extracts, the hand of "Vindex," "Neal," "Presbyter," and "Dissenter," of "Mutual Rights" memory? But we have given enough of this appeal to the public to show the character of the work. If all this is said of the Methodist Episcopal Church itself—and it is only a very small sample of what is said of it—our readers can easily imagine how individual opponents fare. And now having given specimens of the writer's rhetoric, let us examine his logic.

It is asserted in the Appeal—as it is elsewhere by the supporters of the separation—with the air of demonstration, that the General Conference of 1844 had constitutional authority to enact the "Plan of Separation," by virtue of the "full powers" granted to the General Conference at the time of its institution, "to make all necessary rules and regulations for the government of our Church." The constitution adds, however—what we shall show is fatal to the pretension—the words, "*under the following limitations and restrictions.*" Of

these limitations and restrictions we shall show that two of them at least are violated in the "Plan of Separation." But apart from the restrictions, the question is, Does the power to make "rules and regulations for the government of 'our' Church—that is, the Methodist Episcopal Church—grant or imply the power to create and organize another Church, with separate jurisdiction and independent legislative authority?" This is the real question to be determined. But, so stated, the affirmative would be so absolutely and ridiculously absurd, that no man, whose reputation for common sense and honesty was worth preserving, would venture to support it. Its deformity must, therefore, be not only covered, but decked in the most meretricious ornaments. Accordingly it is argued that the new Church is not another Church, but the very same, because it is to be built of the same materials—the same ministry and the same members; only it is to have independent powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial. How hopelessly mystical is this duality in unity. It reminds us of the sage decision of the Irish court, who determined that "the county should build a new jail; that the new structure should be built with the materials of the old one; and that the old jail should stand until the new one was built." The idea of identity between two communities, whether ecclesiastical or civil, having each a perfectly distinct and independent government, may, for all we know, be very profound, but it is equally intangible, inscrutable, and incomprehensible. Our readers will indulge us when, with all humility, we beg to be excused the task of discussing a proposition which we confess we do not understand, after all the verbiage which is wasted upon it in the books before us. We must leave it, where the advocates of the "distinct ecclesiastical organization" have placed it—"before the public."

But we have said that whatever be the "full powers" granted to the General Conference, they are granted under specific limitations and restrictions. The force of this objection is wont to be met by alleging that those limitations and restrictions are of no more force than any other act of the General Conference which may be annulled by its subsequent action. The restrictions were imposed, it is said, by a General Conference, and the General Conference might, at any future time, set them aside by virtue of inherent power.

The fallacy of this argument will be best exposed by a brief history of the institution of the General Conference as now composed. Originally the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church was composed of *all* the travelling preachers in full connexion. The body as thus constituted met for the last time in 1808. It was invested with powers of government, limited only by the laws

of the Supreme Lawgiver, to whom all things are given by the Father, both in heaven and earth, and who is of right "head over all things to the Church." In this conventional capacity they did institute a delegated General Conference, transferring to, and vesting in, the then created body all the powers which the convention possessed to make rules and regulations for the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church; under the paramount laws of its Supreme Lawgiver; with certain specified exceptions, embraced in six restrictive articles. How the "all power," limited specifically by the same power which conferred it, can be without limitation or restriction we cannot conceive.

We take the following positions:—The act of the General Conference of 1844, in enacting the "Plan of Separation," was wholly unconstitutional, being not only without constitutional warrant, but in violation of the constitution. The authority was not found in the powers given; but it was positively excepted in the restrictive articles. And,

First. The "all power" given in the constitution "to make rules and regulations for the government of 'our' Church,"—that is, for the Methodist Episcopal Church,—does not confer, and does not imply the power to divide the Church, and to erect another, and an independent Church, within the jurisdictional limits of the Methodist Episcopal Church. And the pretension that the "Plan" did not look to or authorize the erection of another Church prospectively, and upon a contingency, is inadmissible and utterly absurd. The "rule or regulation" thus enacted, could not be construed to be "for the government of our Church;" but to release a large portion of the Church from its government. But we cannot think it necessary to sustain by further argument so plain a position as this. Those who take the opposite ground, do so upon the supposition that the "Plan" did not propose the erection of "another" Church; but only to divide the jurisdiction of the same Church. The constitution, however, gives the General Conference no more power to *divide* the Church, than to create a new one within its limits and jurisdiction. But the "Plan" does, in fact, look to, and provides for, the erection of another Church organization, with separate and independent powers of government, absolute, and without restriction; and the Louisville Convention professedly acting upon "the Plan of Separation" did withdraw from the jurisdiction and government of the Methodist Episcopal Church, creating and organizing a separate ecclesiastical organization, owing no more obedience or allegiance to the Methodist Episcopal Church, than to the "Protestant Episcopal" or the "Presbyterian Church."

Secondly. Two of the restrictive articles of the constitution are violated by the "Plan of Separation." The first is, the article which prohibits the delegated General Conference from "altering" the plan of our general itinerant superintendency. It is as follows:—"They shall not change or alter any part or rule of our government, so as to do away episcopacy, or destroy the plan of our itinerant general superintendency."—*Discipline*, p. 27.

We contend that the "Plan of Separation," if it does not absolutely destroy our episcopacy, does most materially *alter the plan* of the "general itinerant superintendency." According to the Discipline, the general superintendents have a common right to appoint the preachers to their several stations and circuits, wherever they may preside in an annual conference, and the right so to preside is common to all the bishops, and in every part of the connexion. They have also the right to decide all points of law which may arise in an annual conference, though the application of the law to the case under consideration is with the annual conference. The plan of individual visitation is left with the bishops themselves, provided that the general itinerant superintendency is preserved—that is, that no dioceses shall be created, localizing or limiting within prescribed bounds the authority, or confining the official prerogatives of the bishops to particular districts. The "Plan of Separation" authorizes the division of the Church, and the establishment of a line, beyond which the bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church shall not pass, or carry their official authority; and it is maintained, that the annual conferences from which they are excluded, constitute, after the division, a part of the same Church over which they were appointed to exercise their episcopal oversight. The same Church we say; for this is contended for by the South, as part of the "Plan of Separation." The same Church, only with a separate and independent jurisdiction! If this is not an alteration of the *plan* of our general itinerant superintendence, we cannot conceive how it can be altered.

At the General Conference of 1820, great stress was laid upon the word "plan," in the restrictive article, by the Southern delegations. A motion coming from delegates from an opposite quarter, proposed to alter the mode of appointing the presiding-elders. Under the Discipline this had been heretofore done by the bishop who presided at the annual conference within whose district the presiding-elders were to exercise their peculiar functions. It was now proposed that they should be elected by their conferences, severally. To this it was objected, and the objection was sustained by the Southern delegations with great unanimity—that it would "alter

the *plan*" of the general itinerant superintendency. By the "*plan*," was to be understood whatever related to episcopal power and prerogative, and it could not be constitutionally altered or modified by the General Conference. After long and able debate, the matter was referred to a committee, selected from both parties, who reported compromise resolutions. These resolutions provided that the bishop should nominate, and the conferences elect the presiding elders. One of the Committee, in whose judgment the Southern delegates had great confidence, declared that, in his opinion, the reported resolutions did not "*touch the plan*," and they were adopted by a very large majority.

At this stage of the proceedings, the Rev. Joshua Soule, who had been elected to the Episcopal office a few days before, wrote a note to the Bishops, informing them that if ordained he would not execute the rule lately adopted in regard to the mode of appointing the Presiding Elders, as he believed it to be unconstitutional. This placed the bishops in a dilemma. They considered themselves bound to execute the orders of the General Conference, and that body had elected Mr. Soule to the episcopacy, thereby placing him in their hands for ordination. And yet, it did appear improper to ordain a person to the episcopal office who had declared he would not, or could not obey the conference. There was no alternative but to lay the matter before the conference. This done, Mr. Soule formally declined ordination, and it was supposed a new election must be had. But an expedient was found by which things were restored to their former position. The conference suspended the resolutions for four years, and Mr. Soule consented to be ordained. Another suspension took place in 1824; and finally, the resolutions were repealed in 1828.

Such were the opinions of Bishop Soule, and the Southern delegates, with respect to the *plan* of the general itinerant superintendency, in 1820. But times and circumstances change, and men change with times and circumstances. In 1820 it was, in the view of Bishop Soule and the Southern members of the General Conference,—some, and the most influential of whom were also members of the conference of 1844,—essential to the plan of "*our general itinerant superintendency*," that even the power to select and appoint presiding elders should remain in the episcopacy, absolute and entire. Now, they tell us, it is no violation of the same "*plan*" to divide the field of episcopal oversight into two parts, still constituting only one Church, but to exclude the bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church from nearly one half the annual conferences. Such is the logic of the books under review.

The second restrictive article to which we have referred, as being violated by the "Plan of Separation," is in these words:—"They shall not do away the privileges of our ministers or preachers of trial by a committee, and of an appeal: neither shall they do away the privileges of our members of trial before the society, or by a committee, and of an appeal."—*Discipline*, p. 28.

The "Plan of Separation" wholly disregards the prohibitions in this article of the constitution. It allows indeed to members on the border a right of choice as to church relation; and to ministers of every grade the utmost latitude in this respect. But to interior charges nothing is allowed. The line of division once fixed and settled, every member of the Methodist Episcopal Church whose location places him in one of these interior charges, constituting the great body of the membership in the slaveholding States and Territories, is utterly cut off and separated from the Church relation which he had sought from choice, and into which he had been received under a positive provision of the constitution that he should not be expelled therefrom, without trial, and the right of appeal; and under disciplinary regulations, which secured to him a trial by his peers, and the right of appeal to the quarterly conference of his circuit or station. It was of no consequence whether he did or did not prefer a connexion with the Southern organization. He was transferred, like a Russian serf, with the soil. The language of the "Plan of Separation" is explicit and imperative in respect to interior charges within the bounds of the Church South. "The ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church shall in no wise attempt to organize Churches or societies within the limits of the Church South, nor shall they attempt to exercise any pastoral oversight therein." Thus those who declined to enter the "Church South" were cut off from all the privileges they had heretofore enjoyed as Methodists. "The interior charges," the "Plan" says, "shall in all cases be left to the care of that Church *within whose territory they are situated*." There could not, surely, be a more palpable violation of the constitutional restriction than the "Plan of Separation" perpetrated.

At the General Conference of 1848, numerous petitions and memorials were sent up from districts within the bounds of the separating conferences, earnestly beseeching the conference to revoke the sentence of excommunication against the petitioners. They had never forfeited their *rights* as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and had not abandoned them by joining the Church South; although they had belonged to interior charges, now within the territory of the said Church. They were, by the "Plan of Separation," deprived of the ministry which they preferred; and the

benefit of the institutions of the Church of their choice; and had suffered great persecution for refusing to adhere to the new organization. The memorialists amounted in number to nearly three thousand souls. The conference did all they could for their relief. They declared the "Plan of Separation" null and void, and thereby took off the restriction upon the ministers of the Church in regard to "oversight" and the organizing Churches and societies within the territory of the Church South.

But the constitutional right of the General Conference to divide the Church is attempted to be sustained by precedent. The Canada Conference was authorized to erect itself into a separate and independent Church by the General Conference of 1828. To this it would be sufficient to reply, that two wrongs cannot make a right. The assumption of a constitutional power by the conference in one instance, if the assumption was unwarranted, does not create the power, or justify its exercise. But there is really no parity, nor even much resemblance in the cases. The Canada Conference never was strictly and legally a component part of "The Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States;" for the reason that it was not in the United States at all. It was, in fact, a Mission Conference, although allowed to send delegates to the General Conference from the very necessity of the case. The Methodist Episcopal Church could have no legal right to the houses of worship, cemeteries, or parsonages of the Church in Canada; and if the Canada Conference had seceded without the consent or approbation of the General Conference, they would have carried with them, without any conventional agreement of parties, the legal right to such property. But a secession from the Church by any annual conference in the United States would not legally take with it any property of this kind. The representatives of the Canada Conference stated, in 1828, that they laboured under great and growing disabilities and embarrassments from their connexion with, and subordination to, a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and the General Conference released them. This is all: but how does this justify a division of the Church in the United States, and how does it affect the constitutional restrictions, which so plainly forbid such exercise of power? But ought not the Southern Church to be cautious how they urge this fanciful precedent? The "property question" is yet unsettled; and if this precedent is worth anything, it may have an important bearing against the Southern claim. We are aware that the Church South were, at first, mis-led by the "historian of the Church," and asserted upon his authority that the Canada Conference received ten thousand dollars for their interest in the Book Concern and the

Chartered Fund; and the assertion is reiterated in the books under review. But it is not true, notwithstanding. The Canada Conference did not receive a dollar, according to the official records of the Church. We, however, think the Canada case of as little importance in the decision of the property question, as in the constitutional question.

To notice the many mis-statements of fact with which the "Appeal to the Public" abounds, would be impracticable within the space to which we are limited; and it would be unnecessary were it practicable. But we cannot pass over the misrepresentation of the case of Dr. Pierce. The "Appellants" say: "Take the case of Dr. Pierce, the representative of the South, deputed to bear the tender of Christian salutation to the Northern General Conference, rejected with scorn too bitter even to be civil, because accredited from a slaveholding Church." It seems, by the above quotation, that the appellants think Dr. Pierce might have been rejected with scorn—nay, with *bitter* scorn, if not *too* bitter—without rendering the Conference liable to the charge of incivility. Now we differ with them in this, as in almost everything else. We think that to have treated Dr. Pierce with scorn at all, whether bitter or sweet,—with any, even the least degree of scorn,—would have been very uncivil indeed; absolutely contraband of Christian etiquette, and, what is worse, of Christian obligation. The Doctor is a very worthy man, and an eminent minister of the Gospel. There were, we believe, few, if any, members of the General Conference, who did not highly esteem and sincerely love him.

The General Conference did, however, decline to enter into the "fraternal relations" with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which he had been commissioned to offer; but they also did by "resolution" tender to him personally the assurance of their respect and Christian regards, inviting him to attend their sessions. This is not all. The conference did not reject the proposition of Dr. Pierce for the reason, any more than in the manner stated by the appellants. It was not because he was accredited by a *slaveholding Church* that he was not received in his official capacity, but because he represented a *belligerent Church*, which had been and was still waging a ruthless war upon the Methodist Episcopal Church along her whole southern border. The General Conference thought that *fraternal relations* implied peace at least, if nothing more; and they could not declare that a Church was at peace with them, much less sustaining fraternal relations, who, according to abundant evidence in their possession, had violated in numerous instances the obligations of the very "Plan of Separation" on which they based their right to erect their Church,—entering into the ter-

ritory of the Ohio, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Philadelphia Annual Conferences, seducing interior societies, stations, and circuits from their allegiance, and taking the "pastoral oversight" of them, contrary to the express provisions of the "Plan" they so much glorify; and, what is worse, taking possession of houses of worship, and performing ministerial services in them, from which the ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church had been driven by lawless mobs, who neither feared God, nor regarded man; thus enlisting "Lynch law" as an auxiliary to the "Plan of Separation."

Nor was all this the act of individuals, for which the "Church South" could not be held responsible. The very worst aggressions complained of had their origin in a resolution of the Louisville Convention, authorizing minorities of conferences, not adhering to the Southern organization, to send delegates to their General Conference; and the first General Conference held under the "organization" specifically, and in due form, sanctioned these aggressions. The General Conference was therefore under the necessity of annulling the "Plan of Separation,"—boundaries and all, seeing that no boundary lines were observed or acknowledged on the other side.

The "Appeal," while it pours out unmeasured abuse on the General Conference for declaring the "Plan of Separation" null and void, insists vehemently, that the "Plan" did not fix any line of separation, but only the basis of a line; as if a line of demarcation could be separated, even in idea, from its basis. This, however, is mere logomachy. The annual conferences in the slaveholding States were allowed, upon the occurrence of a certain contingency, to separate themselves from the Methodist Episcopal Church and to enter into a "distinct ecclesiastical connexion." The Northern boundary lines of these conferences must therefore be the limits of their jurisdiction, and the boundary line between the two Churches. Some latitude of choice was allowed to societies on the border, but none to entire societies. The last were to remain undisturbed under the care of the ministry of that Church within whose territory they might be found to reside. The appellants, however, declared that even the interior societies, circuits, stations, and conferences, who did not, formally and by resolution, vote to adhere to the Methodist Episcopal Church, are to be considered neutral ground; yet *neutral* ground which may be, as it has been made, an arena of strife and contention between the Churches. The line, although by the admission of the appellants the General Conference fixed the basis, has really no basis at all, but is liable to be pushed North or South as strength or address may prevail. Surely it was a very harmless thing which was done by the General Conference of 1848. It only

repudiated a boundary, which was declared by the opposite party to have neither fixed line nor basis, in earth, air, or water.

Upon an impartial review of the whole matter,—both the action of the General Conference of 1844 in the case of Bishop Andrew, and the controversy which grew out of it,—will not any disinterested inquirer come to the same conclusion to which a celebrated United States Senator came, and which he announced in his place in the Senate, that he could not perceive any good ground for the division of the Methodist Episcopal Church? The Senator said he had read the whole controversy carefully; and we may suppose he was furnished with all that had been written upon the Southern side of the question at least, as he is one of the advocates retained to plead their cause in the suit at law they have instituted, to procure a division of the Book Concern and the Chartered Fund; yet with all his sagacity, and with all the bias of an advocate in favour of his clients, he had not been able to discover any good cause for their separation from the Church they had left. This, we believe, would be the conclusion to which any other impartial umpire would come. The cause of separation, therefore, must be looked for elsewhere, and will be found in the political contests to which slavery has given rise, and the exasperated state of feeling in the slaveholding States, which has unfortunately grown out of it. The Methodists in these States generally partook of these feelings, and the ministers still more than the private members, and they hastened to sever one of the ligaments which held the political confederacy together. How long the remaining ligaments will abide in their integrity and strength no human foresight may determine. May our merciful God, who has the hearts of all men in his hands, make them perpetual! Our confidence in statesmen and politicians has been fearfully shaken by the obvious infusion into their patriotism of party interests and party resentments, especially as we have seen these feelings operating with such irresistible force in men whom we had greatly esteemed—and do still esteem—for their wisdom and piety. To an overruling and omnipotent Providence, therefore, may we look for salvation from the awful, incalculable calamities of a political convulsion, bringing with it immediate sufferings too fearful to contemplate, and consequences which may be felt by the whole family of man. For who can doubt that the experiment now making by the United States, is destined either to prove the advantages of free and popular government, or to disappoint the best hopes of humanity in the capability of man to secure the blessings of liberty regulated by law, under purely republican institutions? But God is our refuge, in Him will we put our trust.

ART. IV.—THE GOVERNMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

[FIRST PAPER.]

I. THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY IN GENERAL.

§ 1. *Origin and Design of the Sacred Ministry.*

CHURCH government is grounded in the *Christian Ministry*, which is originally one with the *Apostolate*, and includes in itself the germ of all other Church-offices.

Its institution flows not from men, but directly from Christ. As the Lord was about to leave the earth, he clothed his disciples, whom he had trained for the purpose previously by a personal intercourse of three years, with a commission to carry forward his Divine work, to preach the Gospel to all nations, and baptize the penitent in the triune name of the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of the human race. "As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you." For this purpose he imparted to them by an outward symbolical act the Holy Ghost, in the way of pledge first, and afterwards in full gift on the day of Pentecost: "And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost." With this gift he joined at the same time the power of the keys; that is, power in his name and by his authority to open or shut the gates of heaven, to proclaim and certify remission of sins to the penitent, as well as Divine punishment to the impenitent: "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." John xx, 21-23; compare Matt. xvi, 19; xviii, 18; xxviii, 18-20. It is a false view, when Socinian and Rationalistic expositors see in this a special gift, which belonged to the apostles only in their own persons, and so became extinct with their death. Rather, the apostles appear here as the representatives of the ministerial office generally, of the whole congregation of the faithful indeed, to which the right of Church discipline is expressly granted, (compare Matt. xviii, 18 with verse 17,) just as the promise also of the Lord's continual presence passes over the apostolic age, and reaches forward to the end of the world. (Matt. xxviii, 18-20; xviii, 20.) The ministry of reconciliation is indispensable for the continuance of the Church, as well as for its first establishment. Hence Paul says of it, in distinction from the Old Testament ministry of the law: "If that which is done away was glorious, much more that *which remaineth* is glorious." 2 Cor. iii, 11.

The object of the Christian Ministry is no other than the object of Christ's own mission,—namely, the redemption of the world from sin and error, and the extension and completion of the kingdom of God, as a kingdom of truth, love, holiness, and peace. Apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, are divinely appointed, “for the perfecting of the saints for the work of the ministry,* for the edifying of the body of Christ, till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.” Eph. iv, 11–13. The spiritual office or Church ministry (*διακονία*) is the bearer of God's dispensations of grace, the regular channel through which the blessings of the Gospel flow to mankind, the organ through which the Holy Ghost works upon the world and transforms it still more and more into the kingdom of God. From its different sides and functions it takes different names. It is called the ministry of the *word*, (*διακονία τοῦ λόγου*, Acts vi, 4,) because the preaching of the Gospel is its first business, according to the commission from which it springs; (Matt. xxviii, 19 seq.; Mark xvi, 15;) again, the ministry of the *Spirit* (*διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος*, 2 Cor. iii, 8,) which maketh alive, in distinction from the Old Testament ministry of the letter, that killeth; the ministry of *righteousness*, (*διακ. τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, ver. 9,) which comes from faith in Christ and is owned of God, in contrast with the ministry of condemnation as proclaimed by the law; the ministry of *reconciliation*, (*διακ. τῆς καταλλαγῆς*, 2 Cor. v, 18,) as brought to pass by Christ between sinful men and a holy God.

Hence appear the endless importance, dignity, weight and responsibility of this calling. It is the main instrument for the execution of God's plan of mercy towards the world, and from it proceed almost all movements and advances in the Church. The apostles, and in wider view all ministers of the Gospel, are “the salt of the earth,” by which the human family is preserved from corruption and kept in right savour; they are “the light of the world,” from which the rays of eternal life are shed into the night of the natural heart, and made to irradiate all the relations of the living world; (Matt. v, 13–16;) they are “co-workers with God,” (1 Cor. iii, 9,) and “stewards of the mysteries of God,” which they are required faithfully to administer, and for which they must here-

^a *Διακονία* is to be taken here in its wider sense, as denoting the particular service or function that falls to the members severally of Christ's body, for which they are to be fitted by the *διακονία* in the narrower sense—the ministry of apostles, prophets, &c. Compare on this whole passage, Eph. iv, 11–13, the instructive and thorough exposition of Stier, *Comm. zum Eph. Br. II. S. 96* seqq.

after render an account; (1 Cor. iv, 12; Tit. i, 7; 1 Pet. iv, 10;) they are "ambassadors for Christ," (*ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ πρεσβεύομεν*,) who in his stead, as though God himself were beseeching by them, pray sinners, "Be ye reconciled to God." 2 Cor. v, 20. As the Lord himself comes in his servants, their reception or rejection is at the same time a reception or rejection of Christ, which is attended accordingly with a great blessing in the one case and with a heavy curse in the other: "He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me." Matt. x, 40 seqq., ver. 15; John xiii, 20; compare John xii, 26; xvii, 23; Matt. xxv, 40. Of course, however, this high position gives them no reason for self-exaltation, but forms an occasion, rather, for humility. Even a Paul, in view of the glory of an office which is to believers a savour of life unto life, to unbelievers a savour of death unto death, and from a deep sense of his own unworthiness, exclaims, "Who is sufficient for these things?" (2 Cor. ii, 16;) and refers all sufficiency to God's grace alone, (iii, 5, 6.) Just as little may they abuse their authority to lord it over conscience and to wrong the rights of the people; but are bound, rather, to be an example unto them in holy living, (1 Pet. v, 3,) that they may not preach to others and be themselves cast away; (1 Cor. ix, 27;) giving themselves up as true shepherds, with self-sacrificing devotion, to the welfare of the flock purchased with Christ's blood and committed to their care; (Acts xx, 28; compare John x, 12 seqq.,) bearing in mind that, according to the rule of the kingdom of heaven, greatness and rank are to be measured by the scale of humility and love,—“Whosoever will be great among you,” saith the Lord to his disciples, “let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.” Matt. xx, 26-28; compare Luke xxii, 26-30. For their office is indeed a service, as the original Greek term for it, *διακονία*, imports,—ministers are immediately and in the highest view servants of God and of Christ, (2 Cor. vi, 4; 1 Cor. iii, 5; iv, 1;) but for this very reason also, in the true sense servants of the congregation for their eternal welfare, as Paul writes to the Corinthians, “We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord, and ourselves your servants for Jesus’ sake.” 2 Cor. iv, 5; compare Coloss. i, 25.

§ 2. Development of Government out of the Apostolate.

Church-Officers and Congregation-Officers.

Originally, as already remarked, the ministerial office was one with the apostolical. With the outward and inward growth of the Church, however, the apostles found their sphere of work also en-

larged, so that it became impossible for them to sustain longer the sole charge of discipline and public worship, and recourse was had accordingly to a division of labour. In this way arose gradually, just as the wants of the Church and the pressure of circumstances required, the several single offices, which have their common root in the apostolate, and through it partake with different measure in its Divine origin, its powers, privileges and duties. The Lord himself gave no directions on the subject in detail, but left his disciples to the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Under this guidance they proceeded with the greatest wisdom and consideration, following closely the objective course of history, and conforming as far as possible to the existing arrangements of the *Jewish synagogue*. Hence, in the beginning the Church was looked upon merely as a sect or school (*aipeus*, Acts xxiv, 5; xxviii, 22) within the wider theocratic communion, along with other sects, as the Pharisees (xv, 5; xxvi, 5,) and the Sadducees, (v, 17.) Even the apostle of the Gentiles, Paul himself, turned to the synagogues first, and moved in the order of their customary forms, till he was thrust out of them with his followers and friends. (Acts xiii, 5, 46; xiv, 1; xviii, 4-8; xix, 8-10; xxviii, 17-29.) At the same time, however, it is proper to remark here, that the analogy, which undeniably holds between the constitution of the apostolical Church and the Jewish synagogue, must not be pedantically extended to the smallest details, as has been sometimes done,* but at bottom is of force only as regards the organization of single congregations, the office thus of presbyters and deacons, and even here too those differences must not be overlooked which grew necessarily out of the essential distinction between the Christian and the Jewish principle.

In settling the number and division of the Church-offices, the passage Eph. iv, 11 seqq., is especially to be kept in view: "And he (Christ) gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." It is true that in this place (and more particularly in the

* For example, by *Campegius Vitringa*, who first brought out this analogy under a thorough and full view in his celebrated work: *De Synagoga Vetere Libri III.* 1696. Against him, the objections of *Mosheim* in his *Institutiones Majores*, p. 168-171, are in part not without ground. Compare on this point particularly also the work of Dr. *Richard Rothe*, (now in Bonn,) on the Commencement of the Christian Church, vol. i, 1847, p. 147 seqq. This is undoubtedly the most learned and acute work of modern times on the constitution of the Primitive Church, and in spite of its peculiar, almost universally disapproved, views with regard to the relation of the Church to the State, and the rise of episcopacy, it is a work of permanent value.

parallel passage 1 Cor. xii, 28-30, where the evangelists are left out, and, in their stead, the power of miracles and several other functions are mentioned, along with apostles, prophets and teachers) Paul speaks immediately and primarily of the so-called *charismata* or spiritual gifts, as the connexion clearly shows; but still these have a close relation to the offices, inasmuch as they form the Divine qualification and outfit for such trust, as it were the interior side of the offices, although they might appear also beyond these bounds. He does not propose besides a *complete* catalogue, since he passes over the deacons,* of whose existence other parts of the New Testament leave no doubt. If now we add these, and then take pastors and teachers to mean the same persons, those† namely who are elsewhere usually styled presbyters, or it may be also bishops, we get five classes of officers: *apostles, prophets, evangelists, presbyter-bishops*, (with the double function of teaching and government,) and *deacons*. These offices are so related to one another, that the higher still include in them such as are lower, but not the reverse. The apostles (as for example John, the writer of the Gospel, the Epistles and the Apocalypse) were at the same time prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers, and had charge at first even of the business of the deacons. (Acts iv, 35, 37; vi, 2.) In the highest sense was this universal character true of Christ, who is expressly called apostle, (Heb. iii, 1,) prophet, (John iv, 19; vi, 14; vii, 40; Luke vii, 16; xxiv, 19; Acts iii, 22, seq.; vii, 37,) evangelist, (*εὐηγγελίστα*, Eph. ii, 17,) styles himself the good shepherd, (John x, 11,) and condescends even, notwithstanding his participation in the Divine government of the world, to take the title minister or servant. (Luke xxii, 27; compare Matt. xx, 28; John xiii, 14; Philip. ii, 7.) In general, the different branches of the spiritual office are the organs through which Christ himself continues to exercise and carry forward upon the earth, by the Holy Ghost, his prophetic, priestly, and kingly work.

In the next place, however, these offices differ among themselves in this,—that the first three have reference to the general Church, while the presbyterate and diaconate look to single congregations.

* Allusion is had to them 1 Cor. xii, 28, in the word *ἀντιλήψεις*, which denotes the spiritual gift answerable to the office of the deacons.

† As may be inferred lawfully even from the circumstance, that the Apostle does not place *τοὺς δὲ* again before *διδασκάλους* but simply *καὶ*. This is noted strikingly by *Jerome*: "Non enim ait, alios pastores et alios magistros, sed alios pastores et magistros, ut qui pastor est, esse debeat et magister." So *Bengel* on the passage: "Pastores et doctores hic junguntur, nam pascunt docendo maxime, tum admonendo, corripiendo, etc."

This gives us the distinction of *ecclesiastical* and *congregational* systems, which *Rothe* especially brings into view; only that he is wrong in placing the last before the first. The entire organization has formed itself downwards from above, or from the general to the particular, and not in the contrary order. Even under the Old Testament the kingdom of God stood not in any local assembly or single tribe; rather, the tribes collectively formed the theocracy. This conception then passed forward directly to the Christian communion, as the true spiritual Israel and proper succession of the old faith. (Rom. ii, 28, seq.; iv. 11, seq.; 26, 17; ix, 6, seq.; 24, seqq.; xi, 1-7; Gal. iii, 7, 26-29; iv. 26; Col. iii, 11.) This consisted of all, of every nation, who were separated from the world by God's grace and called to eternal life; (the *ἐκλεκτοί*, *κλητοὶ θεοῦ*;) and such society of the elect (*ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ*) distinguished itself from the ungodly world (the *κόσμος*;) as did the chosen people of the ancient covenant from the *עַמִּים*, the *ἔθνη*, the nations with which they were surrounded. (Compare Acts ii, 47; xiii, 48; 1 Pet. i, 1, 2; Jude 1; Rom. i, 6, 7; 1 Cor. i, 2; Tit. i, 1, etc.) The apostles accordingly are always named first, (Eph. ii, 20; iv, 11; 1 Cor. xii, 28; *πρῶτον ἀποστόλους*, ver. 29, etc.,) and from their office all others have grown, like branches from a common stock. The broader sense of the Church, as being the totality of believers, the whole kingdom of Christ upon earth,* is the original sense; that by which it is taken to mean a particular local congregation, such as Corinth or Rome, is secondary and derived.† This is shown even by the passage where the term *ἐκκλησία* first meets us, and this, too, from the lips of the Lord himself. When he says of his Church, (namely, Matt. xvi, 18,) that the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it, it refers necessarily to the Church in the complex view, since it is only this which is indestructible; while single congregations, and even large districts of country, where Christianity once flourished, have become spiritually dead or have been overwhelmed by the power of a false religion, such as Mohammedanism. In the first stadium of Christianity both conceptions properly fell together, as the Church was confined to the congregation at Jerusalem, and the apostles consequently were at the same time congregational officers. Still their mission and vocation looked from the beginning to the whole human family, the evangelization of all nations. (Matt. xxviii, 19; Mark xvi, 15.)

* Compare Matt. xvi, 18; Acts ix, 31; xx, 28; 1 Cor. x, 32; xii, 28; Eph. i, 22, seq.; iii, 10; v, 25-27, 32; 1 Tim. iii, 15, etc.

† *Rothe* himself allows this, p. 285.

§ 3. Election and Ordination of Officers.

The inward call to the Christian ministry, with the necessary furniture of gifts, can proceed only from the Holy Ghost; as Paul accordingly reminds the elders of Ephesus, that they were made overseers or bishops by the Holy Ghost, to feed the Church of God. (Acts xx, 28.) This, however, does not exclude the co-operation of the congregation. True, the apostles were chosen directly by Christ, as instruments for laying the first foundations of the Church. But as soon as there was any society of believers, nothing further took place without their active participation. This was shown even in the measure of supplying the vacant place of the traitor, after our Lord's ascension, Acts i, 15-26. Peter lays before the whole congregation here, consisting of about one hundred and twenty souls, the necessity of a choice to complete the sacred number of twelve; whereupon not only the apostles, but the disciples generally, designate (ἐστῆσαν, ver. 23,) Barsabas and Matthias as candidates; all pray for the discovery of the Divine will, (ver. 24,) and all give forth their lots;* (ver. 26;) and so a decision is reached finally in favour of Matthias. Much more must we expect such a regard to general rights in the choice of the ordinary congregational officers. At the first appointment of deacons, Acts vi, 1-6, the twelve call together the multitude of the disciples, (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μαθητῶν, ver. 2,) and require them to make a choice; they fall in with the proposal, go into the election themselves, (ἐξελέξαντο, ver. 5, which refers to the immediately preceding πάν τὸ πλῆθος,) and then present the candidates to the apostles, not for confirmation, but only for ordination, (ver. 6.) As regards the presbyter-bishops, Luke informs us (Acts xiv, 23) that Paul and Barnabas appointed them to office in the newly-established congregations by taking the vote of the people, merely presiding thus over their choice. Such at least is the original and usual sense of the word χειροτονεῖν,† (compare 2 Cor. viii, 19.) But even taking it more generally, (as we find προχειροτονεῖν used of God, Acts x, 41,) the co-operation of the congregations is thus just as little excluded as it is by the charge

* Either dice, or more probably small tablets, which were inscribed with the name of a candidate and put into some sort of box or vessel. By this mode of choice, which as is well known the Moravians imitate in their marriages, (though of late less generally than in former times,) it was sought to place the decision, out of man's pleasure, and wholly in the hands of Divine Providence.

† From χεῖρ and τείνειν, to stretch out the hand, and hence *manum porrigendo suffragia dare, suffragiis creare.*

of Paul to Titus, Tit. i, 5.* For in the nature of the case, of course, the apostles and their delegates had the best judgment in such elections, and exercised the most influence; probably in young, inexperienced congregations they themselves nominated the candidates, so that it was only necessary for the new converts to concur in their favour. Assuredly, however, they had regard in this always to the wishes of the people, as may be seen from the direction in the Pastoral Epistles that only men of blameless reputation should be chosen to these dignities.† (1 Tim. iii, 2, 7, 10; Tit. i, 6, 7.) The formal right of the congregations to a living participation in all their affairs ought not to be called in question, though the actual exercise of it be conditioned by the measure of their spiritual maturity. All authority and power came indeed always from God, who is alone supreme, and from the Holy Ghost, who animates and rules the Church; but still the conveyance of it to a particular individual must, even for order's sake, be in some way humanly mediated, and why should not the Divine will be able to make itself known through the body of the people in the service of Christ, full as well as through one or more persons acting in their name? The democratic principle no doubt has its dangers; which, however, have their full counterpart again in other dangers belonging to the monarchical and aristocratic principle, while they disappear in proportion as the spirit of Christianity prevails in its true form.

The view now given of the way in which appointments to Church-offices took place, is confirmed by the testimony of the apostolical father, *Clement* of Rome, who in his first epistle to the Corinthians says expressly that the apostles appointed bishops and deacons "with the concurrence of the whole Church."‡

After the election followed the ordination, or a solemn induction into office by prayer and the imposition of hands, (a ceremony derived from Judaism, compare Numbers xxvii, 18, seq.) the symbol and medium of that communication of grace which the case was felt so urgently to require. So at the ordination of deacons, (Acts vi, 6,

* Compare *Rothe*, *Die Anfänge*, etc., s. 150, and *Neander*, A. G. I, s. 268.

† The course was similar in the choice of synagogue rulers, whose solemn introduction into office followed only after the consent of the congregation.

‡ Συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης—Epist. ad Corinth., I. c., 44. Even Cyprian himself, in the third century, who marks an epoch we know in the development of hierarchical principle, says of election to the priesthood: "Quod et ipsum videmus de divina auctoritate descendere, ut sacerdos plebe præsente sub omnium oculis deligatur et dignus atque idoneus publico iudicio ac testimonio comprobetur . . . ut plebe præsente vel detegantur malorum crimina, vel bonorum merita prædicentur, et sit ordinatio justa et legitima, quæ omnium suffragio et iudicio fuerit examinata." (Ep. 68, p. 118, ed. Bened., I. p. 118, seq., ed. Tauchn.)

καὶ προσευξάμενοι ἐπέθηκαν αὐτοῖς τὰς χεῖρας.) It was natural, that the apostles themselves should perform this act, where they were present. In their absence it was performed by their delegates, such as Timothy and Titus; compare Tit. i, 5, and 1 Tim. v, 22, where Timothy is cautioned against *hasty* ordination (χειρας ταχέως μηδενὶ ἐπιτίδει,) so as not to make himself a partaker of other men's sins. From 1 Tim. iv, 14, however, it appears, that the presbyter-bishops also might ordain, or at least assist in the transaction; for Paul exhorts his disciple not to neglect the gift which was given to him by prophecy, (compare 1 Tim. i, 18, and Acts xvi, 2,) with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery or college of elders. From 2 Tim. i, 6, we learn indeed that Paul himself was present on the occasion; (διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου;) unless we assume two different cases,* which is very questionable. At all events, however, the part taken by the presbyters can have been no mere empty ceremony, as little as this was the case with the part taken by the congregations in the choice of their different officers, (compare also Acts ix, 17 and xiii, 3.)

§ 4. *Support of the Ministry.*

As to the *maintenance* of the different ecclesiastical and congregational officers, the Lord himself had already uttered the principle, "The labourer is worthy of his hire," (Matt. x, 11; Luke x, 7, seq.; compare Levit. xix, 13; Deut. xxiv, 14.) Yet he had previously warned his followers not to turn the work of the Gospel into a common trade, (Matt. x, 8, seq.;) for disinterestedness is one of the most needful and becoming accomplishments in one who proclaims the free and unmerited grace of God; and exhorts men to seek first of all the everlasting blessings of the kingdom of heaven. The same principle is proclaimed by Paul, in connexion with various apt illustrations: the soldier has his charges paid, the farmer partakes of the produce of his field, the shepherd lives from the milk of his flock; and so the minister of Christ, whose office is often represented under these images, has a just claim also to his own support from the Church in whose service he labours, (1 Cor. ix, 6-10,) the more especially as carnal or outward gifts are only a small recompense for spiritual and eternal benefits offered in exchange, (ver. 11). "Know ye not," he goes on to say, enforcing on his readers from another

* As is done for instance by *Rothe*. This passage is handled at some length, with reference to the views of English divines, by Dr. *Samuel Miller*, "Letters Concerning the Constitution and Order of the Christian Ministry." Phil. 1830, 2d ed., p. 31, seqq.

quarter this self-evident but too often sadly-neglected duty, "that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple? and they which wait at the altar, are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel," (ver. 13, seq.) When he writes to Timothy, 1st Epis. v, 17, "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honour," the idea of remuneration is at least included;* as the immediately following verse shows, where he quotes the declaration of Christ already noticed, along with the Mosaic precept, (Deut. xxv, 4,) enjoining mercy to animals: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn,"—that is, in this application, show thyself grateful towards those with whose hard work thou art served. According to the usual interpretation, the passage Gal. vi, 6, also, "Let him that is taught in the word communicate unto him that teacheth in all good things," must be taken as an injunction to liberality towards the teachers of the Gospel. Just as earnestly, however, does the same apostle warn ministers, on the other hand, against the love of filthy lucre, which is for them especially unseemly, and goes completely to destroy their religious influence; exhorting them at the same time to contentment, hospitality and forgetfulness of self. (Tit. i, 11; 1 Tim. iii, 3, seq.; vi, 6-10; Acts xx, 34, seq.) He himself exhibited in his life an exalted pattern of disinterestedness, inasmuch as he earned his own support, mostly by his trade of tent-making, often labouring day and night, so as not to be burdensome to the congregations, which were composed generally, no doubt, of persons without property, to procure the more ready access for the Gospel, and to stop the mouths of Jewish adversaries, who tried to place his motives in a false light. (1 Thess. ii, 5-10; 2 Thess. iii, 7-9; 1 Cor. ix, 12, 15; 2 Cor. xi, 7-10; xii, 14-18; Acts xviii, 3; xx, 34, seq.) Paul could indeed say without any exaggeration, that through the power of Christ strengthening him, he was able to do all things, being instructed both to be abased and to be exalted, both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need. (Phil. iv, 11-13.) Yet he made an exception with the congregation at Philippi, whose relation to him was one of special confidence and affection, and received from it at times free presents. (Phil. iv, 16; 2 Cor. xi, 8.) For even if the labour of his hands might have been sufficient to cover the cost of his own living, it could not well meet the expenses he incurred by his frequent and long journeys, in which he had with him commonly a number of attendants, once as many as seven.

* Many expositors make *τιμῆς* refer here *wholly* to remuneration, and translate it, *reward*.

(Acts xx, 3, 4.) When we take into view these numerous and expensive journeys of the apostles and their delegates, who could all say with Peter no doubt, "Silver and gold have I none," (Acts iii, 6,) for the furtherance of the Gospel, and to preserve and promote the unity of the Churches; and when we bear in mind besides, with what great zeal the Christians of Macedonia, for instance, in spite of their own poverty, raised collections for their needy brethren in Palestine—we cannot fail to form a high opinion of the liberality and self-sacrificing love of these apostolical congregations.

We are not to suppose, however, that there was any *regular* and *fixed* salary for ministers in this period. Many, like Paul, and in conformity with Rabbinical usage, may have continued their previous trades in connexion with their new calling, so as in this way to earn either in whole or in part their own subsistence. Those who were animated with the right spirit looked not, at all events, beyond what was absolutely needful. So long as Christianity remained without sanction from the State, the Churches, as such, could hold no property. Many Christians, especially converts from Judaism, might adhere to the old custom of paying tithes (*decimæ*) and first-fruits (*primitiæ*) to the service of religion. As yet, however, there was no law on the subject.* All contributions for religious and benevolent purposes were *voluntary* gifts, and regulated according to ability and need. Thus we read, Acts xi, 29, on the occasion of a great dearth in Palestine, "The disciples, (at Antioch,) every man according to his ability, determined to send relief unto the brethren which dwelt in Judea." Just so we find it again in the case of the later collections for the poor saints in that country, Rom. xv, 26; 1 Cor. xvi, 1, seqq.; and a similar course would be taken no doubt with any salary which was to be paid to ministers.† Clearly too the voluntary system, where it really deserves this name, (for many of our so-called voluntary donations are at bottom most involuntary, and proceed from interested motives far more than from any true love towards God and the Church,) corresponds most fully with the spirit of the Gospel, and is best fitted to advance the interests of the kingdom of God; inasmuch as it calls into exercise a large amount of

* Legal enactments in regard to the payment of tithes are not met with in the Church before the sixth century. Long before this, however, we have the opinion of *Irenæus*, (Adv. Haer. iv, 8, 13, 18, etc.,) that Christians also should pay tithes, in order not to fall behind the Jews in liberality and piety. The same view was entertained by *Chrysostom*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, *Hilary*, *Augustine*, and other Church fathers. See *Augusti*, Handbuch der Christl. Archäol. I. s. 314.

† *Tertullian* holds up this spontaneous giving as still the order in his day, when he says: "Nemo compellitur, sed sponte confert." (Apol. c. 39.)

individual and personal activity in the affairs of the Church, whilst the support of religion by the State tends naturally to turn the Church into a creature of mere civil law, to make its ministers servants of the government, to prevent the virtue of liberality from coming to its full growth, and to degrade the value of the Gospel in the eyes of the people.

But where the Church is thrown for her support so entirely on the free love and gratitude of her members, as was the case during the first three centuries, it becomes so much the more necessary, if her operations are not to come to a dead stand, that she should recommend some certain system or method in giving, by which every one may impose a law on himself corresponding with his means and resources. Such was the simple yet most judicious regulation, by which Paul provided for collections in the Churches of Galatia and Greece; namely, that every one, on the first day of the week, the holyday of Christians, (compare Acts xx, 7; Rev. i, 10,) should lay by him in store a part of his earnings,* and so keep a separate treasury for the Lord according to his best ability and conscience. 1 Cor. xvi, 1, 2†

§ 5. *Relation of the Officers to the Congregations. The Universal Priesthood.*

Notwithstanding the Divine origin, the greatness and the dignity of the sacred ministry, its institution was not designed to form a chasm between it and the people—the opposition of clergy and laity in the modern sense. True, this office is not the creation or product of the Church, but rather its productive commencement, the Divinely-appointed organ by which it was to be founded and built. The apostles go before the Church, and not the contrary. Hence they are styled (not merely their doctrine and confession, but themselves as living persons in their union with Christ and as organs of the Holy Ghost) the foundation of this spiritual edifice, of which Jesus Christ is the architect and at the same time the chief cornerstone, binding and holding together the single parts, and representing at once the whole, (Eph. ii, 20; compare Matt. xvi, 18; Rev. xxi, 14.) But so soon as the Gospel had taken root, and a Christian

* ὃ τι ἂν ἐβόδωται, as he may be prospered, according to his gain and success, or as far as his means may allow. Compare Rom. i, 10; Acts 11, 29, καθὼς ἡμπορεῖτό τις; 2 Cor. viii, 12, καθὼς ἔσται ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.

† On this rule the venerable *Bengel* well remarks: "Consilium facile. Semel, non tam multum datur. Si quis singulis diebus dominicis aliquid seorsum posuit, plus collectum fuit, quam quis semel dedisset."

community was formed, there followed a relation of living reciprocity between the pastors and the people; in which, though the first took the lead, yet was it always in the spirit of brotherly love, and with the feeling that the members of the flock stand in the same relation essentially to the common Head and chief Shepherd, Jesus Christ, are sanctified by the same Spirit, and participate alike in all the privileges and benefits of the Christian salvation. Hence all believers who have been separated from the world and set apart to the service of the Triune God are styled, without exception, "brethren," and "saints." (Acts ix, 32; xxvi, 18; Rom. i, 7; viii, 27; xii, 13; xvi, 15; 1 Cor. i, 2; vi, 2; 2 Cor. i, 1; xiii, 12; Eph. i, 1; ii, 19; v, 3; vi, 18; Col. iii, 12; Phil. i, 1; iv, 21, 22; Titus ii, 14; 1 Pet. ii, 9, 10; Heb. xiii, 24; Rev. xiii, 10, etc.) Whilst on the one side the congregations were far from the assumption of authority over their leaders, and were exhorted rather to yield them affectionate obedience, (Heb. xiii, 17; 1 Cor. xvi, 16,) so on the other side also, the leaders imposed no laws and ordinances on the congregations that were not first sanctioned by their own free approbation. The officers formed no priestly corporation or caste, standing immediately between God and the people. The New Testament owns indeed the idea of the priesthood; but extends it expressly to *all* true Christians, who have direct access to Christ by faith and should come before Him every day with sacrifices of praise and intercession. In virtue of their union with Christ (*πρὸς δὲ προσερχόμενοι*), Peter styles his readers "a spiritual temple, a holy priesthood, (*ἱεράτευμα ἁγίον*), to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God by Jesus Christ," (1 Pet. ii, 4, 5; compare Rom. xii, 1;) and directly after (ver. 9), addresses them with the salutation: "Ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, (*βασιλεῖον ἱεράτευμα*), a holy nation, a peculiar people, that ye should show forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light." It is true indeed that the same high character was assigned to the people of Israel under the old economy, where with the general distinction, we know was joined also the special Aaronic priesthood, Exod. xix, 6: "Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation." In the old Testament, however, this was mainly prophecy and purpose; while in the New, on the contrary, it is the same thing fulfilled and made real. It is Christ first, "who hath washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father." Rev. i, 5, 6. In the same measure in which Christianity generally throws Judaism into the shade, does the New Testament priesthood also excel that of the Old Testament, as is well shown particularly in the Epistle to the Hebrews, (compare chap.

vii-x; xiii, 10, 15, 16.) The term clergy, (κλήρος,) which in ecclesiastical usage distinguishes the spiritual order from the laity, is applied by Peter (1 Pet. v, 3) to the congregations; so that every Christian society is regarded as set apart, like the Levites of the Old Testament, for the peculiar ownership of God.* Paul calls upon his readers, in virtue of their priestly character, to make supplication for himself and for all men, (2 Cor. i, 10, 11; 1 Tim. ii, 1;) after the pattern of Christ, the eternal High Priest, (Heb. vii, 25; compare Luke xxii, 32; John xvii, 9, 20.)

This universal priesthood will serve to explain the *liberty* of teaching and the *share* of the people in Church government, which present themselves to our notice in the apostolical age.

The general liberty of teaching was an anticipatory fulfilment of the prophecy, according to which in the time of the Messiah the Spirit should be poured out upon all flesh, even down to servants and maids, and all would be taught of God, (Joel iii, 1, seq.; Isaiah liv, 13; Jer. xxxi, 34; Acts ii, 17, 18; John vi, 45; compare 1 Thess. iv, 9; 1 John ii, 20, 21, 27.) According to this any one might come forward, speaking in an unknown tongue, praying, teaching or prophesying in the congregation, if only he possessed the requisite gift for it, without being an officer of the Church; for the gifts of the Spirit were by no means confined to official station. This liberty of teaching appears very plainly from the representation, which Paul gives us, of the meetings for public worship among the Corinthians, 1 Cor. xiv, 23-36.† Nay, from ver. 34, and 1 Cor. xi, 5, it is plain that even women, forgetting their natural position and mistaking the true idea of religious equality, (Gal. iii, 28,) prayed and prophesied in public. But here came in also the proper restriction. For in the first place Paul rebukes in general all abuse of the liberty of teaching, and reminds the Corinthians that God is a God of order and not of confusion: hence they should make use of their gifts,

* Others take τῶν κληρῶν, which at all events refers to the people, in the sense of the congregations committed by lot or election to the presbyters.

† This was still understood by an ecclesiastical writer belonging to the close of the fourth century, the author of the Commentary on Paul's Epistles, which is found among the works of *St. Ambrose*, (probably the Roman deacon *Hilary*.) Thus he says on Eph. iv, 11: "In episcopo omnes ordines sunt, quia primus sacerdos est, hoc est princeps est sacerdotum et propheta et evangelista caetera ad implenda officia ecclesiae in ministerio fidelium. Tamen postquam omnibus locis ecclesiae sunt constitutae et officia ordinata, aliter composita res est, quam coeperat. *Primum enim omnes docebant et omnes baptizabant*, quibuscunque diebus vel temporibus fuisset occasio . . . Ut ergo cresceret plebs et multiplicaretur, omnibus inter initia concessum est, et evangelizare et baptizare et Scripturas in ecclesia explanare, etc."

not all at once but one after another, with becoming regard always to the edification of the congregation, (1 Cor. xiv, 5, 12, 23-33.) James also chides the mania with which many in his Jewish-Christian congregations (where doing was so often lost sight of in talking) put themselves forward as teachers, out of pure vanity and without any inward call, adding his powerful admonition on the sins of the tongue, chap. iii, 1, seqq. The exercise of teaching thus was not to be restricted indeed to any office, but it must be joined still with the possession of the necessary gifts of the Spirit, and these were to be used with humble feeling and a sense of increased responsibility. In the next place, as regards the female sex, Paul goes still farther and directly requires that it shall take no part in the public services of the Church, 1 Cor. xiv, 33, 34; 1 Tim. ii, 12.* With this indeed 1 Cor. xi, 5 seems to stand in contradiction: "Every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered, dishonoureth her head;" and to this passage accordingly the Montanists, Quakers, and other sects, have been accustomed to appeal in justification of their practice. But the apostle here simply quotes the fact, which no doubt had place, without approving or condemning it, reserving his censure for a subsequent connexion, (chapter xiv;) for in chapter xi, he is not treating at all of public worship, but only of the custom of covering the head, which some Christian females in Corinth affected to disregard, in opposition to the prevailing notions of decency, as though all outward difference between the sexes had been abolished by Christ. Nor will it answer, to make a distinction here between public *teaching* and public *praying* and *prophesying*; and to say that Paul's prohibition regards only the first function, (the proper *διδάσκειν*, 1 Tim. ii, 12,) but not the last two, in which there is more of the inspiration of feeling. For to say nothing of his placing prophets above teachers, (Eph. iv, 11; 1 Cor. xii, 28,) his injunction is altogether general, 1 Cor. xiv, 34, that women must be silent (*σιγάωσαν*) in the Church and not speak, (*λαλεῖν*), and this whole chapter besides treats, not of didactic discourses, but directly of speaking with tongues and prophesying. Every public act of the sort implies, while it lasts, a superiority of the speaker over the hearers, and is contrary also to true feminine delicacy. Christianity has indeed improved vastly the condition of woman, and brings all heavenly blessings within her reach;† but all this without prejudice

* In the synagogue also women were not permitted to speak. Compare *Wetstein* on 1 Cor. xiv, 34, and *Vitrina*, Synag. p. 725.

† Gal. iii, 28: *οὐκ ἐνὶ ἄρσεν καὶ θήλει πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*; whereas on the contrary even Aristotle says directly: *χειρὸν ἢ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός*, *Magn. Ethic.* I, 34.

still to the Divine order of nature, by which she is formed to be in subjection to man, (Gen. iii, 16; Eph. v, 22,) and for the sphere of private life. Here, in the quiet domestic circle, she has full room for the exercise of the fairest virtues; here too she is clothed with a certain right to rule; and here she is not only to pray diligently herself, but also to teach her children to pray and to lead them in early life to the Lord.*

With this liberty of teaching corresponded in a great measure the conduct of Church government. The presbyters were indeed the regular pastors and managers of congregational business, but in such way that the people took part with them directly and indirectly in the work, and so bore also their share of its responsibility. In the first place the officers, and also the delegates for particular services, (compare 2 Cor. viii, 18, 19; Acts xv, 3,) were taken from the midst of the congregation itself, by its own election or at least consent, as we have already shown in a previous section. And then again, after they were thus in office, they were not to lord it over God's heritage, but rather to be ensamples to the flock in the way of a holy life; and to serve it, taking the oversight thereof not with constraint and force, but on the ground of its own free compliance and with due respect everywhere for its rights, (compare 1 Pet. v, 1-5.) The apostles themselves proceeded in this way. Almost all their epistles, containing instructions, exhortations, and decisions in regard to the most weighty questions, are addressed not to the Church rulers merely but to the whole congregation. In cases of controversy it appears to have been customary, according to 1 Cor. vi, 5, to choose a session of arbitrators from the body of the people, (compare Matt. xviii, 15-18.) Paul indeed excommunicated the incestuous person at Corinth, but only as united in spirit with the Corinthian congregation, (*συναχθέντων ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πνεύματος*, 1 Cor. v, 4,) so that his act was at the same time theirs. Nay, even in controversies that concerned the whole Church, the apostles did not decide by their own right merely, but drew the congregations also at least frequently into consultation. A striking proof of this is furnished by the council at Jerusalem, called to settle the great question concerning the binding authority of the Mosaic law, and the terms on which the Gentiles were to be admitted to the privileges of the Gospel. Here the apostles, elders, and brethren, come

* Probably the prophesying of the daughters of the evangelist Philip in Cæsarea, (Acts xxi, 9,) occurred also in family worship; unless we assume that something took place here that Paul would not have approved (compare *Neander* s. 267); for Luke simply narrates the fact, without pronouncing upon it any judgment.

together; the transactions go forward before the whole congregation; Peter urges his clear Divine vision in regard to Gentile baptism not as a command but only as a motive or reason, (Acts xv, 7, seqq.; compare xi, 2, seqq. ;) the whole assembly joins in passing the final resolution;* and the written decision of the council goes forth, not in the name of the apostles and presbyters only, but in the name of the brethren generally, and is addressed to the collective body of the Gentile Christians in Syria and Cilicia.†

This relation between the rulers and their congregations, to which the name *democratic* is sometimes applied,‡ though not altogether aptly, stands closely connected with the extraordinary effusion of the Holy Ghost in the apostolic age, and was secured by this against the abuses which must necessarily attend such a form of government, where the mass of the people is under the dominion of ignorance and wild passion. We see mirrored in it to a certain extent the ideal state, which will come in when the prophecy of the outpouring of the Spirit upon all flesh shall have its absolute fulfilment.

We must now go over the several offices of the apostolical Church more in detail, taking up first those that look towards the Church as a whole; since this idea is older than that of a single congregation, although both fall together as to extent originally in the mother-Church at Jerusalem. But, as space fails us, this discussion must be reserved for another article.

* Chapter xv, 22: τότε ἔδοξε τοῖς ἀποστόλοις καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.

† Ver. 23: οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῖς . . . ἀδελφοῖς, etc.

‡ For example, by *Rothe* in his work before quoted, (p. 148 and frequently.) We disapprove of this title, because it is derived from a foreign sphere, that of politics, and may be easily misunderstood. In the Church strictly there is no kind of dominion, neither democracy, nor aristocracy, nor monarchy, but only service (*διακονία*). The very Saviour of sinners himself came into the world, not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many, Matt. xx, 28; Luke xxii, 27; John xiii. 14, 15, seq.; Phil. ii, 6-8. *Rothe* at the same time asserts this so-called democratic character in favour only of the congregational order, the government of congregations singly taken, and not in favour of the polity of the Church as a whole, which he styles rather (p. 310) *autocratic*, and which, in his view, even before the close of the apostolical age, immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem and under the auspices mainly of St. John, became episcopal. As regards the first point, however, he goes evidently too far, when he says, (for instance, p. 153) of the congregational officers: "They were *purely society functionaries*, the mere magistracy of the people, whose authority flowed from no other source but the will of the congregation itself, to which they owed their election." Compare against this what we have already said on the divine origin of all Church-offices; in part also the tract of the Rev. *Charles Rothe*, (since gone over to the Irvingites), entitled: "Die wahren Grundlagen der Christlichen Kirchenverfassung." 1844, s. 3-33.

ART. V.—PROGRESS OF LIBERAL PRINCIPLES.

LIBERAL principles lie at the foundation of man's real good. Without freedom of thought, belief, speech, and action, there can be little or no human improvement: hence the anxiety always felt by Christians and philanthropists for the progress of liberty. Often has it appeared that the power of tyranny was about to be broken, never more to have the ascendancy, but almost as often have these encouraging prospects been blasted. Many—in contemplating the long-protracted bondage of the masses of mankind, in considering how often they fail in striking for their rights, and the little progress consequently made in human amelioration—have been led to conclude, that, on the whole, the cause of freedom gains no ground, and the world grows no better. We know that while there is progress in some things there is retrogression in others—that while mankind have improved in some periods or places, they have deteriorated in others; but a careful review in history will show, we think, that in the main *liberal principles* have ever been advancing, and the world steadily improving. Though the standard of freedom has been struck down in every nation of Europe, France excepted, (if, indeed, we may except that nation,) where it has been so hopefully unfurled within the last few years, yet the philanthropist has no cause for despair. History, as well as reason and revelation, teaches that right must eventually triumph. While the present holds up so gloomy a picture in respect to freedom and progress, let us examine the past, and see if we cannot find in its annals ground to hope for the future.

In times previous to the advent of the Saviour, hardly anything appears but wrongs, violence, and oppression. All is one dismal Sahara with but here and there an oasis. Egypt is thought to have enjoyed, to some extent, the blessings of liberty in some parts of her existence. But that Egypt ever had a government under which the people were free, or a government such as a limited monarchy is generally understood to be, does not appear from history. It is doubtful, indeed, whether the mass of the Egyptians, in any age, were qualified, in point of intelligence, for such a government. It appears from some things in Xenophon, that Persia, before it was united with the Median kingdom, had a government similar to a limited monarchy. But in reference to most Oriental nations of antiquity, we gather nothing from history but what leads us to suppose that they were incessantly subjected to tyranny. We find it different, however, when we turn our attention to the more Western nations.

Greece and Rome were not unmindful of liberty. A portion of the people were really free in some periods of the history of these nations, but in other periods the same was not true of any of the people, and at all times a considerable portion of the inhabitants were doomed to slavery. The Greeks and Romans acted upon principles most destructive of liberty. These principles taught that the prisoner taken in war had forfeited his life—that the conqueror had absolute control of it, and might take it at pleasure. If the victor chose to preserve the life of the captive, the latter became the slave, the absolute property of the former. From the result of these principles, Greece and Rome teemed with a population deprived of every right, and subjected to every species of indignity and cruelty. Italy in particular abounded with the victims of oppression; almost every nation and tribe of Europe contributed to their supply. The fair-skinned Angles, as well as the swarthy Iberians, were sold in the shambles of Rome. Captives taken in war were not alone the articles of this commerce; but so general had the traffic become, and so hardened and darkened was the ancient European mind in regard to it, that even parents sold their own children into bondage.

Thus we see that the Greeks and Romans, so eager for liberty themselves, were ever ready to set their iron feet upon others. But the day of reckoning at length came—the enslavers became enslaved. If we may learn of their history, it teaches, in the plainest manner, that those who wrest freedom from others must themselves lose it; and from the maledictions of Scripture against oppression, we should be led to conclude, that they are destined to lose it as a just judgment from Heaven. But if we seek for a philosophical solution of this truth, it will be found in the fact that slavery, if permitted to exist for successive generations, is sure to work moral corruption among the governing portions of the people, that must necessarily lead to national ruin.

The freest government of antiquity, nay doubtless the freest that ever existed, our own not excepted, was that which God gave to his chosen people. Under that government the Israelites had unparalleled prosperity for some three hundred years. They attained to distinguished greatness, notwithstanding their territory was quite limited. Solomon, their third king, was able to accomplish the wonders which distinguished his reign, only in consequence of the prosperity of the nation during its democracy. Samuel, the prophet of the Lord, made known to the people the evils that would come upon them if they established a monarchy, (1 Samuel viii, 11-18;) but evil counsels prevailed, and their republic was changed to a

kingdom. Their glory then departed. Ever after they continued to decline, till finally their land became "a perpetual hissing," and they "an astonishment, a proverb and a byword among all nations."

The Christian era may be regarded as the true time when liberal principles began to gain ascendancy and permanence. But human nature was the same before that it was afterwards. Mankind had always sighed for liberty, and occasionally some ineffectual, spasmodic efforts were made to obtain it. Whenever the blow was struck for freedom, myriads were found who were not only ready to pour out their blood for so great a boon, but readily chose to die rather than submit to the will of a conqueror. When Julius Cæsar was staining the soil of Europe with the blood of her inhabitants, that he might have the glory of conquering and enslaving them, such was the resistance he encountered, that he exclaimed in his Commentaries, "*Omnes homines natura libertati studere, et conditionem servitutis odisse.*"* *All men naturally love liberty and hate the condition of servitude.* But though all men loved liberty, and thought, and said, and did much in reference to this great good for which they instinctively longed, its benefits were but indifferently realized till the inspired apostles opened their message to mankind. Then, and not till then, did liberal principles begin to be so clearly understood, and so generally embraced, as to render it impossible for tyrants to extinguish or suppress them.

At the commencement of the Christian era, despotism was holding universal sway. The glory of Greece's freer days had long before departed. The liberal government of the Roman republic had been changed to a military despotism, or to what was well nigh such. The Roman emperor, whose power was then felt by almost every nation, stood ready with his mailed legions to suppress the first risings of liberty. Still human nature was the same: all men loved liberty and hated servitude. What mankind needed was something to call out and direct the inherent principles of their nature; something that would hold up to their view their true interests, and direct in pursuit of them. Christianity supplied this stupendous desideratum. The Roman power seems to have descried this inevitable tendency of the system established by Jesus of Nazareth, and became at once jealous of the rising Church. Hence persecution followed upon persecution. But the noblest spirits were found in the Christian Church; their blood was poured out like water, not on the field of battle in murderous conflict, but calmly and passively in testimony, and we may say in defence of their faith. In spite of the allied powers of earth and hell, Christianity extended through

* Cæsar's Com., lib. 3, cap. 10.

the west of Asia, the north of Africa, and the south and west of Europe, instructing mankind as to their destinies, duties, and relations, laying down and enforcing the most important principles. One fact connected with the establishment of Christianity should have our particular attention—that is, it gave rise to the representative principle in the formation of its councils, which were often made up of delegates that represented different sections of the Church, in different and distant countries. State legislative bodies, similarly formed, had their exemplar in the Christian Church, and it need not be affirmed how much this principle has done, and is destined still to do, to harmonize, free, and elevate the human race. Finally, in tracing the progress of Christianity we trace the progress of liberal principles.

It is greatly to the praise of the Christian religion that it contributed, as some historians represent, to the fall of the Roman empire, and thereby to the destruction of despotism. At the time the Roman empire ceased to be, the principles of liberty were better understood and more widely diffused than ever before; but the Roman hierarchy had already gained powerful ascendancy. Having engrafted upon itself the essential features of the ancient paganism, it became an engine for darkening, rather than enlightening mankind. Popes and bishops allied themselves to emperors and kings, and gained such power over them, and made their selfish interests so mutually dependent, that they all took advantage of the people's ignorance to lay upon them the chains of slavery.

In surveying historical facts that relate directly to our subject, we may notice some that are well known; but by following events through the middle ages, we shall be afforded the pleasure—notwithstanding there was so much of darkness and gloom—of contemplating the steady progress of light, truth, and liberty. We see the people during these periods beginning to enjoy some of the benefits of liberty; but there was mingled with those benefits much of anarchy and confusion. Principally out of this state of things, historians suppose, grew the feudal system—a system fraught with oppression and cruelty. But chivalry now arose amid the mass of adverse influences, and struck for “the right and the true.” It must be acknowledged that there was much to be condemned in its votaries, and that it was sometimes turned to the account of despotism is true; but it is equally true that the spirit of chivalry, embracing as it did the principles of valour, generosity, and charity, exerted an important influence throughout Europe, in behalf of liberty.

The world, however, is principally and primarily indebted to

Christianity for the blessings of liberty. While the Roman hierarchy was darkening, degrading, and enslaving the people, the pure principles of the Christian religion were not extinct, but were preserved in great purity among the Waldenses, and doubtless elsewhere, and were exerting their power. While papacy and the feudal system, while spiritual and temporal princes, were all combined to exterminate the liberties of the people, the principles of freedom were operating, the people were restless, active, and moving for their rights. But we see no very rapid advance made in liberal principles, at any one time, for the long period of a thousand years subsequent to the fall of the Roman despotism. But during those long and dismal ages, tyranny with all its aids was never able to gain entire ascendancy—it could never entirely subdue the spirit of liberty. In the latter part of this protracted period, in the times of Wiclif and of Huss, we see some signal promotions of those momentous reforms that commenced in the beginning of the sixteenth century. When these reforms commenced, there arose a tremendous struggle between oppression and freedom, between light and darkness.

This great era dates not simply a reformation in religion, as it is sometimes regarded, but a reformation in the whole system of social order. Martin Luther was not, as he is commonly considered, simply a reformer in ecclesiastical affairs. He was, to be sure, the first among the great ecclesiastical reformers of that memorable age; but his influence rested not alone with the Church—it reached the state. Though his movements were aimed at the corruptions of the Church, they told against all oppression. His giant blows drove "his Saxon steel" to the very vitals of the tyranny of state. He taught civil as well as religious liberty. He showed the people to what extent they had been robbed of their rights, and called their attention to revealed truth, as the only sure guarantee of their liberties. "The word of God" he declared to be "the true source whence all liberty flows." Having rescued this invaluable treasure from monastic seclusion, and having given it to the people in their own language, and copies of it being indefinitely multiplied through the facilities of printing, a blow was struck, from the effects of which all oppression must eventually die. A more rapid progress was then made in liberal principles than ever before. We see them gaining substantial vantage ground, from which they never can be driven. The settlement of our country followed close upon the establishment of the principles of the Reformation. Enlightened and guided by them, she enjoyed a great measure of liberty, and in reality governed herself, even during her colonial

existence;* and to these principles is she mainly indebted for independence.

In examining the course of events, we should not leave Holland unnoticed, so conspicuous does she stand forth in the annals of liberty, and so remarkable and peculiar is her history in that respect. The people occupying the lowlands about the mouths of the Rhine, and to the north of that river, the ancestors of the modern Dutch, were never subjected to the Roman rule. We believe that principles taught and practised, whether good or bad, are far-reaching in their influence. But whether the principles of liberty, so successfully maintained by the original occupants of Holland, were or were not handed down from generation to generation to the times of the Reformation, certain it is, that the people of that country better understood and more fully enjoyed their rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, than those of any other country of Europe. Thither freedom's advocates were wont to flee and find refuge from persecution and death. It is thought that the pilgrim ancestors of New-England gained some additional knowledge of human rights during their sojourn among the Dutch, previously to their departure from the Old World, which enabled them the better to establish those rights on their settlement in the New.

But more of instruction and interest is to be acquired in a survey of the progress of liberal principles in the British empire. Macaulay remarks that, "the sources of the noblest rivers, which spread fertility over continents, and bear richly-laden fleets to the sea, are to be sought in wild and barren mountain-tracts, incorrectly laid down on maps, and rarely explored by travellers. To such a tract the history of our country during the thirteenth century may not unaptly be compared. Sterile and obscure as is that portion of our annals, it is there that we must seek for the origin of our freedom, our prosperity, and our glory." It will hardly do to controvert Macaulay, but we may prolong his imagery. "The sources" of these rivers are supplied by water from rains and snows that percolates through the mountains; and we must look far back of the thirteenth century for those things that contributed to the "origin" of Britain's freedom, prosperity,

* The advantages accruing to the colonies from being under the protection of the mother country, were more than counterbalanced by her encroachments. Their history not only shows that they governed themselves, but presents the singular spectacle of a people ever engaged in the two-fold work of governing themselves and of repelling a power constantly seeking to govern them *contrary to their wishes and interests*.

and glory. It has been held* that our Anglo-Saxon ancestors descended from the Scythians, who so signally defended their liberties against all invasions, in times prior to the Christian era: particularly, that the Saxons in the north of Germany were a tribe of that people; and hence their love of liberty, and their knowledge, valour, and success in preserving it. Some may think this theory as unworthy of credence, as the notion of the Romans, that they originated from the Trojans. However all this may be, the Anglo-Saxons, from their earliest history, have been more successful in maintaining their rights than most other portions of the human race: not, probably, because they were constitutionally more attached to freedom, better able to defend it, or more valourous than the rest of mankind; but because they have been more favourably circumstanced, perhaps, for the defence of their rights than other nations. As a people they have been greatly distinguished for intelligence, valour, and independence. Nevertheless, very many of them have been sunk to the lowest depths of slavery. It is interesting to go over their history, from the time that many of them were held as absolute property by masters of the same Anglo-Saxon blood,—from the time that the ancestors of such men as Locke, Blackstone, and Peel were villains, adscripto to the soil, or absolute slaves,—and see them emerging from such a state, and steadily rising to all the advantages and glories of freedom.

A writer in the *Biblical Repository* of January, 1836, in an article entitled, *Slavery in the Middle Ages*, remarks:—"There seems to have been no general law for the emancipation of slaves in the statute book of England. Though the genius of the English constitution favoured personal liberty, yet servitude continued long in England, in particular places. In the year 1514, we find a charter of Henry VIII. enfranchising two slaves belonging to one of his manors. As late as 1547, there is a commission from Elizabeth with respect to the manumission of certain slaves belonging to her." Macaulay informs us, that "some faint traces of the institution of villanage were detected by the curious so late as the days of the Stuarts; nor has that institution ever, to this hour, been abolished by statute." The important fact then appears, that *the extinction of slavery in England did not result from statutory law, but from the noiseless action of the liberal principles of the British constitution.* Though the slavery of the Anglo-Saxons came to an end along in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, slaves continued to be introduced into England, and held as such, down to 1772, when the well-known case of Somerset took place. The last

* Sharon Turner's *Hist. Anglo-Saxons*.

of slavery in the British foreign possessions, ceased in 1844. Thus we see the power of Britain and the principles of her constitution simultaneously and co-extensively extending, till eventually, when the sun sets not on her dominions it shines not upon a British slave.

The primary principles which have led to these most auspicious results, and the leading events in this advancement, ought to be carefully studied. These principles are few and simple. The events are not numerous, but stand boldly and proudly out in English history. By the Norman conquest the laws and usages by which the people of England had been previously governed were overthrown, and the feudal system established. For one hundred and fifty years from that time the English groaned under intolerable oppression. That oppression was broken, or very materially diminished, by Magna Charta. Among the important provisions of that instrument the 46th article stands pre-eminent. It reads as follows:—"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, disseized or outlawed, or banished, or any way destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, or commit him to prison, unless by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." This was leaven in the meal. According to this provision, no freeman could be deprived of his liberties, except by legal process, and no legal process could do it but in case of debt or crime. This principle operating in connexion with other important principles of the British constitution, rendered the liberties of the English people safe, so long as they were at all vigilant. The provision in question remained for nearly five hundred years, without any law or regulation to give it any definite application, or to secure its action in all cases of unlawful violence. Still it had its place in the sure foundations of English law, and could at any time be appealed to with effect. But it came into more thorough and efficient action after the enactment of the law of the writ of Habeas Corpus, which took place in the reign of Charles the Second. This law is justly called the great bulwark and second Magna Charta of English liberty. After it had been in existence about one hundred years, it was most effectually used in the highly important case of Somerset, already mentioned, which was brought before Lord Mansfield by Granville Sharpe. So strong were the prejudices that existed against the race to which Somerset belonged, so long had the world been accustomed to behold their degradation, and so great were the monied interests involved in the case, that even the stern and lofty Mansfield seemed to be warped against the plaintiff. He

• Tindal's Rapin.

delayed judgment, and twice threw out the suggestion, "that the master might put an end to the present litigation by manumitting the slave;" but the suggestion was providentially not attended to. The matter was pending for nearly five months, in consequence of pleadings and postponements; but the great principles of English law at length prevailed, and Mansfield gave his ever-memorable decision, that secured so important a triumph to justice, humanity, and liberty.* It was, comparatively, a very small matter that Somerset was liberated. This decision—to use the appropriate and expressive words of a certain writer—"revolutioned the jurisprudence of the realm; overthrew ancient precedents; reversed venerated decisions; and inscribed beneath the cross of St. George, on the royal flag, '*Slaves cannot breathe in England.*'"

The cause of liberty then received a new and powerful impulse, and a somewhat different direction. Soon commenced those movements that led to the abolition of the slave-trade, and the ultimate entire extinction of slavery in the British dominions.

The contest for the abolition of the slave-trade shows how difficult it is for right to gain ascendancy over wrong, or liberty over tyranny, where prejudice and power, connected with monied interests, are to be overcome. For twenty years the contest incessantly went on, sometimes to the personal danger of those in favour of the measure. Every inch of ground was disputed; but the enterprise steadily won upon the sentiments of the nation, and gained favour in parliament, till finally the legality of the cruel traffic terminated in 1807. Next commenced those operations that resulted in the emancipation of the slaves of the British West Indies, and the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. These movements continued; and on the first of April, 1844, no less than twelve millions of hereditary slaves in the British East Indies, became free by act of parliament; since which time, no slaves have been legally held in the dominions of the English.

In thus looking over the course of events, we see how a few well-apprehended, leading principles have operated to raise the great body of the English people from slavery to liberty, and to strike off the shackles of oppression wherever the British power has extended. During five hundred years, from the time that Magna Charta was wrested from King John, we see no very marked advances made, at any one time, towards the attainment of human right. The mass of the people had not become sufficiently enlightened for any special advancement, although they were steadily increasing in intelligence

* A full account of this interesting case is found in the life of Granville Sharpe.

and becoming more and more possessed of their rights. Though not successful in their attempts to establish a republic in the times of Cromwell, the convulsions of that period prepared the way for the revolution of 1688, and for the subsequent universal establishment of liberty in the English dominions. There is still, it is well known, much of oppression and suffering in Great Britain and Ireland; but it would be unjust to charge it all upon the British government, or any of it upon the real principles of the British constitution. Popery and the vices of portions of the people, contribute largely to it. The debt of Great Britain incurred by wars, gives rise to burdensome taxation;* the remains of the Feudal system, in the existence of extensive manors, worked by tenants; the legal support of the established Church, so utterly inconsistent with liberty,—these things dispose many to give but little credit to England's professions of regard for freedom, or for what she has actually done in its behalf. Nevertheless, wherever it is clearly apprehended that England grants liberty, it should be allowed. We apologize not for England's faults. We have simply traced the real progress of liberty in her dominions, from which we can draw lessons of valuable instruction even in this Republic.

We should be glad to speak of the progress of liberty in other portions of Europe, but this we have neither time nor limits to do at present. Of our own country we need not speak at length, though a word or two we cannot withhold. Freedom has been her watchword through all the periods of her history, yet her history tells not of freedom only. Her Declaration of Independence is a text-book of liberty; but what a commentary do we write upon it in the slavery allowed to exist! Her constitution is such, that only by assuming that its framers attached certain meaning to certain words, can it be made to shield oppression in case of a single human being, and yet one-seventh of the people are slaves. But amid all this inconsistency and gloom, there is ground for hope. The principles on which our government is based, together with the prevalence of Christianity, will in time, it is believed, work out the entire enfranchisement of all in our land; and to similar causes are we to look for the ultimate triumph of freedom throughout the world.

From the investigation of this subject it appears plain that no substantial success can be made in this work, unless principles be

* It is ascertained from a late statistical work, entitled, "Porter's Progress of the Nation," vol. ii, that full ninety per cent. of all that is paid into the British Treasury goes to liquidate the interest on the war debt.

clearly defined and understood. The people may depose kings and terminate dynasties; but if they have no clear ideas of human rights, they may be compared to a ship at sea without rudder, the sport of winds and waves. We have seen that the English people have been chiefly indebted to well-apprehended principle. In this country, the people have always had the most definite ideas of what belonged to their rights. Success is not to be expected in the declamation of demagogues, the stormy debates of the legislative hall, or in the force of arms, but in the silent heaven-working of enlightened principle.

Still more than all this is necessary. *There must be virtue in all classes.* There may be eloquence and ability in the Senate; there may be skill and bravery in war; there may be intelligence among the populace; but if virtue does not generally prevail, the cause of liberty can make no abiding progress. When the love of glory, of power, of self-aggrandizement, prevails to the seclusion of integrity, patriotism, and philanthropy, the people will find themselves still bowing under the yoke of oppression, however long they may labour or eagerly look for freedom.

It is also indispensable that the views of mankind should be corrected in respect to war. In some rare instances men have taken up arms in defence of their rights, and have been successful. But for the most part, war is a grand generator of vice, ignorance, and slavery. M. Bouvet, in a late speech in the French Assembly, well remarked:—"War, founded on force and restraint, is contrary to *liberty*. War, enabling the strong to triumph over the weak, is contrary to *equality*. War, shattering the law of love, which unites individuals and communities, is contrary to *fraternity*. Thus the Republic, to be consistent with its own constitution, ought henceforth to endeavour to suppress the military system, and to substitute for it an *international jurisdiction*. Such an object is so honest, so generous, so important to the public welfare, that France need not blush to make it the principal aim of its political existence." Happy would it be for France to follow the lead of such a champion.

If we look for the true reasons why liberty has made no more progress in Europe since the commencement of the great movements near the close of the last century, it will be found in the lack of intelligence in the people, and of virtue in those who led—especially in the latter particular. There are junctures when the cause of freedom depends on a single individual. Might not integrity in Bonaparte have established the liberties of France, and led to the enfranchisement of Europe? Does not truth forbid the concession that circumstances compelled him to grasp the sceptre? Might

not Washington, in a particular period* of the Revolution, with as much or more propriety, and perhaps as much success, have seated himself on a throne? Patriotism in Washington saved the cause of freedom in America; ambition in Bonaparte ruined it, for a time, in Europe.

But notwithstanding the European movements at the close of the last century and the commencement of the present, terminated so disastrously, liberal principles did make no inconsiderable advancement during those times. Light was disseminated and aspirations kindled up among the masses, that contributed largely to the late commotions of continental Europe, in which we see decidedly more intelligence and virtue, and more progress made in the establishment of the rights of man, than in those former movements; and we look for intelligence, virtue, and liberty, to go forward in time to come, as Christianity advances in its purity, simplicity, and power.

ART. VI.—PLUTARCH'S MORALIA.

THE writings of Plutarch are partly historical and partly moral. Most of his treatises admit of a ready and distinctive reference to the one or the other of these classes. Some, however, lie on the dividing line between them, and all partake more or less of both the historical and the moral element. His history always teaches lessons of ethical and practical wisdom; and his ethics are always illustrated and embellished by the facts of history. Endowed with large powers both of observation and reflection, disciplined alike in the study and the practice of the virtues, taught scarcely more by communion with books than by intercourse with men and things, he is everywhere at once the historian and the moralist, tracing events back to their causes and forward to their results, linking duty with its reward and wrong-doing with its punishment, developing theory in practice and illustrating principles by facts, interested in facts by themselves and loving principles for their own sake, but supremely delighting to unite them in a harmonious, living form, in which the soul shall animate and inform the body, while the body shall give utterance and expression to the soul. Plutarch revels in concrete forms, in actual existence, in real life—he has no eye and no heart for barren abstractions. He is not at home in speculative

* The time alluded to is, when Washington and his men lay at Valley Forge, suffering from neglect, and chafed with criminations for their want of success.

philosophy. Though usually classed as an Academic philosopher, his real master was Socrates, like whom he sought fruits more practically than Plato and more spiritually than Bacon. His Ethics are virtually Lives, as his Lives are essentially Ethics.

Plutarch is said to have been the author of about three hundred historical and philosophical treatises, of which less than half are extant. The principal historical pieces are the Parallel Lives, in which he has written the biographies of forty-six Greeks and Romans, and arranged them in pairs, each pair containing the life of a Greek and a Roman, between whose character and history there are usually some striking points of resemblance. Each pair is also followed by a comparison of the two men, in which the parallel features, whether of likeness or contrast, are grouped together or summed up in studied antithesis: in a few pairs, however, the comparison is omitted or lost. There are also four separate lives, which are usually placed, in the editions, after the forty-six parallels.* Besides these, fourteen biographies by the hand of Plutarch are known to have been lost, in compensation for which several others, such as the lives of Homer and the Ten Orators, have been attributed to him, whose authorship, we think, he would not be ambitious to claim. If the same author wrote the life of Demosthenes in the Parallels and the life of Demosthenes in the Ten Orators, he must have written the latter when he was asleep.

There are some ten or twelve treatises, usually placed under the head of *Moralia* and printed indiscriminately with the moral essays, which are strictly historical or anecdotal in their contents. Among these are the essay on the Malignity of Herodotus, which needs no refutation and scarcely deserves mention; the Parallels from Grecian and Roman History, designed to confirm the credibility of certain improbable events in Roman history by the analogy of similar events in Grecian; and the Apophthegms or sayings of distinguished kings and commanders, dedicated to the Emperor Trajan and intended to be a kind of supplement to the *doings* of illustrious men recorded in the Lives,—all of which some critics have pronounced supposititious, and we would cheerfully relinquish as adding little, especially the first, to our author's credit, though candour obliges us to add that they bear strong internal evidence, especially the last two of having proceeded from the pen of Plutarch. To the same category belong also the pieces entitled, The Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander the Great, the Fortune of the Romans, and Whether the Athenians were more renowned for their Warlike Achievements

* In the Leipsic edition, the Life of Artaxerxes is placed between those of Cicero and Demetrius.

or for their Learning,—three splendid declamations, in which the author imputes the conquests of Alexander chiefly to virtue, the empire of Rome pre-eminently to fortune, and the glory of Athens not more to literature than to military prowess. The first two of these pieces, when compared with each other, have been received by some critics as a demonstration of Plutarch's partiality for the Greeks over the Romans, and even as a key to the whole design of the author in writing his *Parallel Lives*. We have already declared* our inability to accept such a conclusion; and the very pieces, on which the argument chiefly rests, furnish a sufficient refutation of it. How any one can read the introduction to the treatise on the Fortune of the Romans, and still accuse the writer of an envious or bigoted prejudice against the Roman Empire, passes our comprehension. "Nature herself," he says, "who produces all things, is by some reputed to be fortune, by others to be wisdom. The present discussion, therefore, attaches great honour and an enviable distinction to Rome; since she is thought worthy of the same question which is wont to be argued respecting the earth and seas, the heavens and the stars, viz., whether she owes her being to chance or to providence. And I think it may be truly affirmed, that notwithstanding the fierce and lasting wars which have ever been going on between Fortune and Virtue, they both amicably conspired to rear the structure of her vast power and dominion, and harmoniously co-operated in the execution and perfection of that most beautiful of human works." Fortune and Virtue are then introduced and painted in lively colours, as entering the lists of controversy. Fortune, as a goddess firmly seated at Rome and worshipped by the Romans above all the Virtues, boasts at great length of all the miracles in the early mythical and poetical history of Rome; of the unexpected and marvellous deliverances of the city and its armies in the wars of the Gauls, the Carthaginians, the Cimbri and the Teutones; of the want of union and co-operation among the enemies of the State, who might easily have crushed it by their combined forces, but divided fell one after another under its dominion; and finally she vaunts, as her crowning favour, the early death of Alexander, before he had completed his conquests in the East and turned his victorious arms, as he would have done, against Italy and the West. The argument, however, appears to terminate abruptly in the midst of the sketch of Alexander's ambitious schemes. And the reply, which the reader is prepared to expect from Virtue, if it was ever written, is no longer extant. Whether such a piece affords a sufficient ground for charg-

* *Methodist Quarterly* for January, 1850, pp. 20, 21.

ing a great historian with Grecian partialities and anti-Roman prejudices, let each one judge for himself.

The *Moralia* properly so-called, or rather the philosophical works of Plutarch as contradistinguished from the historical, are over sixty in number. They treat of a great variety of subjects, and might properly be subdivided into social, political, physical, metaphysical, ethical and religious treatises.

To the sphere of *social* or private life belong the Conjugal Precepts and the Education of Children, of the excellence of which we spoke in a former paper,* and upon which we cannot now dwell. Here belong also the treatises on Love of Offspring, Fraternal Love, and the Virtues of Woman; the first two quite creditable to the author's head and heart, but the last, a one-sided view of woman as exhibiting in similar circumstances the same stern and masculine virtues with the other sex. They who would turn the sex into Amazons and viragos, will find in this treatise of Plutarch some thirty examples adduced from as many different States of antiquity, and to their purpose quite. The Consolation to Apollonius on the loss of a son, and that to his own wife on the death of a daughter, present the author in quite another—aspect as alive to all the peculiar relations and all the tender sensibilities of the family-circle. Nor can we refrain from mentioning in this connexion those fine educational tracts on Hearing (that is, Reading) the Poets, and on Hearing in General, that is, on Listening to Instruction and Advice; the former designed particularly as a guide to the teacher of youth, the latter addressed to the young man himself and adapted to aid him in the work of self-education. We have often admired the grand principle which is inculcated at the beginning of this latter treatise as revealing in a single short sentence the whole secret of virtue and happiness: "They only who have learned to desire what they ought, live as they desire." So also the sweet singer and king of Israel says: "Delight thyself in the Lord, and he shall give thee the desires of thy heart." Passing out from the family and the school into the wider social relations, we meet with tracts on the Distinction between a Flatterer and a Friend, on a Multitude of Friends, and on Deriving Benefit from Enemies. In all these treatises on the domestic and social relations, as in all matters pertaining to ordinary life, the good sense and kind heart of the author shine conspicuous. The Essay on Love, and the Love Stories, (a collection of five short historical novels, or tragical histories as they have been sometimes called,) disclose a depravation of sentiment and a corruption of morals on this subject, which no nation but those who were guilty of

* Methodist Quarterly for January, 1850, p. 24.

it—the æsthetic but unchaste Greeks—has ever been able to contemplate without a blush, which their best philosophers, not excepting Plutarch and Socrates, did not stamp with deserved infamy; though Socrates reprobated it, and Plutarch wrote well in praise of pure and wedded love, and, with that full belief in the justice of an overruling Providence which is so characteristic of his writings, recorded in repeated instances the righteous retribution that sooner or later followed an unrestrained and unnatural indulgence of the passions.

The principal *political* essays bear the following titles: That Philosophers ought especially to Associate with Rulers; To an Unlearned Prince; Whether an Aged Man should be permitted to Govern the State; Political Precepts or Rules for Government; Monarchy, Democracy and Oligarchy; The Laws and Customs of the Lacedæmonians. In common with most of the Greek philosophers, Plutarch admires the political virtues, if not also the political system, of the Spartans. He prefers monarchy to either of the other *simple* forms of government, alleging Plato for his authority; yet he dissuades from violent changes and insists on the good of the people as the only proper chief end and aim of rulers, for the attainment of which he lays down some very patriotic and upright as well as politic precepts. On the whole, however, we are struck with the inferiority of his political works to those on the common affairs of private life. The day was already past for enlightened and liberal views of government. We must go back several centuries, to Aristotle's Politics, if we would study the master-piece of Grecian wisdom in political science.

The following are the titles of the *physical* treatises: Physical Questions; the First Principle of Cold; the Face seen in the Disc of the Moon; Whether Fire or Water is the more Useful; Whether Land Animals or Aquatics are the more Intelligent; that Brutes possess Reason; on Eating Animal Food.

Plutarch argues strenuously, that the lower animals have not only rational souls, but reasoning powers, even to the practical comprehension of the syllogism; and he utterly repudiates eating flesh, as of a piece with cannibalism,—nay, with devouring our own kindred. His repugnance to animal food is greatly increased by a cordial belief in the doctrine of transmigration of souls, which makes beasts not only kindred, but, by possibility, identical with men. He also adduces in opposition to the practice the anatomical structure of the human frame, which is so unlike that of the carnivorous animals, as to demonstrate that he was intended to subsist on other food. The debate on the relative intelligence of land and sea animals—or, as it might properly be styled, the treatise on the sagacity of ani-

mals,—is an exceedingly entertaining and instructive synopsis of the most remarkable manifestations of animal instinct, which can hardly be exceeded in interest, though it may doubtless be surpassed in accuracy and extent, by the natural histories of our day. It is the unfailing mine, from which modern editors and compilers have translated or copied anecdotes on that subject for their Greek readers, as well as for story-books in other languages.

The Man in the Moon Plutarch explains as we do, by the elevations and depressions on the Moon's surface, though not without suggesting several other theories; and he develops incidentally the true doctrine of the Moon's light as well as of its relation to tides and eclipses; though of the physical causes of these phenomena he cannot form even an approximate conception, and he ridicules the doctrine of antipodes and a centre of gravity with a serious earnestness that throws the comic character of Deacon Homespun quite into the shade. Cold, in Plutarch's *Physics*, is not the mere absence of heat, but a positive substance referable to one of the four primary elements (fire, air, water and earth,) he does not know which, except that it is not fire. In reading the *Physical Questions*, we hardly know which are the most laughable—the questions themselves, or the answers to the questions, or the reasons for the answers. For example: "What is the reason that sea-water does not nourish trees? Is it not for the same reason, that it does not nourish land animals? For Plato, Anaxagoras and Democritus think, that plants *are* land animals. Nor, though sea-water is aliment to marine plants, will it therefore nourish plants on the land, since it can neither penetrate the roots because of its grossness, nor ascend by reason of its weight. Or is it, because drought is a great enemy to trees, and sea-water is of a drying faculty? Or is it, because oil is destructive to plants and kills things anointed with it? But sea-water partakes much of the nature of oil, for it burns with it. Or is it, because sea-water is not fit to drink?" etc., etc. So the discussion on the comparative utility of fire and water quite disturbs our gravity by its striking resemblance to the declamations and debates of school-boys and sophomores; only it perpetuates absurdities which no child would now be guilty of. But the Greek schools of philosophy—nay, the Greek agoras and porticos—were all so many debating-clubs, and their senates and popular assemblies were, far more than ours, schools of rhetoric. The *Physics* of Aristotle himself are a wide *meta*-physical battle-field, in which entities and non-entities, qualities and quiddities jostle and annihilate each other, to the no small amusement of the English and Baconian reader. And if Plutarch in his physical researches inquired what must be and

ought to be, not what is—if he not unfrequently mistook an illustration for an argument, an analogy for a demonstration, a hasty generalization for a sound induction,—it was only in imitation of the master of the Academy, who never wanted any stronger proof of a doctrine or theory, than that it pleased his imagination as beautiful, or commended itself to his judgment as fit.

The Platonic Questions, the Doctrines of Philosophers, the Procreation of the Soul, and even the piece on Music, may well enough be classified as *metaphysical* treatises, though the subjects discussed are many of them physical or ethical. Their chief value to us consists in the history of ancient opinions,* which they embody. Plutarch was not a metaphysician. When he undertook to play that part, he did it *invita Minerva*. Yet he sometimes attempts to follow the earlier philosophers, particularly Plato, into the realm of ideas, causes, and the like abstractions, and loses himself, even more hopelessly than his leader, in a chaos of mathematical and musical, physical and metaphysical subtleties, where none but a Greek or a German, or perchance some such erratic spirit as Milton sings of, can live and breathe. His doctrine as to the origin of body and soul was this: "Whereas the world consists of two parts, body and soul, God did not create the body; but, matter eternally existing, he formed and fitted it, binding it up and confining what was infinite within limits and figures. But the soul, partaking of understanding reason and harmony, was not merely the work of God but part of him, not only made but begotten by him." The following extract is a fuller development of his ideas on the subject, and may serve as a specimen of the Platonic Questions:—

"Why is it that while Plato always represents the soul as more ancient than the body and the cause and principle of its production, yet again he says, that soul is not produced without body, nor intellect without soul, but soul in body and intellect in the soul;† for so it will follow that the body both is and is not, at once coexisting with and produced by the soul. Perhaps that we have often said is true, viz: that the soul without intellect and the body without form always coexisted, and neither of them had generation or beginning. But when the soul partook of intellect and harmony, and by symphony having become intelligent, became a cause of change to matter, and having overpowered the motions of matter by its own motion, drew and converted them to itself, then and thus the body of the world had its generation from the soul, being both conformed and assimilated to it. For the soul did not create the nature of the body from itself nor out of nothing, but out of a disorderly and formless body it made one orderly and obedient to law."

* The Doctrines of Philosophers especially is invaluable as a history of ancient Physics, which, it will be remembered, embraced many topics that we refer to metaphysics. We observe, that in the *Encyclopædia Americana* the genuineness of this treatise is questioned; on what ground it does not appear.

† The reader will observe the three-fold division, answering somewhat to the body, soul and spirit of Paul.

In short, as we understand him, matter and spirit are both eternal, but order in the world and reason in the soul are both from God, and the former through the medium of the latter.

The following are the *ethical* pieces:—Anger, Bashfulness, Tranquillity, Envy and Hatred, Curiosity, Talkativeness, Love of Wealth, Borrowing and Running in Debt, Banishment, Virtue and Vice, Moral Virtue, That Virtue may be Taught, How a man may be Sensible of his Progress in Virtue, Whether Vice is sufficient to render a man unhappy, Whether the Passions of the Mind or the Diseases of the Body are the worse, Whether it was rightly said, Live Concealed, How a man may inoffensively praise himself, Against Colotes the Epicurean, That according to the doctrine of Epicurus it is impossible to live pleasantly, That the Stoics speak greater Paradoxes than the Poets, Contradictions of the Stoics, Common Sense against the Stoics. We propose to give a brief analysis of each of these pieces in their order, very much abridged and condensed of course, (for the originals fill volumes,) and yet not a mere abstract of dry doctrines, not here and there a brick taken at random from the pile, but, if we succeed in our object, an exhibition in miniature of not only the matter but the manner in which Plutarch has constructed his ethical works.

1. On Anger.—This begins as a dialogue between Sylla and Fundanus; but soon loses itself, as Plutarch's dialogues are prone to do, in a continuous discourse or argument by one of the interlocutors. Sylla speaks only twice, when Fundanus proceeds, at his request, to relate, how he subdued a naturally irascible temper, and turned it into a spring of useful and fruitful action. Anger, he says, is not to be cured by a single prescription as it were of a drug, but by a gradual and constant imbibing of the precepts of reason as of wholesome daily food and drink, which must be taken in not when the mind is already heated by passion, but laid up beforehand, like a stock of provisions for a siege. We must set out with the conviction, that it is not incurable; must check it in its first beginnings, and repress its outward manifestations, as Socrates did, by speaking in a low tone of voice and assuming a placid countenance. We should withdraw from the exciting causes or objects of anger; nay, if need be, retire into complete seclusion from the company of friends as well as foes. We should observe and reflect, how disgusting, how disgraceful it appears in others, as the Spartans were taught to loathe drunkenness by seeing it in the Helots; how ignoble and unmanly a thing it is—characteristic not of man, but of women and children. On the other hand, we do well to contemplate the numerous examples, which observation or history may furnish, of

magnanimity and self-control under the highest provocation. With this view, the author relates several striking instances, not only of philosophers, who are sometimes thought to have no gall in them, but of kings, who are peculiarly tempted to vent their rage on slight offences. Delay is wise even under provocations that excite just indignation—nay, under offences that demand severe punishment: for if the provocation is just and real to day, it will be no less just and real to-morrow; and the punishment, which is inflicted not in anger but in calmness, is received not as a cruel misfortune, but as a merited penalty. As anger is peculiarly liable to be excited at home, among familiar persons and about little things, where we are less on our guard and less studious to apply the precepts of reason, we should carefully avoid setting our hearts on such trifles as dress and food and drink, and should sedulously watch our feelings and conduct towards our wives, children, friends, and domestics. In all our intercourse with men, we should remember, that we also are men; and should not expect that perfection in others which we know does not exist in ourselves. Finally, vows and prayers for Divine assistance, and sacred days of fasting and meditation are important helps to a complete victory. Such in substance were the principal means by which Fundanus subdued a singularly irascible temper, and learned by happy experience, that a meek, cheerful, and benevolent disposition is to none so acceptable, obliging, and delightful, as it is to those who possess it.

2. On Bashfulness, or False Modesty.—This might well be denominated an essay on the art of learning to say, no! The spirit of the whole piece is embodied in a quotation from the *Medea* of Euripides:—

" 'Tis better now to brave the direst hate,
Than curse a foolish easiness too late."

And the grand precept is to accustom ourselves to obey the dictates of our own reason and conscience, even in little things, that it may be easier for us to carry out the principle, where property, life, and even greater interests are at stake. In illustration, a story is told of Xenophanes, who, when called a coward because he refused to play at dice, replied:—"Yes, I confess myself a coward, for I dare not do a base or unworthy action."

3. On Tranquillity of Mind.—This piece is in the form of a letter, addressed to Paccius, a friend, who lived at Rome.* We learn from it, what we might have presumed from the characteristics of his writings, that the author was in the habit of keeping something

* Of course the essay was not written at Rome, as some have supposed that all the *Moralia* were.—*Vide* Methodist Quarterly for January, 1850, p. 16.

like a common-place book, since he apologizes for having hastily transcribed this piece, (in order that he might avail himself of an unexpected opportunity of sending to the imperial city,) chiefly from memoranda which he had casually made on the subject. Tranquillity, he teaches, must be sought, not in outward circumstances, but in a well-regulated mind. The silver slipper will not cure the gout, nor the imperial diadem ease the head-ache. A sound mind makes all situations easy and all changes pleasant, as a healthy body relishes and digests all kinds of food. Alexander wept, when he heard from Anaxarchus, that there was an infinity of worlds, while he had not yet completed the conquest of one. On the other hand, Crates, with nothing but his scrip and tattered cloak, laughed his life out, as if he had always been at a wedding-banquet. We should blunt the edge of troubles by expecting them; and when they come, learn to bring good out of evil, as bees extract honey from bitter herbs, as philosophers have often found necessity the mother of wisdom. We should meditate less on what we have not, and more on what we have, not forgetting those common blessings, whose value we usually appreciate only when they are lost, though the loss adds nothing to their real worth. Do you ask, what it is that we have? Rather, what have we not? Life, health, the pleasant light of the sun, peace, plenty, liberty, that we can talk and be silent when we please. If we must needs look beyond ourselves, let us look at those who are less fortunate than we are; or, if we will fix our admiring eyes on the great, let us not forget their peculiar trials and misfortunes. We must moderate our expectations and desires. Even the gods do not each excel in everything; but one in wisdom, another in beauty, some in war, others in peace. Thou hast a province of thine own,—adorn this, and be content. Pain and sickness, sorrow and misfortune may come upon you; but there is a limit, beyond which the severest calamities and death itself cannot pass—they can overcome the body, but they cannot conquer the will, they cannot destroy the soul. If the storm rises too high, it may sink the ship, but it will not bring the man the sooner to the haven. The urns that contain real good and evil, are not placed, as poets say, at Jove's threshold, but in our own breasts. Innocence is an unfailing treasure; virtue is an impregnable fortress. No power, no choice can make a good man wicked, a brave man a coward: it lies within the scope of every man's own will to say, that some things shall not befall him—that he will not be guilty of falsehood, treachery, or any baseness. In conclusion, the author declares, that to the good man every day is a festival, and all the world a goodly spectacle, which the gods have provided for his entertainment.

4. On Envy and Hatred.—An analysis of envy and hatred in order to an exposition of their characteristic differences. The proper object of envy is the felicity of others; that of hatred is evil, real or supposed, intrinsic or relative. Brutes are susceptible of hatred, but incapable of envy. Envy is always unjust, whereas hatred may be founded in justice. Hence many will acknowledge they hate, but none will confess they envy. Envy usually increases, as its object rises higher, and hatred as its object grows greater. Yet there is such a thing as rising above envy, whereas none is too great to be hated; no one envied Alexander, but he had many enemies. Hatred ceases, when the man is persuaded that he is not injured; but not so envy. Hatred may often be overcome by goodness and kindness, but virtues and benefits only exasperate envy.

5. On Curiosity, or Meddlesomeness.—This essay is chiefly taken up with a humorous and satirical description of the busybody in other men's matters. The character is acknowledged to spring from a proper constitutional element. But it is grossly perverted. Our curiosity should rather be directed to a close scrutiny into our own character and affairs. Become an eavesdropper to thine own house, listen to the whispers of thine own heart; survey the wonders of nature in the heavens and the earth, the air and sea; pry into her most secret recesses: but as to your neighbours, say, as Philippius the comedian did, when asked by king Lysimachus, what he wished might be imparted to him, "Anything but a secret." Or, if you must needs wallow in pollution, like the swine in the mire, ransack the history of the world, and there revel in folly, wickedness and misery, to thy heart's content. Impertinent inquisitiveness, like many other vices, becomes its own punishment by filling the mind with a noisome heap of other men's vanities, follies, and vices—a treasure much resembling the city Poneropolis, so called by Philip, after he had peopled it with rogues and vagabonds. Moreover, it leads to tattling calumny and espionage.*

By way of remedy, the author recommends, that we begin with repressing curiosity in minor and indifferent matters, pass hand-bills and showboards unheeded by, avoid looking into windows and shops with open doors, turn away from the knots in the streets and crowds in the market-places, and accustom ourselves to receive letters, messengers, and exciting news without precipitancy,—nay, with calmness and self-imposed delay,—as Rusticus, while listening

* In this connexion, Plutarch explains the etymology of the Greek *συκοφάντης*, or fig-babbler; i. e., originally, one who informed against those who, contrary to law, exported figs.

to one of Plutarch's lectures at Rome, received an express from the emperor, and did not so much as open it till the lecture was closed, though he had no small reason to apprehend that his life might be suspended on its contents.

6. On Garrulity.—This essay, like the preceding, to which it is nearly related, begins with an exceedingly lively and graphic description of the talkative person—a description quite immethodical, but full to overflowing of anecdote, humour, satire, and invective. Whatever is said to him runs through him, as through a colander; he hurries about from place to place, like an empty vessel, void of wit or sense, but making a hideous noise; while all he meets flee from him, as seamen scud before a rising storm; himself meanwhile a greater wonder than anything he tells, and those who stop to hear him the greatest wonder of all, if they have legs to run away. The babbler is always and everywhere drunk, by day and by night, in the market-place, at the theatre, in the streets, in the porticos. If a physician, he is worse than the disease; if a companion in a voyage, he is more insupportable than the qualms of sea-sickness. Of other passions, some are dangerous, others hateful, and others ridiculous; but in garrulity all these evils are united. The merciless sacking of Athens by Sylla resulted from the silly prattle of a barber's shop. The tongue of one man prevented Rome from regaining her freedom by the destruction of Nero. Pittacus therefore did well, who, when the king of Egypt sent him an animal for sacrifice, and ordered him to take out and set aside the best and the worst piece, pulled out the tongue, and sent it to him as being at once the instrument of the greatest good and the greatest evils in the world. Nature herself enjoins silence or reserve in speaking, since she has given us two ears but only one tongue, and that, enclosed more strongly than any other organ, within a double fortification; Homer gives to words the epithet winged, for he that lets go a bird out of his hand, does not easily catch her again. Neither is it possible for a man to recall and cage again in his own breast a word let slip from his mouth. A unit by itself always remains a unit, but two contains in itself the principle or power of endless multiplication. So thought is a secret, but speech grows at once into common rumour. If he to whom thou hast communicated a secret, be like thyself, thou art deservedly lost; if better than thyself, then thou art miraculously saved, by having met with one who is more faithful, than thou art, to thine own interests. But thou wilt say, he is my friend? Very well: this friend of thine had another as worthy of his confidence, as he was of thine; and in like manner, his friend another, till the lengthened chain encloses the whole community. The essay con-

cludes, as usual, with prescribing remedies, which, however, are not particularly striking, or worthy of repetition.

7. On the Love of Riches.—The mass of rich men, according to our author, may be divided into two classes—those who do not use their wealth, and those who abuse it. The former resemble the bathkeeper's ass, that carries fuel for the fire, and is always smothered with the smoke and ashes of the furnace, but is never bathed nor warmed for all his pains. The latter may be likened, especially when they draw near the close of life, as Antipater likened the pleasure-loving, but eloquent Demades in his old age, to a sacrifice, when all is over and nothing is left but the tongue and the stomach. Do you seek riches only for the supply of your wants? The rich man only gets what he can eat and drink and wear, for the care and trouble of all his riches; and you can have just as much without that trouble. Do you covet them for the sake of display? Then all your happiness hangs on the eyes and lips of others. Do you hoard them up for the sake of your children? They will be of no more service to them than to you; but each successive generation seems only, like the successive pipes of an aqueduct, to transmit its contents to the next. The piece is short, and most of the thoughts and illustrations, though sensible and sprightly, have become stale by frequent repetition.

8. Against Borrowing or Running in Debt.—A vehement philippic against usurers as the worst of tyrants, and an impassioned expostulation with debtors as the meanest of slaves, and as in danger of becoming the worst of sinners. The Persians considered debt as the greatest of crimes, because it is the parent of every other crime. Usury begets lying and fraud, both in the borrower and the lender. They say, that hares at the same time suckle one leveret, are ready to bring forth another, and conceive a third. But the usuries of these wicked men, bring forth before they conceive. For at the very delivery of their money, they immediately demand it back, taking it up at the same moment they lay it down, and letting out that again at interest, which they receive for the use of what they had lent: so that they laugh at those natural philosophers, who hold that nothing can be made of nothing; for they make usury of what neither is nor ever was. No coach bought with borrowed money will run so fast, but they will outrun and overtake you. Take rather the first ass thou shalt meet, or the first pack-horse that shall come in thy way, and flee from this most cruel enemy, into the debtor's only refuge—the sanctuary of economy and moderation. If thou hast of thine own, borrow not, since thou hast no need of it; and if thou hast nothing, borrow not, because thou

wilt not have any means to pay. But you will say, perhaps, how am I then to get a living? Is this a question for thee to ask, who hast hands, and feet, and a tongue—who art a *man*, capable of loving and being loved, of doing and receiving benefits? Teach grammar, educate children, be a gatekeeper, turn sailor—anything, rather than be saluted with duns for the payment of borrowed money. No employment is servile, which earns for us liberty or wisdom. Cleanthes ground by night, that he might study by day; and Crates and Anaxagoras, even forsook their patrimony, that they might not be enslaved by the care and management of it.

9. On Banishment.—A stone is hard, and ice is cold, by nature; but banishment and loss of powers are light or heavy, easy or hard to be borne, according to the opinion which each man entertains of them. The greatest and best of men have been exiled, and cared little for it: it was not they, but their country, that suffered the loss and the disgrace. Who would not rather be Themistocles the banished, than Leobates, who signed his condemnation? or be Cicero in exile, than Clodius, that drove him from Rome? Multitudes leave their native land from choice; and many have done their greatest works, and won their proudest honours, in voluntary or involuntary exile. Thucydides and Xenophon both wrote their histories when banished from Athens. No place can deprive a man of his happiness unless he choose, any more than it can rob him of his virtue or his wisdom. Anaxagoras wrote his book on the squaring of the circle, in prison; and Socrates still discoursed of philosophy, and was not the pity, but the envy and admiration of his disciples, when he was about to drink the hemlock. Nature gives us no country, as also no house or field. We are all born, as Socrates said of himself, not Athenians, not Greeks, but citizens of the world, with no narrower boundaries to our country than the sky, with the same elements to minister to our comfort, with the same heavenly bodies to preside over our sphere, under the government of the same Supreme Ruler, and under the administration of the same just and good, eternal and immutable laws: or rather, we are all strangers and exiles in this world. Heaven is the birthplace of our souls, heaven the proper country of our spirits; and it is a matter of comparative indifference in what spot of earth we sojourn, till we return thither again. Such are some of the lofty sentiments in which, incidentally, as it were, this piece abounds.

10. On Virtue and Vice.—Plutarch is never weary of insisting on the superiority of character to fortune, of the soul to outward circumstances. The little piece which we have just named, like the foregoing, is from beginning to end an illustration of this truth.

Happiness, like the vital heat, must come from within. As no amount of clothing can of itself warm the body, so no array of external trappings can gladden the soul. The light and life of the soul is virtue; and it is inextinguishable. Vice, on the other hand, shrouds the soul in perpetual darkness. You cannot flee from it at any moment, as from a disagreeable companion, nor give it a bill of divorce at pleasure, as a cross-grained wife. It will be your fellow-traveller wherever you go by day, and it will lie down with you as your bed-fellow, wherever you are at night, till by philosophy you gain a complete victory over your unholy appetites and passions. Then you will learn to be pleased everywhere, and with everything: with wealth, as a means of usefulness, and with poverty, as freedom from care; with fame for being honoured, and with obscurity for being unenvied.

11. On Moral Virtue.—This treatise is more metaphysical and controversial, than most of our author's moral essays. It is an extended discussion of the distinction between moral or practical, and intellectual or contemplative virtue. Plutarch, in common with Plato and Aristotle, but in opposition to Zeno and Chrysippus, maintains, that these two virtues, or kinds of virtue, are essentially distinct, having their seats in different parts or faculties of the soul. For man is not only of a two-fold nature as being compounded of body and soul; but the soul itself is two-fold, comprising a sensual and irrational, as well as an intellectual and rational part—the latter possessing reason in itself, and having a natural power or adaptation to subject the sensual, the bodily, and even the inanimate to its own dominion; the former destitute of reason, and yet having a natural susceptibility or aptitude to be governed by it. The due exercise or cultivation of the intellectual part in itself, and in the study of the universe, or of absolute existence, gives rise to contemplative virtue or science. The proper employment of the intellectual and rational powers in guiding and governing the irrational and sensual part, and in the regulation and use of all such things as exist relative to us, is the source of moral virtue or prudence. Contemplative virtue, therefore, is not subject to chance or change, whereas moral virtue is dependent on circumstances and liable to fluctuation. Contemplative virtue is incapable of excess, and consists in the highest possible exercise of reason in the highest attainable perfection of knowledge. Moral virtue is liable both to excess and defect, and consists in a proper medium between these extremes. Thus courage is the medium between cowardice and rashness; liberality between parsimony and prodigality; and so every moral virtue is a medium between the vices of too little and

too much. The rational and irrational elements co-exist and co-operate in the moral virtues—the irrational to communicate impulse and motion; the rational to regulate, moderate, and confine within proper limits. Extinguish reason and there will no regulator; eradicate the passions, as the Stoics teach, and there will be nothing to regulate. Adjust the balance duly between them, and all the appetites and passions, not less than the dictates of reason and conscience, are useful in their proper places. But neither of them can, in fact, be annihilated, or identified with the other. They always do and always will co-exist in every man's breast, more or less consciously distinct—nay, opposed to each other—the one commanding or forbidding, approving or disapproving, and remonstrating, even when it can no longer command; the other obeying or disobeying, complying or rebelling, and reluctant, or too tardily following, when it submits to be led. Even in matters of opinion which are connected with practice, and wherein the passions are concerned, the judgment is disturbed and a conflict ensues; whereas, in those questions with which the passions have nothing to do—such, namely, as pertain only to the contemplative part of the soul—there is either an immediate decision, or there is at all events no conflict—only a suspense of the judgment. This proves the essential distinctness of the rational and irrational parts of the soul. And we see this distinctness, not only in the conflict, but also when they concur; since in this case they are not simultaneous in their impulses, but the one usually takes the lead, and the other follows—as when, for instance, the affections follow and obey the judgment, or the judgment on the other hand yields and submits to the affections. Moreover, we see conclusive evidence, that reason and passion reside in different seats or inhere in different parts of the soul, in that the appetites and passions so agitate and thrill the body, as in the excitements of hope and fear, joy and sorrow, pride and shame; while the operations of pure intellect, as in the solution of a mathematical problem, or the contemplation of the heavens, leave the body in a state of undisturbed tranquillity; thus evincing, that the appetites and passions are in some way more closely connected with the body than reason is.

12. That Virtue may be Taught.—This short and apparently unfinished piece, is an argument chiefly analogical and *a fortiori*, in proof of the proposition, that virtue does not come spontaneously, without reason and without art, but that it may and should be made a matter of instruction and discipline. When all else that is valuable for the body or the mind is taught, it were absurd to suppose that virtue, the highest excellence and felicity of our nature,

must be left to the development of blind nature, or still blinder chance.

13. How a Man may be sensible of his Progress in Virtue.—This admirable essay, full of the author's characteristic good sense and practical wisdom, is addressed, as are also several of Plutarch's Lives, to Sosius Senecio, thrice consul under the Emperor Trajan. At its commencement an assault is made upon the extravagant dogmas of the Stoics, which concede no medium between absolute folly and perfect wisdom, and, therefore, preclude the very idea of progress in virtue. Some of the indications of progress, which compose the remainder and the principal part of the treatise, are such as these:—Constancy in endeavours after virtue and in struggles with vice is a certain means as well as a sure sign of progress; as the traveller who makes no stops or halts, but toils on at however slow a pace, is sure at no distant day to arrive at his journey's end. Another measure of proficiency is found in the increasing firmness of our resolutions, and the growing intensity of our application to all good culture, as well as in the lover-like pain we feel at any diversion or distraction which separates us for a season from the beloved object of our pursuit. Again: the proficient in wisdom, as he will not be daunted by difficulties, drawn aside by avocations, shamed by ridicule, or deterred by danger, so will he not be allured by the superior pleasures, honours or rewards, that attend another mode of life, to abandon the prosecution of the highest good. On the contrary, he will be conscious of a growing indifference to all such outward circumstances in comparison with the excellence of virtue, till at length he estimates himself and others solely by their moral worth; as Agesilaus, when he heard the king of Persia styled the Great King, asked, How is he greater than I, if he be not more just? Another proof of proficiency in virtue is the alteration of one's style of writing and way of managing an argument or discourse,—learning to write in a more chastened style, attending to things rather than mere words, and seeking not so much to win present admiration as to leave a permanent and useful impression—learning also to argue for truth rather than victory, and to maintain equanimity whether the auditors be fewer or more in numbers and of greater or less distinction. True virtue needs not auditors or applauders, but sits down contented with self-approbation. Still less will she become her own herald, and trumpet her own good deeds. Such men show, that they look beyond themselves for satisfaction, that they thirst for praise, that they never were admitted near spectators of virtue, never saw her real person and presence, but only her image and shadow in a transient dream. Modesty and

serenity are marks of distinguished excellence. Candidates for initiation into the mysteries run together with rude clamours and boisterous vociferations; but, when admitted to the presence of the sacred rites, they attend with holy awe and religious silence. And those who frequent the schools at Athens, are first σοφοί, (sages,) then φιλόσοφοι, (lovers of wisdom,) then ῥήτορες, (rhetoricians,) and finally ἰδιῶται, (ordinary men.) Progress in virtue appears in a willingness to be admonished of our faults,—nay, an eager desire to discover them, and a frank acknowledgment of them when discovered. Diogenes said, that whoever wished to be constantly and certainly right, must get either a faithful friend or a bitter enemy to be his monitor; and Hippocrates published to the world a mistake he had made in anatomy, adding, that it ill became him whose business it was to cure others not to be able or willing to correct himself.

14. Whether Vice is sufficient to render a Man miserable.—This is manifestly a fragment, dismembered both at the beginning and the end. The question is of course answered in the affirmative. Men have laughed at racks and tortures, at losses and calamities, at all the engines of tyrants and all the storms of fortune. But Vice is an absolute and self-sufficient worker of misery, and stands in need of neither instruments nor executioners. Anger, fear, remorse and despair, have stretched tyrants themselves and the favourites of fortune upon a rack, from which there is no deliverance.

15. Whether are worse, the Passions of the Soul, or those (that is, the Diseases) of the Body.—Man is here declared, after the authority of Homer, to be the most miserable of creatures, and chiefly miserable because his better part, his soul, is subject to so many and so cruel maladies. The diseases of the soul are worse than those of the body:—1, because they are self-caused and inherent; 2, because they are less open to the view whether of the patient or his friends; 3, because he is always more or less deranged or bereft of reason; 4, because, being unconscious of his condition, he shuns the remedy and seeks that which aggravates the disease; and 5, because he is not only miserable but usually guilty, and suffers only the consequences of his own follies and sins.

16. How a Man may inoffensively Praise himself.—Offensive as self-commendation usually is, there are occasions when a man may and should make himself the subject of his own discourse—not for the sake of courting flattery, still less to obscure the merit of others, but in self-defence, or as a means of usefulness. For instance, calumny may compel us to glory in our praiseworthy actions. Thus Epaminondas, when he was arraigned before the Thebans for having prolonged his command beyond his lawful term of office, declared

that he would willingly be put to death, if they would set up this accusation against him: "Epaminondas has wasted Laconia, an enemy's country, prosperously settled the affairs of Messene, and happily secured an alliance with Arcadia, against our will." Whereupon the people, smitten with admiration at his magnanimity, dismissed him with honour, without so much as putting the question to vote. Phocion also showed his greatness of mind under the unjust sentence which was pronounced upon him, when he said to one of his fellow-sufferers: "What, is it not a pleasure to thee to die with Phocion?" And Themistocles, experiencing the neglect of the populace whom he had saved, said to them: "Upon every storm, you fly to the same tree for shelter; yet when fair weather returns, you strip it of its leaves and fruit, as you go away." If in apologizing for ourselves, we can delicately interweave with our own the praises of our auditors, we are doubly secure from envy; as we see many admirable illustrations in the oration of Demosthenes for the Crown. Orators often commend themselves indirectly by lavishing encomiums on others, whose character, or conduct, or sentiments resemble their own. Those who are forced to dwell upon their own praises, are more readily excused, if they do not arrogate the merit wholly to themselves, but ascribe it partly to fortune, and partly to God. So Achilles attributed his conquests to the gods, and Zaleucus referred his laws to the wisdom of Minerva. It may seem to forestall envy, if, when we are extolled by others, we waive the credit imputed to us, while at the same time we acknowledge our claim to some less envied, yet perhaps more truly meritorious action. Thus, when Pericles, on his death-bed, was reminded by his friends of his many honours and victories, he checked them with the assurance, that his chief satisfaction was derived from the consciousness that he had never been the occasion of any of the Athenians wearing black. Nay, it may even be expedient for us sometimes to charge ourselves with some minor faults by way of obscuring a splendour that might otherwise be painful to envious eyes. Self-praise is justifiable, especially in the aged and the truly great, as a means of exciting others to a virtuous emulation, as old Nestor, by relating the achievements of his youth, inflamed ten Grecian chieftains with a burning eagerness for single combat with Hector; or for the sake of repressing an ill-grounded pride in others, as Aristotle wrote to Alexander, that not only those who have mighty empires, may think highly of themselves, but they also who have worthy thoughts and notions of the Deity; or to inspire our friends and fellow-citizens with courage amid danger, as Cyrus, though far from boastful at ordinary times, talked largely in the midst of battles and perils; or

to offset false encomiums and recommend a more excellent way, as Phocion, while Leosthenes yet prospered, being asked, what good he had done the city, replied, "Nothing but this, that, during my administration, there have been no funeral orations, though all who have died have been buried in the sepulchres of their fathers." In conclusion, the author cautions his readers to look well to themselves, lest, in the belief that self-commendation is sometimes justifiable, they should be betrayed into an unseasonable and offensive indulgence in it, for the mere gratification of their own pride, vanity or self-love. This treatise illustrates the ease and felicity with which a trifling theme grew in our author's fruitful mind into a copious and beautiful essay.

17. Whether it was rightly said, Live concealed.—Live concealed, was a saying of Epicurus; and Plutarch thinks, if the precept were applicable to any, it would apply with emphasis to him and his demoralizing sect. Yet Epicurus himself did not believe his own doctrine; else why did he *publish* it? Was it not for the very purpose of being noticed? Like watermen, who look astern while they row the boat ahead, so Epicurus and his followers row hard after fame with their face another way. To recommend this precept to the ignorant and vicious, were like bidding the sick man take care lest the physician find him. On the other hand, to urge it on the virtuous and wise, were to rob the world of their influence—to bid Epaminondas lay down his arms, and Lysurgus rescind his laws, and Socrates forbear his discourses. Virtue becomes practical, operative, useful, only as it is seen and known, as light is in its own nature glorious and at the same time beneficial to the world. Concealment, like the night, induces drowsiness and torpor, while publicity, like the day, wakes all the dormant energies to life and action. Or, if concealment is favourable to any kind of activity, like darkness it favours only the wicked; and if publicity represses action, it is only the vicious that shrink from it, as from the light of the morning. Life is in its very nature a manifestation. The soul existed before, but it was *concealed* in the womb of the universe. At birth, it came forth to be seen and known, conspicuous and illustrious. Accordingly, the king of the lower world is called Hades, (that is, the unseen or invisible,) while Apollo, or the Sun, bears the name of Delian and Pythian, (that is, the manifest and known.) And the ancients called man *φῶς*, (*quasi φῶς*, light,) because of his innate desire of knowing and being known. Nay, some philosophers think, that the soul itself is in its essence light, since, of all things being, the soul most dreads ignorance, obscurity and darkness. To conclude the whole: at death pious souls go to a world of unending day

and unclouded glory; while the wicked sink to an abode of perpetual darkness and oblivion, where they are punished, not, as poets sing, by vultures gnawing at their livers, and heavy burdens or fruitless labours oppressing their weary bodies, but by ignorance and ignominy, plunging their souls in a bottomless abyss of inactivity, uselessness, and obscurity.

18. The two treatises which we have named next in order,* may well be mentioned together, since the one is a supplement to the other, and both are directed against the doctrines of Epicurus.

Colotes, the disciple and particular friend of Epicurus, wrote a book with this doctrine and title: "That according to the tenets of the other philosophers, it is impossible to live." In his treatise "Against Colotes," Plutarch turns the weapons of the Epicurean against himself, and shows that, according to the same manner of reasoning, Epicurus may be far more justly charged with annihilating all life, since he denied the objective reality of sensations and qualities, maintained the immutability of atoms, and hence by fair implication (especially if no qualities really exist to combine with them) the impossibility of their becoming living beings, confounded the distinction between essential being and merely accidental existence, taught that the soul is partly composed of aerial and fiery particles, and partly of some nameless and unknown but equally perishable material substance, annulled the justice and providence and virtually the existence of the gods, and incited mankind to seek the supreme goal not in "vain and empty virtues which have nothing but turbulent hopes of uncertain fruits," but, like the brutes that perish, in the mere gratification of their bodily appetites and passions.

In the other treatise, our author again carries the war into the enemy's country, and argues, that, according to the doctrine of Epicurus, it is impossible to live *pleasurably*; for if pleasure is to be sought in the body, it is liable to more pains than pleasures, and those more acute and of longer duration—the pleasure of eating and drinking, for example, being momentary, while the intervals of hunger and thirst, or at least of privation, are prolonged; and if pleasure is to be found in the mind, Epicurus cuts off the mind from the widest field of the highest and purest pleasure, when he annihilates the hopes and virtues we should derive from the gods, and extinguishes, both in our speculative faculties the desire of knowledge, and in our active powers the ambition to do good and win immortality.

There is a fine passage, in the former of these pieces, on the

* See p. 464.

universality of the belief among men in the existence and providence of God, and the absolute necessity of such a belief to the prosperity and perpetuity of nations. "Travel through the world," he says, "and you will find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without theatres, without gymnasia, without money, without houses. But there never was and never will be a city without temples and gods, or without prayers, oaths, prophecies and sacrifices for the averting of calamities and curses—for the obtaining of benefits and blessings. Nay, I am of the opinion, that a city might better be built without any ground to stand upon, than a commonwealth be established, or, being established, be preserved, without religion and the fear and worship of the gods." Plutarch has no complacency, nay, no patience with the Epicureans. He looks on them as the enemies of society and of mankind—as he writes, his indignation gathers, and he pours a storm of hard words and hard arguments upon the rabble rout.

19. The Stoics, at whom the three remaining ethical pieces* are levelled, are treated with more respect. Indignation gives place to humour, and playful satire stands instead of bitter invective. He ridicules the paradoxes of the Stoics, as more extravagant than the wildest dreams of the poets. For the fables of the poets maintain consistency and decorum—they never leave a Hercules destitute of necessities: but supplies spring up, as from some hidden fountain, for himself and his companions. But the vaunted Sage of the Stoics is a rich man, and yet begs his bread—a king, but resolves syllogisms for hire—has all things, and yet pays rent for the house in which he lives. Again, our author turns the logic of the Stoics against themselves, and shows, that, while they make their boast of following nature and reason as the standard of life, their system is so unnatural and absurd, that they cannot but contradict each other and themselves as often as they pass from one treatise to another, nay, often in the same treatise—that their conduct gives the lie to their theory, and the very laws and necessities of the language they use falsify the doctrines they teach—and that they do violence to the common sentiments, the native instincts, and even the senses of mankind. He argues with special earnestness against the doctrine of Chrysippus, that Vice is not wholly useless to the universe, since without evil there would not be any good. "Is there then no good among the gods," he asks, "where there is no evil? And when Jupiter, having resolved all things into himself, (another doctrine of the Stoics,) exists alone, will there then be no good, because there will then be no evil? Can there be no harmony in a choir unless some one

* See p. 464.

sings badly, and no health in the body unless some member is diseased? Could not Socrates have been just, if Melitus had not been wicked? Could not the Deity have found means to bring a Hercules and a Lycurgus into the world, if he had not also introduced a Phalaris and a Sardanapalus? They will next teach us, that the consumption was intended for the sound constitution of men's bodies, and the gout for the swiftness of their feet, and that Achilles could not have had a good head of hair, if Thersites had not been bald. To say, that vice was made by the providence of God—like a wanton epigram by the will of the poet, to give grace or spice to the whole poem—transcends in absurdity all imagination. For, this being granted, how will the gods be givers of good rather than evil, and how will wickedness appear to be displeasing and hateful to them? Pray, tell us, wherein is vice profitable to the universe? In heavenly things? Would the sun cease to rise and set, if men did not lie and steal and murder? For earthly things? Are we then more healthy for being vicious, or do we enjoy more plentifully the comforts of life? Does vice contribute to beauty or strength? Or is vice favourable to virtue, hatred to friendship, and light to darkness? But prudence, they say, consists in a knowledge of good and evil, and without evil would be wholly precluded. As if there could be no sight, unless there were such a colour as black for it to distinguish! When, as they hold, the world shall be set on fire, there will then be no evil left; but all will then be prudent and wise. There may therefore be prudence without evil. But granting, that prudence must always be a knowledge of good and evil, what would be the loss or inconvenience of parting with such a virtue, if, instead of it, we might have another and kindred virtue, which should be, not the knowledge of good and evil, but the knowledge of good only?"

But we must bring these notices to a close? The religious or theological treatises of Plutarch must be the subject of another paper, for which they afford richer materials than we have been able to appropriate to our present use.

We only allude, in conclusion, to the Banquet of the Seven Sages, and the *Symposiaca*—two pieces, which are of so miscellaneous a nature, that they can hardly be referred to either of our heads of classification. The former is comparatively brief, and records with great conciseness the answers which the seven sages are imagined to have given, each in turn, to a succession of curious questions, which arise spontaneously and quite immethodically, while at the same time they discuss the merits of the successive dishes at a feast. The other is the longest of all Plutarch's treatises, addressed,

like several of his best works, to *Sosius Senecio*, and divided into nine books, (the number of the muses,) each of which contains a discussion of ten questions. The questions are of every kind, actual, possible or conceivable, in history and archæology, in physics and metaphysics, in politics and ethics, in science and religion, in poetry and music, in literature and art, in dietetics and dancing, pertaining to body, soul and spirit, extending to things in the heavens above, in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth; and the work is no unfit symbol of the multifarious and miscellaneous mind of its author.

ART. VII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) MESSRS. LANE & SCOTT have just issued "*Religion, the Weal of the Church and the Need of the Times*, by GEORGE STEWARD," (12mo., pp. 256.) It consists of a series of essays, twelve in number, upon topics so connected with each other that the work has a remarkable unity of design and of thought, in spite of its fragmentary form. The first Essay, entitled "The Speech of God," exhibits the nature of God's revelation to man—first, as closed and ended in the Bible; second, as perpetually going on in the development of God's Providence. The second chapter, on "The Work of God," sets forth the CHURCH as the great organ and centre of the Divine activity for the renewal of mankind; and the third, shows the necessity of "Evangelism"—a constant zeal for the revival of religion—for the extension of the Divine kingdom. In chapter IV. the "Characteristics of the Present Age," and their relations to the progress of religion, are exhibited; while chapter V. ("Unbelief") dwells upon the grounds and aspects of the modern sceptical theories. Having thus considered the relations of modern society to the Church, Mr. Steward next devotes his attention to the present relations of society to the Church. The need of a pure and scientific theology, as well as of able teachers thereof, is strongly indicated in the chapter on "Church Requisites." Chapters VII. and VIII., on "Church Provision" and on "Methodism," take up the questions of the Church's duty to provide for the culture of the masses; and how far Methodism is suited, in her doctrines, polity, and spirit, for this aggressive work. These chapters, which are at once thoughtful, suggestive, and bold, are perhaps the best in the book. The following remarks upon religious divisions are applicable to Methodism at this day on both sides of the Atlantic. Speaking of the difficulty of preserving the union of religious bodies of great magnitude, the author proceeds:—

"The modes of relief, open to unwieldy and incoherent bodies, are less theoretically than historically manifest. Amendment, or partial reconstruction, is one; the emission of intractable material is another; and a third is a division into several communities, either independent or federally related only. All these, however, have their drawbacks. The primary and true policy is *conservation combined with movement*,—and the one in order to the other.

"The currents of society must not be thwarted, or dammed up; but easy channels should be formed for their undisturbed flow, and they should be made tributary to Church strength, instead of draining off its life. The happy art undoubtedly is, that of a musician who combines various, and even discordant, notes into harmony; or, to ascend higher, of the Divine Mind, which combines conflicting powers into glorious unities, by the interposition of such affinities and balances as best serve his ends.

"Periodic convulsions, in a body, though they relieve from disturbance, abstract its energies. The residuary becomes effete, while the birth of agitation, for the moment preternaturally active, subsides into permanent torpor. When the separated portion is comparatively fractional only, it is almost as liable to wither and die, as a branch riven from its parent stem; there is the loss of just so much salutary agency to society in general, with a proportionate defalcation from the residuary Church. This is all but an unmixed evil. It is only when the seceding mass approximates to the residuary, that the chances of life and growth are increased by the breadth of counter-array and energetic competition. *Character and reputation* are frightfully deteriorated by the struggles of schisms—incomparably the most intense of human collisions, as they issue from the very depths of our moral nature. It is obvious that frequent internal convulsion and separation must consume much of the life and resources of any community. Their effect must be a *moral* as well as *statistical* retrogression: the results of former toil are squandered; the harvest of years strewn to the winds. Considering the terrifically Antinomian exhibitions of such seasons, and the stimulus they give to the infidel and profane, the wonder is, that religion itself in any particular form of it where this happens, survives the blow,—not that it should, for a time, languish, or its recovery be slow. Such a fact seems to declare its divinity as a thing separable from the worst possible accidents, and that its resurrectional energies are as the reflection of that of Christ himself, from the tomb; a type, too, of its final triumph alike over the treachery of friends and the insults of foes."

We should be glad to quote further; but our limits forbid. Our readers will find Mr. Steward a *thoughtful* and *suggestive* writer, as we have said: and we are sure that, if he lives, the Church will hear more from him—and even better—than the excellent book before us contains.

(2.) No history, ecclesiastical or other, abounds more in materials of attractive and even romantic interest, than the history of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It has had its heroes and its martyrs of the noblest stamp; their *memorabilia* are worth the world's reading. We welcome, then, with a singular and peculiar delight, every history, however partial or local, every biography, however humble, and every record, however fragmentary, that may tend to embalm and preserve the memoirs of the heroic age of our Church. Our readers will remember, as one of the pleasantest books of this class, the "Sketches and Incidents from the Saddle-bags of a Superannuated Itinerant," and we now with pleasure note the appearance, from the same pen, of "*Sketches from the Study of a Superannuated Itinerant.*" (Boston: C. H. Peirce & Co., 12mo., pp. 257.) The book gives sketches of Zadok Priest, Hezekiah Calvin Wooster, Enoch Mudge, and John Collins, with a beautiful memorial of the Garrettsen family, their homestead on the Hudson, and its chief light and ornament, Catharine Garrettsen. Several essays on Methodism, education, and other topics are interspersed among the personal sketches. The writer of these sketches wields the most versatile and graphic pen known in our Church—and it fails in none of its qualities in these pages. We trust the book will find its way into the extensive circulation it deserves.

(3.) "*Memorials of Missionary Labours in Africa and the West Indies, with Historical and Descriptive Observations*, by WILLIAM MOISTER." (New-York : Lane & Scott, 1851 ; 12mo., pp. 348.) Mr. Moister spent two years in Africa, and ten in the West Indies and Demerara, in the service of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, and this volume contains a record of his labours and observations in both those interesting fields. Prefixed to the first part is a very satisfactory account of Western Africa and its people, conveying, in brief compass, a large amount of information with regard to a country but little known. The record here given is enough to vindicate the policy of the Church in sending her missionaries to those inhospitable and insalubrious shores. Mr. Moister landed on the coast of Africa, at St. Mary's, on the 15th of March, 1831, and immediately commenced his labours.

"The first Sabbath we spent in Africa was a day never to be forgotten. At morning-dawn the native prayer-meeting was held, and many thanks were offered to Almighty God for our safe arrival. In the forenoon I read prayers, and opened my commission by preaching from that delightful text, 'This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.' 1 Tim. i. 15. The people heard with marked attention, and the whole appearance of the congregation was truly pleasing. It afforded an interesting proof that the labours of my revered predecessors had not been in vain, though some of them had been called hence at an early period after their arrival. The negroes who had been brought to a knowledge of the truth, both male and female, together with their children, appeared in the house of God neatly clothed, and, in their general aspect, presented a striking contrast to their sable brethren who still remained in heathen darkness. They sang the praises of God most delightfully, and the impression made upon our minds was of a very pleasing character. Another service in the evening, conducted partly in the language of the natives, and partly in English, closed the exercises of this blessed day."

In March, 1832, Mr. Moister ascended the Gambia to M'Carthy's Island, two hundred and fifty miles from the mouth of the river, founded a school and mission, and left John Cupidon, a native convert, in charge of it. Twelve months afterwards, the missionary returned again to M'Carthy's island, and thus describes the change that had been wrought meanwhile :—

"At ten o'clock, A. M., the people assembled for Divine worship, evidently anticipating something more than usual. As I entered the chapel, I could not but observe the change which had taken place in the appearance and manners of the people since I last addressed them. They presented themselves in the house of God clean and neat in their apparel ; and conducted themselves with a reverence and propriety becoming the solemnity of the occasion. I preached with freedom and comfort to a deeply-attentive congregation, after which I baptized seven adults and sixteen children. The adults had been carefully instructed and prepared for this sacred ordinance, by the native teacher ; and the children were the offspring of parents who had avowed their determination to give themselves to the Lord. In the afternoon I examined the Sunday school, which consisted chiefly of young men and women, and I was delighted to observe the eagerness with which they were endeavouring to make out the meaning of the words of Him who 'spake as never man spake.' We held another service in the evening, which proved to be a season of 'refreshing from the presence of the Lord.' This holy Sabbath was, indeed, a day long to be remembered ; and had I not actually beheld it, I could scarcely have believed that such a change could take place in so short a space of time, through the simple teaching of a converted African,—for several gave pleasing evidence that a work of grace had commenced in their hearts ; and the whole congregation engaged in the singing, and other devotional exercises, with a life and energy truly pleasing."

Soon after, a missionary was sent out from England to take charge of the work at M'Carthy's Island, and it has been carried on successfully, from that day to this. Hundreds of natives have been brought under the sound of the Gospel at that station; and one of its missionaries has translated part of the Bible into the Mandingo language. The school, at the latest dates, numbered ninety scholars; and there were one hundred and fifty natives in Church-fellowship. This is but a single specimen of the fruits of recent missionary labour in Africa.

Mr. Moister's account of his residence in Demerara and the West Indies is, if possible, still more interesting. We should be glad to give some extracts from it, did our limits allow; but must content ourselves with urging our ministers to read this book and to cause its circulation among their people.

(4.) Of popular works on the subject of Geology and its relations to Scripture there is no lack. A new and valuable one is now added to the list in "*The Course of Creation*, by JOHN ANDERSON, D.D." (Cincinnati: W. H. Moore & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 384.) The work is divided into four parts—of which the first treats of the geology of Scotland; the second, the geology of England; the third, that of France and Switzerland; while the fourth discusses general principles. Dr. Anderson is evidently well skilled in geology, and writes with a freedom and vivacity rivalled by no writer on the subject except Hugh Miller. The Conclusion states, with great clearness and force, the bearing of the geological evidences upon the character and attributes of God. The book is admirably got up by the Cincinnati publishers.

(5.) "*The Sabbath School and Bible Teaching*, by JAMES INGLIS." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 12mo., pp. 224.) The aim of the author of this timely work, is, according to his preface, to supply Sunday-school teachers with a practical guide. The work is divided into two parts:—I. On Teaching; II. On the School. After disclaiming any attempt to set forth a new *system* of teaching, the author unfolds, with great judgment and sense, the different steps which he deems essential to successful instruction, viz:—The preparation of the lesson, its explanation, suitable illustration, apt application, and abundant revision. The subject of catechetical instruction is very fully examined. Under the head of "The School," the qualifications, duties, &c., of the superintendent and teachers are carefully discussed, and the details of school-management entered into at considerable length. Believing that the Sunday school is, next to the pulpit, the great instrument of the Church for the spread of religion in this and future generations, we welcome every new work likely to add to the efficiency and value of the system; and we cordially commend Mr. Inglis's book to all who are engaged or interested in the work of Sunday-school instruction.

(6.) "*The Harmony of Prophecy, or Scripture Illustrations of the Apocalypse*, by REV. ALEXANDER KEITH, D.D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851, 12mo., pp. 439.) Dr. Keith is an obscure and prolix writer—and the present work is not clearer nor more satisfactory than his "*Evidence of Prophecy*."

(7.) "*The Works of Horace; with English Notes, for the Use of Schools and Colleges*, by J. L. LINCOLN, Professor of Latin in Brown University." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 575.) Orelli's second edition is adopted by Professor Lincoln as the basis of his text of Horace; and he could not have done better. The prolegomena contain a neat and carefully prepared Life of Horace; a chronological table; a statement of the lyric metres of Horace; and an Index to the metres. The text itself, which is printed in a large, bold, and beautiful type, occupies 309 pages, while the notes occupy 237; thus reversing the proportion of some modern text-books, in which the text seems only to be a scaffolding for the notes. Mr. Lincoln's plan of annotation aims to explain only *real* difficulties: "to give such and so much aid, only, as may at once stimulate and reward the pupil's industrious efforts; and also not to supersede or interfere with the course of direct instruction and illustration which every good teacher is accustomed to follow with his classes." That this is the true theory on which College text-books should be prepared, we are well assured; and we thank Professor Lincoln for the admirable example of it he has offered us in this excellent edition of Horace. Were we now engaged in teaching, as of old, we should certainly make use of the book—and we cordially commend it to the notice of all instructors.

(8.) "*Nature and Blessedness of Christian Purity*, by Rev. R. S. FOSTER." (Lane & Scott, for the Author: 12mo., pp. 226.) This belongs to the class of practical and devotional books; and yet rests on a basis of sound theological inquiry. That Holiness is attainable on earth, and how it may be obtained and kept—these are its topics, and they are treated with earnestness, clearness, and vivacity, so that the book is attractive as well as substantial. The author shows the extravagances into which some modern writers on the subject have fallen; and makes the calm, sound, and rational views of Wesley, founded on the Scriptures, the foundation of his own. We are particularly pleased with his urgent exhortations to all who *profess* holiness to illustrate it in their conduct. The Church needs *EXAMPLES* of holiness more than professors of it. But we cannot dwell upon this book now: a more extended review is in preparation for a future number of our journal:

(9.) WE have noticed "*Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution*" several times during its issue in numbers, and have now before us the first bound volume (8vo., pp. 576; Harper & Brothers, New-York); and feel it a duty to recommend it, especially as a family book, worthy of the patronage of the whole American people. It is at once a series of pictures of our country and of its history, as the ingenious plan on which the work is prepared combines these two objects. The various localities made famous by the events of the Revolution are noticed in the order in which they were visited by the eminent artist who prepares the book, and from whose drawings, taken on each spot, the whole is profusely illustrated. "To delineate with pen and pencil what is left of the physical features of that period, and thus to rescue from oblivion, before it should be too late, the mementoes which another generation will appreciate," has been Mr. Lossing's employment for many

months—and the result of these genial labours is now placed in a permanent form before the American public. As for the mechanical execution of the work, it is, perhaps, taking paper, printing, illustrations, and all into the account, the very best specimen of a purely American book that we have yet seen.

(10.) THE "Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte is distinguished as well for its exceeding comprehensiveness, with regard to material phenomena, as for its poverty with regard to all others. It is, in effect, a negation of all philosophy, as such; and its final triumph would be the restriction of the efforts of the human mind to the apprehension and classification of material phenomena and their relations. That such a philosophy (or no-philosophy) is necessarily destructive and atheistical, is too obvious to require any argument. Indeed, M. Comte does not hesitate to admit this issue: in fact, he glories in it as the emancipation of humanity from the reign of superstition and of metaphysics.

This stand-point of M. Comte has unhappily prevented the English mind, to a great extent, from appreciating and employing the really sublime results to which his penetrating acuteness and severe logic have led him within the domain to which his method is strictly applicable. But the time, we think, is not far distant, in which all that is valuable in the "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*" will become the common property of literature—the evil residuum being eliminated and rejected. An indication of this tendency is shown in the translation of a part of his great work, under the title of "*The Philosophy of Mathematics, translated from the Philosophie Positive of Auguste Comte*," by W. M. GILLESPIE, Professor in Union College." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 8vo., pp. 260.) This is certainly the best part of Comte's whole work: for in its execution he was aided not merely by his general acuteness of mind, but also by his special experience as a mathematician. M. Arago, indeed, gave his opinion of Comte's mathematical skill very intelligibly in the declaration, "*Chez M. Comte je ne voyais de titres mathematiques d'aucune sorte:*" but there must have been a little personal pique, we judge, at the bottom of this judgment. Be that as it may, there is nowhere to be found so complete a survey of the field of mathematical science as a whole, nor so skillful an exhibition of the relations of the several parts, as in this work; and we cordially thank Professor Gillespie for laying it before us in English. It is rather to be regretted, we judge, that the portion relating to Rational Mechanics has been left out in the translation.

(11.) HENRY MAYHEW has opened a new vein in his "*London Labour and the London Poor*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers,) of which we have six of the serial parts. The novelists have often enough sought for characters and "scenes" in the abodes of poverty and crime; but this is the first instance, so far as we know, in which a professed man of letters has undertaken to seek out statistics for himself—and such statistics—and make out of them a book that the *public* would read. He has succeeded most admirably: and his work will not only arrest the eye, but we trust also the heart of that great "public" for which it was written. We shall return to the work when the series is completed.

(12.) We have seldom read a more touching memorial of early piety and of Christian fortitude than "*A Discourse preached on the occasion of the death of William Edgar Baker*, by C. K. IMBRIE, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Rahway, N. J." (Carter & Brothers, 1851, 18mo.) The subject of this memoir breathed the atmosphere of a pious household from his infancy, and was converted at an early age. Attacked in opening manhood by a fearful malady, he bore the most terrible operation in surgery with a degree of endurance which extorted from the surgeon a tribute of unusual admiration for his more than heroic fortitude. The operation was vain: but his *faith* was not:—he passed through the valley of the shadow of death without trembling. The parents of such a son may rejoice in the "treasure" they have "in Heaven." The edition before us appears to have been printed solely for private circulation; but we are sure the book would do great good if scattered through a wider circle.

(13.) "*The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation*" is a work so well known as to need no new notice. We have only to announce a new and neat edition. (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 12mo., pp. 239.)

(14.) "*Dealings with the Inquisition; or, Papal Rome, her Priests and her Jesuits*, by Rev. GIACINTO ACHILLI, D.D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 351.) We are disappointed in this book. The title is a misnomer, as the "dealings" of Dr. Achilli with the Inquisition make up but a small part of the work. It is also a far more rambling, irregular, and disjointed production than we should have expected from an ex-professor of Theology, even though his training had been acquired in that poorest of all schools for training the human mind wholesomely—a Roman Catholic College. It is a pity that some of Dr. Achilli's judicious friends in England did not revise his work before publication.

But with all these drawbacks, the book is full of interest. It bears the marks of truthfulness on every page, even in the naive self-conceit of the author which is sometimes perfectly amusing. It is clear that Dr. Achilli is an honest and earnest man; and one must forgive a little "self-consciousness" in a man who has passed through so many stirring scenes. The interest of the book does not really begin until the fifth chapter—the remaining fifteen chapters form a sort of auto-biography which throws a flood of light upon many of the ways of Papal Rome, her priests and her Jesuits. The following extract contains part of a long conversation between Dr. Achilli and a Jesuit friend of his—a conversation held long before Dr. A.'s abandonment of Popery:

"'But tell me,' I asked, 'what do the Jesuits do out of Italy; in France, for example, or in England? I do not suppose they employ themselves in the duties of education, the principal object of their foundation. For my part, I never could understand what business they could have either in England or in the United States.'

"'Still,' replied he, 'there are many in both those countries, and many more will follow. It is our desire and our hope to obtain the same influence in England that we have in Italy. Protestantism in that country already inclines greatly toward Catholicism, and will do so still more in proportion as the Jesuits gain ground there.'

"Our success is much impeded by other priests and monks, who, in their ignorant fanaticism, imprudently attack the Protestants, and thus only strengthen their opposition to the Church of Rome. We, on the other hand, have the art of introducing ourselves among them without exciting attention; consequently, without creating suspicion or alarm. Apparently occupied with our own affairs, we appear to take no notice of those of other people. We readily associate with them, sit at their tables, and converse on general topics; we never oppose or contradict what they may advance. Do they talk of the Bible? we are ready to talk on the same subject. We always, however, have some strong arguments in reserve, for which most of them are not prepared—scholastic doctrines, which the Bible does not disavow, and which are received with great willingness; so that while, on the one hand, we lament that there should be an episcopacy separate from Rome, we talk largely, on the other, on the important doctrine that the bishops are the successors of the apostles, and thus prepare the way for the conclusion that the pope is the successor of St. Peter. In fact, you will find that, in consequence of this doctrine of apostolic succession, the Episcopalians generally entertain a respect for the chair of St. Peter, in which the chief of the bishops is seated.

"The principle being admitted, the consequence naturally follows. And it is to be noted, that if any one speaks slightly of the Roman episcopacy, the Bishop of London is the first person to reprove him; and, moreover, the English episcopacy calls that of Rome her sister. It is not so, however, with the Presbyterians and other sects. The Church of England retains the two sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Supper, both of which, according to their belief, and according to ours also, confer sanctifying grace (*gratiam sanctificantem*), not only *ex opere operato*, but also *ex opere operantis*, and thus the minister becomes an advocate, *sine quo non*, for justification in Baptism, and for the real presence in the Eucharist. Should a doubt be expressed as to the sacred character of the minister, or as to the efficacy of the consecration of a bishop, as practised in their Church; should their white robes or their Book of Prayer be criticised, the same outcry is raised by them as would be raised by the sandalled friar if you ridiculed his tunic or his legends of St. Francis.

"Observe now," he continued, "our method of proceeding in England. We get acquainted with the Episcopalians—our time would be lost with others; and while we praise their doctrines, we endeavour to show how near they are to our own. We compare the respective Churches, their bishops with ours, the canons with the laws of discipline, the Mass-book with the Prayer-book, the robe with the surplice, and so on. The only point on which we cannot assimilate is our celibacy and their matrimony. And here we argue that as it is a matter of discipline, the Church might alter it, should it be deemed expedient to do so, the pope having the power to dispense with the observance."

The story of Dr. Achilli's imprisonment in the Inquisition under the French authorities at Rome, for the crime of circulating the word of God in that city, is familiar to our readers. In the concluding chapters of this work, however, they will find the account of his labours, his imprisonment and his escape, given more at length than it has been recited before. The whole book tends to illustrate what cannot be too strongly impressed upon the American mind—that Romanism remains unchanged in its essential features of violence, fraud, and imposture.

(15.) THE American Baptist Publication Society, (Philadelphia,) has issued a volume under the title of "*Bunyan's Devotional Works*," which will be welcome to all Christian souls, in spite of the eccentricity and error which now and then disfigure all the religious writings of the "glorious tinker." The volume contains five distinct works—the Spirit of Prayer; the Saints' Privilege and Profit; the Desire of the Righteous granted; the Unsearchable Riches of Christ; and Paul's Departure and Crown. But one of these (the first) has been before printed in this country.

(16.) DR. ROBINSON'S translation of Buttman's Greek Grammar, of which the second edition was published in 1839, has long been out of print. We can well remember the joy with which, in our own early studies of the language, we turned for the first time over the leaves of the book—a book which for many years was never off our study-table. Since that period the original work has passed through many editions and undergone many changes. The more recent editions edited by Alexander Buttman, have been very largely revised and extended; indeed, the "Syntax, in particular, has been expanded and re-written, with the aid of all the various theories and extensive investigations of the last twenty years." All this is now rendered accessible to American students in a "*Greek Grammar for the Use of High Schools and Universities*, by PHILIP BUTTMANN; revised and enlarged by his son Alexander Buttman, translated from the Eighteenth German edition, by EDWARD ROBINSON," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 8vo., pp. 517.) Amid the multitude of Greek Grammars that has appeared in this country since 1839, Buttman's still stands pre-eminent in one particular, viz., *clearness of statement*. Thiersch is more analytical and original; Kühner more profound and philosophical; Rost more acute and comprehensive; but in transparent clearness of statement Buttman leaves them all far behind. We do not think an obscure passage can be found in this book from beginning to end, while in Kühner, still more in his translators, they abound in almost every section, especially of the Syntax. As an available and useful record of the present state of Greek Grammar, if a student can have but one large treatise, we advise him by all means to buy Buttman. At the same time, we think it much to be regretted that the Editor has not seen fit to adopt the more scientific arrangement of the third declension of nouns which can be found in Kühner and Rost, or to employ Becker's admirable scheme of Syntax, the applicability of which to the Greek has been so fully shown by Kühner. These results of modern scholarship should not remain hidden from University students, for whose use the present volume is intended. Dr. Robinson will secure anew the thanks of American scholars for this translation: indeed, no year passes in which he does not place the fraternity under new obligations to him. The Publishers have got up the book in very excellent style.

(17.) "*The Square-rigged Cruiser: or, Sea Sermons*, by ALFRED M. LORRAINE." (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern, 18mo., pp. 252.) Mr. Lorraine was formerly a sailor, and is now a minister of the Ohio Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The work contains ten sermons, intended particularly for seamen, and abounding in illustrations drawn from nautical sources. We trust the "Cruiser" will make a successful and useful voyage.

(18.) THOUGH the Germans have done more to elucidate the details of Grecian history and life than any other nation, it has been reserved for English writers to combine the *disjecta membra* of history furnished by their more industrious neighbours, into a complete and harmonious whole. Such histories as Thirlwall's and Grote's have no rival in German, or in any other language. It was a happy thought of Dr. Schmitz to make use of these great works in the

preparation of a text-book for schools and for general reading, which now lies before us under the title of "*A History of Greece, from the earliest times to the destruction of Corinth, B. C. 146,*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 541.) The work is in great part an abridgment of Thirlwall—and we could give it no higher recommendation. It is, for this reason, far better written than Dr. Schmitz's *History of Rome*; which is not by any means a readable book, or one suited to be placed in the hands of young students. The present work might have been made much more available for class instruction by a judicious division into periods, and by placing the dates and divisions at the top and on the margin of the page. But in spite of these, and other defects, it is better than any summary history of Greece extant in our language, with the exception of that published by the Religious Tract Society.

(19.) "*The Guiding-Star, or the Bible God's Message,* by LOUISA PAYSON HOPKINS," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 18mo., pp. 260,) is a series of skillfully-prepared conversations, designed to present the evidences of Christianity in a form sufficiently simple and attractive to meet the wants of children.

(20.) No subject needs to be more urgently pressed upon the attention of the Church of this generation than the religious training of children; and we rejoice to see so many evidences of a renewed attention to it. We have now before us a very valuable treatise, entitled "*A Discourse on Domestic Piety and Family Government, in Four Parts,*" by JOHN H. POWER." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power. New-York: Lane & Scott, 1851; 18mo., pp. 191.) Part I. treats of the domestic relation, and of the parties to it; Part II. of the duty of a household service of the Lord; Part III. of the motives to domestic piety; and Part IV. of the momentous interests involved in the duty. Each of these topics is treated with great fulness and force: and the book abounds, throughout, not merely with excellent principles of family government and training, but with practical suggestions of the highest value. We wish the book could be placed in the hands of every Christian parent in the land.

(21.) MESSRS. GOULD & LINCOLN have reprinted "*First Impressions of England and its People,*" by HUGH MILLER," (12mo., pp. 430,) containing a record of observations made during a short tour in England by the author of the "*Old Red Sandstone.*" It abounds in pleasant glimpses of the rural life of England, of illustrations of the character of its lower classes, and in sharply-drawn contrasts between English and Scottish national character. These, and its geological notes, constitute, so far as we can see, its whole merit. Mr. Miller is too little of a traveller to judge, from any high point of observation, either of national character or national monuments as such; and his Scottish one-sidedness shows itself on almost every page. But the book abounds in pleasant reading.

(22.) MR. CHARLES PHILLIPS is well-known as the "Irish Barrister," and as the author of a number of very bombastic speeches. The best thing he has ever written is "*Curran and his Contemporaries.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers. FOURTH SERIES, VOL. III.—31

thers, 1851; 12mo., pp., 451.) The present issue is a revision of a book printed many years ago and now considerably enlarged. It is full of interesting anecdotes of a class of men such as no country but Ireland, and no age but their own, could have produced. Curran is the central light of a whole system of lesser orbs who sparkle in these pages. There is much in the book that could well be spared; but with all its gossiping prolixity, it is full of interest.

(23.) "*The Irish Confederates and the Rebellion of 1798*, by HENRY M. FIELD." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 369.) is really the first attempt at anything like a fair and full history of a period which has been much written *about* but never rightly treated. Mr. Field aims at impartiality; his style, though a little too ambitious for our taste, is well-adapted to the subject and the times—and the book is really an accession to our stores of knowledge on the subject.

(24.) "*A Treatise on Political Economy*, by GEORGE OPDYKE," (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 12mo., pp. 339,) is an able exposition of the doctrine of free trade. Mr. Opdyke is not a practised writer, but he is evidently a laborious thinker. We do not accept his arguments as valid, but we cannot hesitate to recognise their ability. One of the novelties of the book is its advocacy of an *inconvertible* paper currency—a theory, however, not so original as Mr. Opdyke appears to think it.

(25.) "*The Young Ladies' Guide to French Composition*, by GUSTAVE CHOUQUET," (New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 12mo., pp. 297,) contains two parts: first, a treatise on Rhetoric, (in French;) and second, a series of exercises, reading-lessons, conversations, &c. We should think it likely to be useful in the hands of a good teacher.

(26.) IN Church History we have to rely, as yet, almost entirely upon German writers. It is, indeed, a disgrace to English and American theology that no Church History, worthy of the name, has yet appeared originally in the English tongue. We have now before us the first volume of a truly-scientific work on the subject, produced on our own soil, but by a German scholar and in the German language, viz:—"Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche von ihrer Gründung bis auf die Gegenwart, dargestellt von Philipp Schaff, Professor zu Mercersburg." Vol. I. (Mercersburg, Pa.; and New-York: Rudolph Garrigue, 8vo., pp. 576.) This work is meant to be a comprehensive and complete Church History, exhibited in a free Christian spirit, entirely apart from sectarian interests and views: not, to be sure, apart from directly Christian and ecclesiastical interests, but from anything like *partisan* aims. It will also, if completed in the spirit of the present volume, have this great advantage over the richest works of the kind prepared in Europe—that the author combines the pains-taking accuracy and scientific insight of the German, with the practical religious life of the American mind. We should be glad to give a full outline of the work, but our limits forbid it now—we shall return to it in a more extended review

hereafter. In the meantime, however, we advise all our readers who are acquainted with the German language, to procure this volume, which, as containing the history of the "Apostolical Church," is complete in itself.

(27.) MR. KIDDER continues his work of supplying the Church with suitable books for the use of children and youth, with unwearied industry and increasing success. The latest volumes laid before us are "*Frontier Sketches, selected and arranged by the author of 'Dying Hours,'*" (18mo., pp. 142,) containing illustrations of Western life, with sketches of the adventures of Bishops Roberts and Morris in some of their Western tours. It is "more interesting than fiction, and yet may be relied on as matter of fact." From the West and its new life, we pass to the Old World and its places of the dead, in "*A Visit to the Catacombs, or first Christian Cemeteries at Rome.*" (18mo., pp. 108.) A pleasant biographical sketch is furnished in "*The Farmer Boy; or a Child of Providence led from the Plough to the Pulpit.*" (18mo., pp. 160.) Of a better class of books is "*Nature's Wonders; or God's care over all his Works,*" (18mo., pp. 226,) containing illustrations of natural objects and descriptions in easy dialogue, admirably adapted to interest young children.

(28.) WE have received another of Mr. JACOB ABBOTT'S delightful series, viz:— "*The History of Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 18mo., pp. 318.) It is enough to say that the spirit of the series is amply maintained in this new volume, the subject of which, in fact, is one that is eminently adapted to draw forth Mr. Abbott's peculiar powers of graphic and distinct delineation.

(29.) WE have again to notice a volume in the sphere of practical religion from the prolific pen of Rev. CHARLES ADAMS, entitled "*Women of the Bible.*" (New-York: Lane & Scott, 12mo., pp. 225.) The female characters of Scripture are here sketched—briefly and rapidly, it is true, yet with a truthfulness of outline, and, often, a depth of colouring that marks the hand of the genuine artist. "Sober and faithful," indeed, the book is, as the author tells us in his preface he has sought to make it: but it is at the same time graphic and attractive. It cannot but tend to edifying; and will, we trust, be largely circulated.

(30.) WE have received, at the latest moment, a copy of the "*Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*" A more valuable and interesting document has not issued from the press for many years. It is just what such a Report ought to be,—a full outline of the Missionary field, clearly and distinctly drawn, with plain and complete statements of what the Church is doing in that field, and suggestions as to her duty for the future. Several illustrative maps accompany the text. We shall take occasion to give a fuller analysis of the Report hereafter.

ART. VIII.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

WE mentioned in a former number that Dr. S. P. TREGELLES had in preparation a new edition of the Greek Testament. We have now received the prospectus issued by the editor, in the hope of obtaining a sufficient number of subscribers to defray the expenses of publication; and we would gladly second his wishes. Every well-wisher of Biblical literature who can by any means afford to subscribe for this great work, should send in his name at once. The *Text* is formed on the authority of the oldest Greek MSS. and versions, (aided by early citations,) so as to present, as far as practicable, the readings which were commonly received at the earliest period to which we can revert to obtain critical evidence. The *various readings* are those, 1st, of all the more ancient Greek MSS.; most of these the editor has himself collated in libraries at Rome, Paris, Basle, Munich, Modena, Venice, London, Cambridge, and Hamburg; and almost all the others he has collated with published facsimile editions; 2d, of all the ancient versions, most of which have required re-examination; and 3d, of the citations found in the earlier ecclesiastical writers. These are given very fully as far as the end of the third century, (and so as to include Eusebius,) and in cases of importance considerably later. The Latin version of Jerome is given mostly on the authority of the Codex Amiatinus of the sixth century, as collated by the editor himself. The Latin version of Jerome is given in parallel columns with the Greek text; and the Latin readings, in which the commonly printed *Clementine Vulgate* differs from the Codex Amiatinus, or in which the Codex Amiatinus contains a reading which has not been followed, are given below. The work is to be published in one volume 4to., price £3 3s. Subscribers can send their names (with proper references) to Dr. S. P. Tregelles, care of J. Wertheimer & Co., Circus Place, Finsbury Circus, London. Or, if they prefer it, the editor of this Review will receive and forward their subscriptions.

THE first volume of Clark's Foreign Theological Library for 1851 is Olshausen's Commentary on Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians, translated from the German. This volume will complete all of this commentary written by Olshausen himself: the remaining books of the New Testament, however, are to be treated by other able men in the same spirit as far as possible. Of these supplementary volumes, we have received two from Germany, viz:—"Die Briefe des Apostels Paulus an die Philipper, an Titus, Timotheus, und Philemon, erklärt von J. C. A. WIESINGER," (Königsberg, 1850: 8vo., pp. 720); and "Der Brief an die Hebräer, erklärt von Dr. J. H. A. EBRARD." (8vo., pp. 483.) These, we hope, will also be translated for Clark's Library, which we again commend to our theological readers.

WE mentioned some time since that the choice of a successor to NEANDER lay between NIEDNER, ULLMANN, and LEHNERT, of Königsberg. The latter has been chosen. He is in the prime of life, and is said to be one of the most attractive lecturers and pulpit orators in Prussia.

THE second volume of the Rev. James Thomson's "Exposition of the Gospel of St. Luke, in a series of Lectures," has appeared in Edinburgh. This work, which is the only extended exposition of St. Luke in the language, is highly spoken of by English and Scottish authorities.

A PROSPECTUS has been issued for the publication of Neander's Theological Lectures. They will be issued by Wiegandt and Grieben, in Leipzig, under the editorial supervision of Dr. Julius Müller. The work will fall into three divisions: 1. Exegesis of the New Testament; 2. Historico-theological Lectures, embracing Church History, the History of Christian Doctrines and Morals, and Protestantism and Romanism; 3. Theological Lectures on Christian Doctrines and Ethics. We shall be happy to receive and forward subscribers' names. The terms of publication are not yet an-

nounced, further than that the work will be issued in separate volumes, at a cheap rate.

Messrs. LONGMANS have published the ninth volume of their new edition of Jeremy Taylor's works. This edition will be completed in ten volumes.

THE May number of the Prospective Review (which is the organ of liberal Christianity—indeed, of scepticism—in England) has an able article on Mr. Atkinson and Miss Martineau's "*Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development*," in which the utter atheism of that work is severely exposed. The Review remarks, that "Mr. Atkinson is not a Lucretius; nor even an Helvetius; no, nor a Baron d'Holbach; but a rhetorical dilution of Robert Owen;—whose tiresome propositions, scattered by some process of logical explosion, and wildly lying about without any semblance of cohesion, constitute the theoretic elements of this work. We should not have supposed it possible to write so inorganic a book upon organization. We defy the most methodizing intellect to construct the author's doctrine into a presentable whole, or to do more than pile it up as a set of loose and shapeless assertions, serving perhaps to mark, but not to protect, the territory they open as an asylum for all the black sheep of unbelief."

Two small volumes, entitled "Scripture Revelations respecting Angels," and "Lectures on the Apostles," which have recently appeared in England, are attributed to Archbishop Whately. The Christian Remembrancer (a journal not very well disposed to praise anything from Whately's pen) remarks that "in vigour, precision, and life, they maintain the writer's reputation for style, while for practical and religious purposes, they far exceed anything which we remember from the same pen."

"Is Saul also among the Prophets?" one might well ask, in reading such a title as "*De la Célébration du Dimanche, considérée sous les Rapports de L'Hygiène, de la Morale, des relations de famille et de Cité*," par P. J. PROUDHON. (Paris, 1850, 12mo., pp. 84.) The Mosaic law of the Sabbath has never found a higher eulogist, either among Pharisees, Rabbins, or Christian doctors, than it here has in Proudhon, the great high-priest, as he is *said* to be, of socialism and infidelity. He pleads that every means of raising and establishing modern society

will be vain and futile that does not include the *Sabbath* among its chief agencies; and he urges a renewal of Sabbath worship and observance upon the French nation with great eloquence and force. We must reserve this remarkable book for more extended notice.

A STRIKING specimen of the pains-taking perseverance so characteristic of German literature, is afforded by a new book entitled "*Bibliotheca Biographica Lutherana: Uebersicht der gedruckten Dr. M. Luther betreffenden biographischen Schriften, zusammengestellt von E. S. Vogel*," (Halle, 1851, 8vo., pp. 145, New-York, Westermann, Brothers.) The titles of no less than *thirteen hundred and twenty-one* works illustrative of the life of Luther are here collected and set forth under appropriate heads.

We have received the first volume of "*Untersuchungen über Inhalt und Alter des Alttestamentlichen Pentateuch*," von Dr. T. Sörensen, Privat docent in der Universität Kiel," (8vo., pp. 343.) This volume is occupied with a historico-critical Commentary on Genesis, the whole aim of which is to prove that the book was written at a much later period than is commonly assigned to it. The author means to make the same attempt upon the other books of the Pentateuch.

We have been often asked to give some account of the writings of Julius Charles Hare. A critical estimate of their value may, perhaps, be furnished hereafter: in the meantime, the following list includes all, or nearly all, his writings, viz:—*The Mission of the Comforter*, 8vo.:—*The Victory of Faith*, 8vo.:—*Parish Sermons*, two series, 8vo.:—*Life of John Sterling*, with the edition of Sterling's Essays, &c., 2 vols. 8vo.; besides a number of sermons, charges, &c., with "*Guesses at Truth*," 2 vols., edited by J. C. Hare, and written by himself and his brother Augustus.

PROFESSOR F. D. MAURICE, of King's College, belongs to the same school of theologians (so to speak) with Arnold, Hare, and Trench. His writings are tolerably numerous, embracing, among others, the following, viz:—*The Kingdom of Christ*, 8vo.:—*The New Testament, the History of the Church, and the Romish Apostasy*, Joint Witnesses to the Reality of the Divine Kingdom upon Earth:—*The Church a Family*; *Sermons on the Occasional Services of the Prayer-Book*:—*The Prayer-*

Book, specially considered as a Protection against Romanism; nineteen Sermons preached at Lincoln's Inn:—The Lord's Prayer, nine Sermons preached at Lincoln's Inn:—The Religions of the World, and their Relations to Christianity; Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews, with a Review of Newman's Theory of Development, 8vo.:—Christmas Day and other Sermons, 8vo.

It is said that Archdeacon Hare's Memoir of John Sterling does not give a truthful—or at least a complete—account of the religious (or irreligious) condition of mind into which Sterling settled before he died. The London Leader says that he “had emancipated himself from all religious dogmas;” and that, whereas the Archdeacon exhibits him as a Rationalist simply, he was, in fact, “no *ist* at all.” Thomas Carlyle is now engaged upon a biography of Sterling, in which “this and other points are to be set in their true light.”

THOSE of our readers who have perused Sir Charles Lyell's “Second Visit to the United States,” may remember a charge brought by him against the late Pope in the following terms:—“It is well known by those who have of late years frequented the literary circles of Rome, that the learned Cardinal Mai was prevented, in 1838, from publishing his edition of the *Codex Vaticanus*, because he could not obtain leave from the late Pope (Gregory XVI.) to omit the interpolated passages, and had satisfied himself that they were wanting in all the most ancient MSS. at Rome and Paris. The Pontiff refused, because he was bound by the decrees of the Council of Trent, and of a Church pretending to infallibility, which had solemnly sanctioned the Vulgate; and the Cardinal had too much good faith to give the authority of his name to what he regarded as a forgery.” A writer in the London *Tablet* endeavours to refute this charge, and makes the following remarks among others:—“Both from Leo XII. and Gregory XVI., Cardinal Mai received permission to publish the celebrated copy of the Bible which is preserved in the Vatican library, and is marked 1209. This manuscript is justly considered the most ancient copy of the Scriptures in existence, even by those who vaunt the superior age of the text of the Cambridge MS. This permission has never been revoked—never limited. The *Codex* is already printed, and this we affirm from our own personal knowledge

and inspection of the sheets; it will be published as soon as the extensive critical apparatus which is to accompany it will be completed. The Cardinal received permission from two Pontiffs to publish the manuscript as it stands; every facility has been afforded him in furthering his undertaking; this permission was never revoked; the manuscript is even now *actually printed*, and it will be published when the critical notes destined to illustrate it, will be finished. It is, we aver, a faithful transcript of the original—nothing has been added by the Pope, nothing taken away by the Cardinal.”

MR. FABER, in his *Letters on Tractarian Secession to Popery*, proves very satisfactorily that Mr. Newman was a *concealed Papist*, by his own confession, as far back as the year 1833. Says Mr. Faber:—

“Were I an infidel, and did I possess the species of intellect which Mr. Newman possesses, the mode which, in the present day, I should select for the most effectual propagation of infidelity, would be the precise mode adopted by that gentleman in his recent work, (*Essay on Development*). Far am I from asserting that he is himself an infidel; yet he alone can tell what his own sentiments really are. In the year 1833, (the very year in which the imposture of Tractarianism commenced,) Mr. Newman, as he now confesses, said of the Romanists:—‘Their communion is infected with heresy; we are bound to flee it as a pestilence. They have established a lie in the place of God's truth; and by their claim of immutability in doctrine, cannot undo the sin they have committed.’ Declarations to the same effect he confesses himself to have been making at various times in various successive years; and now, at length, he winds up the whole disgraceful management by the infatuated, though providentially ordered, statement, that he had been deliberately asserting what he himself at the very time totally disbelieved. His plea is, that ‘he was not speaking his own words, but was only following almost a *consensus* of the divines of his Church.’ And the reason which he assigns for the fraud, is that ‘such views were necessary for our position’—the position, to wit, of himself and his associates; and that the language so strongly vituperative of Popery, which he then employed as veritably exhibiting his own real sentiments, must be ascribed to a hope of approving himself to persons whom he respected, and to a wish to repel the charge of Romanism. Now when a man has thus openly told us that he scruples not to deliver as his own, sentiments which are not his own, if such a deception should be thought necessary for his position, he has so totally destroyed his own credibility, that in future we can

entertain no certain belief of any exposition which he may please to make of his opinions. He *may*, no doubt, tell us the truth; but since he has also told us that he scruples not to utter untruths, when he deems them necessary to his existing position, we never in any particular instance can be certain that he is honestly declaring his real sentiments. Hence, at present, he *may* be truly a Romanist; but no assertion of his can *now* carry with it any reasonable conviction to that effect, simply because he has suicidally destroyed all claim to our confidence and belief."

THE *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for April contains the following articles:—I. Wherein consists the Forgiveness of Sin, by J. F. K. Gurllitt: II. Rome and Cologne, or the Development of Germano-Christian Art, by Dr. Stark: III. On the importance of the Study of Christian Ethics at the present time, an Introductory Lecture by Professor Schöberlein, of Heidelberg: IV. The Principle of Protestantism, a letter to Dr. Ullmann, by C. Beck: V. A Review of Lücke on the Apocalypse, by Tischendorf: VI. A long and genial article on the personal life, character, &c., of Neander, by Dr. Kling, of Ebersbach.

THE *British Quarterly* for May contains the following articles:—I. Grote's History of Greece: II. French, Germans, and English: III. Volcanoes and Earthquakes: IV. The European Difficulty: V. German Protestantism: VI. Ruskin's Stones of Venice: VII. Jesuitism as it is: VIII. Dixon's Mairwara—Civilization in India: IX. Dr. Brown—Biblical Expositors: X. Modern French Literature: XI. Criticisms on Books, &c., &c.

THE *Journal of Sacred Literature* for April contains the following articles:—I. Egypt: being a review of the late discoveries in Egypt as elucidating and confirming the Scriptures: II. On the words which Paul heard in Paradise, (translated badly enough, from the Latin of Vitringa): III. Inspiration—maintaining the verbal theory: IV. Carl Ritter's Discourse before the Scientific Society of Berlin, on the explorations of the River Jordan and the Dead Sea: V. Modern Spiritualism—a review of Newman's Phases of Faith: VI. Parallelistic Poetry: VII. On the Demoniacal Possessions of the New Testament: VIII. On the Authorship of the Acts of the Apostles: IX. Tischendorf's Septuagint: X. Gilfillan's Bards of the Bible: with the usual book notices, correspondence, &c. Prof. Ritter's Discourse on the Dead Sea

and the Jordan gives the best view of the whole subject, in a condensed form, that we have yet seen. After sketching the partially successful labours of Symonds and Molyneux, he gives full credit to the American Exploring Expedition, as follows:—

"In 1848 the third attempt was made on that stubborn lake-field, and this time the victory over those powers of nature and their perils was a complete one. The honour of that victory was, however, wrested from the Old World by the New. The United States of North America sent from the other side of the Atlantic a vessel fitted out for the purpose. It was well provided with stores and instruments, and had a competent crew, under the command and scientific direction of two officers, Lieutenants Lynch and Dale. To be prepared for every sort of danger, it had on board two metallic boats, one of iron, the other of copper, which, being made in sections for transportation, were carried or drawn on trucks by camels from the seaport of Acre to the Lake of Tiberias. From thence the expedition of discovery was to proceed again by water, through the deepest and hottest crevice of the earth; and, truly, to go through that undertaking under a tropical sky, there was required as much circumspection as for those expeditions which were about the same time completed or begun, respectively, by the Britons in the antarctic and arctic regions, amidst the ice-fields of the two poles. Man feels an inward impulse to break through the limits that nature draws round him in every direction; because complete truth and liberty of mind can only become his portion, in so far as he is able to attain to the fulness of knowledge."

WE have received the first number of the "*Theological Critic*," a quarterly journal, edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, and published by Rivingtons. (London, price four shillings sterling.) It is intended to embrace theology in the widest acceptance of the term, and admitting even classical literature, from its importance to Biblical criticism. The first number contains the following articles:—I. Newman's Ninth Lecture: II. Galatians iii, 13: III. Cardinal Bessarion: IV. Lepsius on Biblical Chronology: V. The Ministry of the Body: VI. Romans xiv: VII. Is the Beast from the Sea the Papacy? VIII. Modern Infidelity—Miss Martineau and Mr. Atkinson: IX. St. Columban and the early Irish Missionaries: X. Dr. Bloomfield and Mr. Alford: XI. "Things Old and New." The article on Newman's Ninth Lecture is a very pungent illustration of Mr. Newman's own principles by facts from Romanist sources. The

following story is from a Romanist book of devotion, published in Paris in 1835:—

"Father Razzi, of the order of the Carmaldules, tells us, that a young man who had lost his father, was sent by his mother to be the page of a certain prince. But before they parted, his mother, who had a great devotion for the Holy Virgin, made her son promise that he would repeat every day the *Angelic Salutation*, and with it this short ejaculatory supplication, *Blessed Virgin, assist me at the hour of my death!* The young man was no sooner arrived at the court, than he plunged into every kind of vice; and his bad conduct lost him entirely the favour of his master, who at last dismissed him from his service. In despair, and without any means of subsistence, he became a *highwayman*; but even whilst he was robbing and murdering on the king's highway, he remained faithful to the *practice of piety* which his mother had enjoined him. At length his crimes met with their reward; he fell into the hands of justice, and was condemned to death. He was thrown into prison, there to remain till he should be summoned to undergo the penalty of the law. On the evening before the day that was fixed for his execution, his disgrace, his approaching death, and the grief of his poor mother, presented themselves so vividly to his mind, that he was buried in sad thoughts, and his tears flowed abundantly; when, all at once, he beheld before him a young man, who, addressing him, offered to deliver him from prison and death, if he would bind himself to obey him. The prisoner gave the promise, when the young man disclosed to him that he was the devil; and commanded him, in the first place, to renounce Jesus Christ and the sacraments, *to which the prisoner consented*. That is not enough, added the evil spirit; you must also deny the Holy Virgin, and renounce her protection. *That I will never do*, replied the criminal, and, addressing the Mother of God, he repeated the prayer which he was in the habit of making to her, *Blessed Virgin, succour me in the hour of death*. These words put the devil to flight; but the poor young man remained inconsolable for having denied his Saviour: in his affliction, he had recourse to Mary, and prayed to her with such fervour, that she obtained for him a sincere contrition for his sins, under the influence of which he confessed with a deep feeling of penitence. On the next day, as the officers were leading him to the place of execution, he had to pass by an image of the Mother of God; he saluted it, and said, *Blessed Virgin, succour me in the hour of death*. The image, in the sight of all who were present, inclined its head, and returned the salutation. Penetrated by this mark of favour, he asked permission to kiss the feet of the image. The soldiers, who were conducting him, did not at all like this; but

as the people murmured, they did not venture to refuse his request. The young man stooped down, and the image, extending its arms, took him by the hand, and held him so tight, that it was impossible to get him away again. At this miracle, but one cry was heard,—*Pardon! Pardon!* and the pardon was granted. He returned to his country, and ever after led an exemplary life, retaining the most tender gratitude to Mary, who had saved him from two deaths—a temporal and an eternal one."

Is it not terrible to think that such teaching as *this* is given in the name of Christianity in the nineteenth century?

THE distinguished New Testament critic, LACHMANN, died at Berlin, on the 13th of March, in his 59th year.

THE late Rev. Edward Bickersteth was not less remarkable for his diligence as a writer, than for his zeal and fidelity as a preacher. The following list contains the titles of his principal works:—A Treatise on Prayer, designed to promote the Spirit of Devotion (seventeenth edition):—A Scripture Help, designed to assist in Reading the Bible profitably (nineteenth edition):—A Treatise on the Lord's Supper, in two parts (twelfth edition):—Christian Truth, a Family Guide to the Chief Truths of the Gospel, with Prayers for each Day in the Week, and Private Devotions for various Occasions (third edition):—The Christian Student, designed to assist Christians in general in acquiring Religious Knowledge, with lists of Books adapted to various Classes (fourth edition):—Practical Reflections on the Four Gospels, arranged on the plan of a Harmony, selected from various Expositions (second edition):—Family Expositions of the Epistles of St. John and St. Jude:—A Treatise on Baptism, designed as a Help to the due Improvement of that Holy Sacrament:—The Chief Concerns of Man for Time and for Eternity (fifth edition):—Family Prayers, a Complete Course for Eight Weeks, with Additional Prayers for various Occasions:—The Signs of the Times in the East, a Warning to the West:—The Promised Glory of the Church of Christ:—The Restoration of the Jews to their own Land, in Connexion with their future Conversion and the final Blessedness of our Earth (second edition):—A Practical Guide to the Prophecies (seventh edition.)

SCOTLAND has produced bold divines as well as warriors; and the race is not extinct yet. The Rev. JAMES COCHRANE has written a book entitled "*Discourses on some*

of the most difficult Texts of Scripture," in which the following subjects are discussed:—The Church's Foundation Rock and the Gates of Hell; The Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; Irrecoverable Apostasy; Salted with Fire; Christ went and preached to the Spirits in Prison; Baptized for the Dead; General View of the Doctrine of God's Eternal Decrees; Sovereignty of God in Predestination; Sovereignty of God in Election; Doctrine of Election practically considered; Sovereignty of God in Reprobation; On the Difficulties in the Ninth Chapter of Romans; The two Genealogies of Christ compared; The Title on the Saviour's Cross; The Election of Matthias; and the Sin against the Holy Ghost. Not having read the book, we cannot judge whether Mr. Cochrane's success is equal to his courage.

AN important work of Origen's, hitherto believed to be lost, has been discovered in Paris, by M. Miller, librarian of the National Assembly, among the Greek manuscripts brought to that capital by M. Mynas about ten years ago. The *Journal des Débats* describes the original work as being in ten books:—the first of which is already known to the world under the title of "Philosophumena." The last seven books are now, it is said, recovered, and about to be published. The French journal describes the work as "a refutation of heresies, in which the author endeavours to prove that the heresiarchs have all taken their doctrines from the ancient philosophers:—a very curious task for Origen to perform, since he was himself chiefly remarkable for the mixture of Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle which he compounded with his Christianity. But apart from its controversial interest, the recovered manuscript will throw new light on the opinions and practices of the Neo-Platonists, and on the manners and customs of ancient times. Discoveries like this point out the necessity for a larger and more combined action of learned societies in the search for ancient manuscripts. Origen's "Stromata" might even yet be completed,—and it is not to be supposed that all the existing fragments of his "Hexapla" were collected by Montfaucon. There are vast stores of old manuscripts in Europe not yet examined. The library of the Vatican would not only yield to the cause of letters some of the unknown or incomplete works of the early fathers, but would probably furnish some valuable

manuscripts of classic writers. There are several libraries in France and Germany, of which the contents are not perfectly known; and among the Arabic transcripts at Constantinople and in other Eastern cities, a copy of the "Republic" and of the lost books of Livy might possibly be found. Learned bodies should take this matter up in earnest—more especially the great universities which have, so to say, charge of the interests of learning. The successful mission of M. Mynas is an instance of what may be done with a little earnestness and energy for the recovery of lost treasures. The remainder of Tacitus and Aristotle might not impossibly be recovered at a title of the trouble which has been bestowed on the search after the supposed buried wealth of the buccaners.

ANOTHER volume of infidelity has issued from that laboratory of scepticism, John Chapman's book-shop in the Strand, London. It is entitled, ambitiously enough, "*The Creed of Christendom; its Foundations and Superstructure*," by W. R. GREG; and lest any of our readers should be induced by its title to purchase it, we state the leading objects of the work, which are to prove—I. That "the tenet of the inspiration of the Scriptures is baseless and untenable under any form or modification which leaves to it a dogmatic value:—II. That "the Gospels are not textually faithful records of the sayings and actions of Jesus, but ascribe to him words which he never uttered, and deeds which he never did:—III. That "the apostles only partially comprehended and imperfectly transmitted the teaching of their great Master." The infection of half-learned arrogance and of blasphemy under the guise of spiritualism, seems to be spreading in England.

DR. JOHN PYE SMITH died, as we stated in our last, on the 5th of February, 1851. A brief sketch of his life and labours is due to his memory and to our readers. He was born in Sheffield in 1775. His father was a bookseller, and in his shop the son learned to read books as well as to bind them. As he showed early signs of talent, he was sent to Rotherham College, and so distinguished himself by his diligence and success in study, that when his academical course was finished, he was made at once a tutor in the College. At twenty-five he was invited to become principal of Homerton College, the oldest theological school of the Independents in England. He held this office,

with ever-increasing popularity and usefulness, for fifty years; and during nearly all this time he was also pastor of a Church in the neighbourhood.

"The chief labour of Dr. Pye Smith's life, and his most enduring monument, was the work entitled 'The Scripture Testimony to the Messiah: an Inquiry with a view to a satisfactory Determination of the Doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures concerning the Person of Christ.' This work is admitted by the greatest scholars to be the first of its kind. It is marked by profound and accurate learning, candid criticism, and by that reverential and Christian spirit which ought to govern every theological inquiry. It has received the rare honour of being admitted, though the work of a Dissenter, as an authority in the English universities. His work on Scripture and Geology added to his theological and scientific reputation, and established his claim to a place in the Royal Society. He also published a considerable number of separate sermons and lectures, with some volumes of controversy. Should his course of divinity be given to the world, as many competent persons have expressed the opinion that it ought, we believe it will greatly add to his fame and his usefulness. It is stated that he was never satisfied to go through his divinity lectures unimproved, but constantly amended them as new lights were thrown on Scripture."

The following estimate of the quality of his mind is given in the funeral sermon pronounced by Dr. John Harris:—

"Those who could best appreciate him will, I think, join with me in the opinion that his mind was not distinguished by any splendid or showy attributes. The daring in imagination, the metaphysical in reasoning, and the inventive in theory, were unknown to him. But if his mental qualities were not marked by breadth and brilliance, they were characterized by strength and intensity. He united quickness of apprehension with great power of application and patient inquiry. Remarkable retentiveness of memory, and the orderly distribution of his knowledge, placed the results of his immense reading at his ready disposal. His mind was a well-arranged library, in which he could easily lay his hand on whatever he wanted. And to these qualities he added—what is rarely found in so eminent a degree in this connexion—true originality. Not that which aims at the striking, or produces the singular; but that which denotes mental independence. Whatever he produced, brought with it, both in form and in style, the stamp of his own mind.

"But more particularly; his course was marked by unintermitting mental activity. The range of reading and study which he

sketched for himself and his pupils on his first coming to Homerton, showed a determination to circumnavigate, if possible, the entire globe of knowledge. Departments of science which were then only just beginning to attract attention, were already familiar to him. The German, French, and other modern languages, unlocked their stores of literature to him, at a time when the first of these especially was, in this country, almost an 'unknown tongue.' Every new book of importance, however costly, was eagerly obtained, and laid under contribution in the cause of truth. And even when his growing infirmities compelled him to retire from official life, his thirst for knowledge remained unappeased. When he retired to Guildford, he entertained the hope of entering on an extensive course of reading in the ancient and modern languages.

"Nor was this intellectual activity a life of mere abstraction, or of mental luxury. Dr. Smith valued knowledge for its useful applications. It has been said that 'to write is to act.' Each of his books was an act; and an act designed to meet a want. Whether he architecturally built up the 'Scripture Testimony to the Messiah,' like the ancient Tabernacle of Witness, or rebuked the flippant attacks of Infidelity; whether he asserted the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ, exhibited the rules for the Interpretation of Prophecy, expounded the Principles of the Reformation, or enforced the claims of Evangelical Nonconformity, his aim was usefulness of the highest order. His great work, the 'Scripture Testimony,' is universally acknowledged to be one of the greatest modern achievements of sanctified learning."

He went down to the grave at last, full of years, without any special disease. His last hours were calm and peaceful:—

"Looking intensely with his mild eyes in the faces of all who surrounded his dying bed, he made a last effort to bless them. 'The Lord bless you all, (said he,) and He undoubtedly will.' To a medical friend he articulated with great difficulty, 'Farewell; I am greatly obliged; the eternal God be thy Refuge!' And, turning to his son, 'The Lord be your portion forever!' And thus, (though he still lingered a short time,) like his Divine Master, he may be said to have ascended in the act of blessing."

THE May number of the British Quarterly Review contains an article on *Jesuitism as it is*, from which we make the following extracts. The present Superior General of the order of Jesuits is Johannes Roothaan, who was appointed July 9, 1829. Speaking of him, the Review says:—

"Since Aquaviva, who died in 1615, the Jesuits have not had so young a superior, one still in the prime of life; and historical

truth compels us to admit that the post has never been held by so able a man, or one of such high mental endowments, as Father Roothaan, who now fills it. He was born at Amsterdam, November 20, 1785, and for a time was clerk to Mynheer Mos, a tobacco manufacturer of his native town. He afterwards left this humble situation in order to take Jesuit's orders. He was scarcely nineteen years of age when, in 1804, he entered the college at Polozk, and displayed rare ability, and great activity, in the discharge of his various and, in some degree, arduous undertakings. At the time of his elevation, Father Roothaan was not quite forty-five years old. He brought to his new office an acute, penetrating understanding, comprehending the whole world in the spirit of his order, the cool consideration peculiar to the Dutch, uncommon power of self-control united with indomitable courage, and extensive knowledge of mankind, of modern states, and their relations. He has, therefore, been deservedly called the greatest political chief, the most skilful pilot to whom the vessel of the order of Jesus could be intrusted; and the festivities with which his election was celebrated in all the houses of the Society, were very natural. According to the prevalent opinion in Rome, heaven itself seemed to signalize Roothaan's entrance into office by a miraculously favourable omen. On the 18th July, the ninth day after his election, there happened a frightful thunder-storm, accompanied by a hurricane, at the time when eighty Jesuit disciples were met for prayer in the chapel of St. Louis of Gonzaga. The lightning struck two places in the Roman college, in the garden, in the church, and the chapel. A flash fell in the midst of those who were praying without injuring any of them. 'A miracle! a miracle!' exclaimed the people; and the holy fathers did not think proper to contradict them, by pointing out the very evident natural explanation of the event.

"It cannot be denied, that the triumphs of the Society of Jesus, under Roothaan's generalship, and the brilliant worldly position which they have again attained, have been in a great degree owing to the circumstances of the age, and especially to that fatal fever of reaction against the spirit of the century, which became more and more prevalent in courts, and at last infected even the wisest potentates. Nevertheless, we must also allow, that Roothaan's distinguished abilities have contributed greatly to this result. It may truly be said that he, throughout nearly the whole of his generalship, was not only the superior of the Jesuits, but also the actual pope, and possessed almost unlimited authority in the States of the Church."

The following summaries of the numbers of the "Society of Jesus" are derived from official documents:—

"JANUARY 1st, 1843.

Provinces.	Priests.	Scholars.	Lay Brothers.	Total.
Rome ...	232	173	196	601
Sicily....	101	71	78	250
Turin....	133	132	114	379
Spain....	152	69	106	327
Paris....	163	57	71	291
Lyons....	154	57	79	290
Belgium	125	93	63	281
Total	1,060	652	707	2,419

JANUARY 1st, 1844.

Provinces.	Priests.	Scholars.	Lay Brothers.	Total.
Rome ...	258	186	226	670
Sicily....	107	75	80	262
Turin....	147	146	132	425
Spain....	156	54	101	311
Paris....	195	87	91	373
Lyons....	181	118	98	397
Belgium	137	149	89	375
Total	1,181	815	817	2,813

JANUARY 1st, 1845.

Provinces.	Priests.	Scholars.	Lay Brothers.	Total.
Rome ...	269	201	232	702
Sicily....	112	72	83	267
Turin....	156	138	134	428
Spain....	156	64	100	320
Paris....	204	110	106	420
Lyons....	188	147	111	446
Belgium	147	176	101	424
Total	1,232	908	867	3,007

"These tables show a constant increase of members. In the three years from 1841 to 1844, the increase in the order was, of priests, 121; of scholars, 163; of lay-brothers, 110; in all, 394 persons. The next year, 1845, gave an increase of 51 priests, 93 scholars, and 50 lay brothers; in all, 194 persons. It is a significant fact that the provinces of England and Ireland do not appear in these official statements. But our authority ('Heinrich Bode Das Innere,' &c.) gives the number of Jesuits on the 1st of January, 1844, as 164 in England, and 73 in Ireland. Some other provinces are omitted. With the probable increase for the year 1845, the aggregate number of members of this proselyting society was, at the end of that year, about 4,400 persons, and the annual increase about 214. If we suppose that the annual increase has remained from then till now the same, though everything gives reason to believe that it has augmented considerably, then, to 4,400 we shall have to add five times 214, or 1,070, making the grand total of Jesuits at the present hour to be 5,470. This, it must be allowed, is a considerable array of spiritual power."

An estimate is attempted of the number of Jesuits in England:—

"In 1780, there were 110 Jesuits out of

359 priests then in England and Wales. Supposing the proportion to have been preserved, then, of the present 826 priests in England and Wales, 253 would be of the Society of Jesus. This calculation, however, does not inform us how many lay-brethren of the order are here, and in active operation. We may employ other means of calculation. It has already been stated, that between 1790 and 1800, there were built eighteen new Catholic places of worship. The number of Jesuits in England about that time was, we have learned, 110. Now, if eighteen new chapels were produced by 110 Jesuits, how many Jesuits are necessary to produce 144—the number built in the period from 1840 to 1850? The answer is, 880. This calculation gives us 880 Jesuits employed in the extension of Catholicism in England during the decennium 1840-1850. The actual number of members that now belong to the Society of Jesus, we have calculated to be 5,470. If, then, 880 are engaged in England, this island receives a full share of attention from General Roothaan, about one-sixth of his army being here engaged in active warfare. Whether or not so large a number is employed in England, we cannot say. In that part of this essay to which we have just referred, the number of the disciples of Loyola in England and Ireland, was seen to be 237. Adding 57 as the proportionate increase, we obtain 294 as the total number of Jesuits now at work in England and Ireland. These results widely differ: 294 is only about one-third of 880. One figure or the other must be remote from the truth. But let it be remembered that England and Ireland are omitted from the official lists, and that the smaller amount is deduced from less recent, and, perhaps, less reliable sources of information than the larger. And while the omission to which we have adverted, justifies a suspicion that the number of Jesuits in England was larger than General Roothaan thought it prudent to publish, especially at a time when the legal documents of the country were declaring that the land was as innocent of Jesuits as it was of Bonzes, we may at any rate, acquiescing in the smaller total, declare that at this hour not less than 300 sons of Ignatius Loyola are employing all their confessedly great resources, and all their secret fascinations, in order to lead England back under the yoke of Rome.

"But Jesuits exist under other names. Proscribed or forbidden as Jesuits, they assume disguises; and under these disguises they work out their dark purposes, especially in Protestant lands. How many cloaked Jesuits are there in England? The idolatry of 'The Sacred Heart of Jesus' prevails in England. The 'Society of the Sacred Heart' was, during the French Revolution, instituted (1794) by the ex-Jesuits Charles de Broglie and the Abbé de Tournely. Another hidden form in which Jesuits have arrayed

their forces is that of 'The Society of the Faith,' established by Paccarini, and other ex-Jesuits, in the diocese of Trent. To the existence in England of one society of the 'Sacred Heart,' (at Roehampton, in the Catholic diocese of Hexham,) the 'Catholic Directory' confesses. Another Catholic authority of recent date (Aschbach's *Kirchen-Lexicon*) informs us that "The Fathers of the Faith" are beginning to spread in Holland and in England.' Are these the persons of whose existence in England many traces are found in the 'Directory,' under the denomination of the 'Order of the Faithful Companions of Jesus?' And among the now very numerous 'Christian Brothers,' who seem specially engaged in the work of popular education, how many belong to the Society of Jesus, or some kindred association? We suspect that Catholic Jesuitism exists in this land far beyond what the smaller results of our calculations show."

Yet, on the whole, comparing Jesuitism now, with what it formerly was, there is no ground for discouragement:—

"The spirit of the age is adverse to Jesuitism. The great tendencies of our actual Christianity are adverse to Jesuitism. The essential qualities of the Saxon race, now every day rising into the ascendant, are adverse to Jesuitism. Nor is the actual condition of the abominable thing otherwise than encouraging, when that condition is compared with what it was in the early days of its existence. To its repeated overthrows we have adverted. The human heart hates Jesuitism, and throws it off as soon as ever it is fully aware of the presence of the incubus. True, Jesuitism has had its revivals as well as its falls. But in the midst of these vicissitudes there has been a general tendency toward decline and decay. In the year 1626, eighty-six years after its foundation, Jesuitism numbered in Europe 13,369 members. In the year 1851, some five thousand members form the sum of its strength. Had it in the last 225 years increased in the same ratio as during those eighty-six years, it would now have held the supreme mastery of the world. Instead of an increase, the society has suffered, on the whole, constant diminution; being weakened every time that human nature and the Gospel cast it to the ground, until now it numbers not one-third of the members which it had of old."

Among the new works in Theology and Biblical Literature announced in Great Britain, are the following:—The Four Witnesses, or the Perfect Harmony of the Four Gospels deduced from the Character and the particular Object in view of their respective Writers, by Isaac da Costa, LL.D., Amsterdam, 8vo.:—Ezekiel and the Book

of his Prophecy, an Exposition, by the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, Salton, author of "Typology of Scripture," "Jonah," &c., 8vo. :—The Idol demolished by its own Priest, an Answer to Cardinal Wiseman's Lectures on Transubstantiation, by James Sheridan Knowles :—A History of the Articles of Religion, with illustrations from the Symbolical Books of the Roman and Reformed Communions, by Charles Hardwick, M.A., Fellow and Chaplain of St. Catharine's Hall, Cambridge :—A Defence of Revealed Religion ; comprising a Vindication of the Miracles of the Old and New Testaments from the Attacks of Rationalists and Infidels, by Joseph Brown, M.D. :—Notes and Reflections on the Epistle to the Romans, by Arthur Pridham, demy 12mo. :—Wesley and Methodism, by Isaac Taylor, author of "Natural History of Enthusiasm," "Loyola and Jesuitism," &c., post 8vo. :—Gregory of Nazianzum. A Contribution to the Ecclesiastical History of the Fourth Century, by Professor Ullmann, translated by G. V. Cox, M.A. :—History of Mohammedanism and its Sects, by W. Cooke Taylor, LL.D. (third and cheaper edition) :—The Early Progress of the Gospel, being the Hulsean Lectures for 1850, by W. G. Humphry, B.D., Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of London :—Quakerism, or the Story of my Life, by one who was a Member of the Society of Friends for upwards of Forty Years, 12mo. :—Protestantism and Popery contrasted by the acknowledged and authentic Teaching of each Religion, edited by the Rev. John Edmund Cox, M.A., F.S.A., of All Souls' College, Oxford, Vicar of St. Helen's, Bishopsgate, London, 2 vols. 8vo. :—Lectures on Ecclesiastes, by the Rev. James Hamilton, D.D., crown 8vo. :—The Bloomsbury Prophetic Lectures, by twelve clergymen of the

Church of England, 12mo. :—A Memoir of the late Rev. Edw. Bickersteth, Rector of Watton, by the Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A., in two volumes post octavo, with portrait :—Lectures on the Prophet Amos, by the Rev. Vincent W. Ryan, M.A., late Curate of St. Mary's, Edge Hill, and Vice-Principal of the Collegiate Schools, Liverpool, foolscap octavo :—Primitive Obliquities ; or a Review of the Epistles of the New Testament, in Reference to the Prevailing Offences in the Church, by the Rev. R. Boys, M.A., in foolscap octavo :—The Jesuits as they Were and Are, from the German of Duller, translated by Mrs. Stanley Carr, with a preface by Sir Culling Eardley, Bart., foolscap 8vo. :—Romanism as it exists in Rome ; exhibited in various Inscriptions and other Documents in the Churches and other Ecclesiastical Places in that City, collected by the Hon. J. W. Percy, 8vo.

Among the new works in Theology and kindred subjects, announced on the Continent, are the following :—

Novum Testamentum latine interprete Hieronymo. Ex celeberrimo codice Amiatino omnium et antiquissimo et prestantissimo nunc primum editit Constantinus Tischendorf. Cum pia memoria Gregorii XVI. Accedit tabula lapidi incisa. Lipsiae, 1850, 46 and 421 pp., 4to.

Das Buch der Religion, oder der religiöse Geist der Menschheit in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Für die Gebildeten des deutschen Volkes dargestellt von einem deutschen Theologen, 8vo.

Pauli epistola altera ad Timotheum graece. Cum commentario perpetuo editit Gottlob Eduardus Leo, theologiae doctor, art. mag., senatus ecclesiastici Schoenburgici senator, Waldenburgensis ecclesiae pastor primar., et dioecesis superintendens.

AMERICAN.

THE first volume of a "*History of the German Reformed Church*," by Rev. LEWIS MAYER, D.D., late Professor in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church in the United States," has appeared, (Philadelphia, 8vo., pp. 477.) This volume is chiefly occupied with an account of the Reformation in Switzerland : the second is designed to embrace the history of the German Reformed Church in the United States.

The venerable author brought his labours down to about 1770 ; the remainder of the history will be given by another hand. Prefixed to the first volume is a Memoir of Dr. Mayer, by Rev. E. Heiner.

THE American translation of Neander's *Life of Christ* has been reprinted in England, as part of Bohn's Standard Library.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

A PERPETUAL activity pervades the whole field of classical philology in Germany—and especially the domain of Greek Lexicography. In this department two important works have appeared, which we have not seen, but which are highly commended in the Leipziger Repertorium. They are the "*Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache*, von C. Jacobitz und E. E. Seiler," 2 vols., large 8vo., pp. 1502 and 1792: and the "*Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zum Schul- und Privatgebrauche*, von Jacobitz und Seiler," large 8vo., 1650 pp.

THE whole number of matriculated students at the University of BONN for the winter semester of 1850-1851, was 911; of whom 58 were students of Theology under the Protestant Faculty, and 204 under the Catholic; 308 of Jurisprudence, 127 of Medicine, and 144 of Philosophy and Theology. The University of BRESLAU, for the same half-year, had 823 students, of whom 297 were students of Theology. In JENA, there were 358 students, of whom 78 were Theological; MARRBURG, 263 students, 72 Theological; MUNICH, 1884 students, 315 Theological; WÜRZBURG, 672 students, 96 Theological.

THE fourth part of the second volume of PASSOW's Greek Lexicon (newly edited by Rost, Palm, and Kreussler) is published, and extends from the word *περασία* to *πλινδύφης*.

WE have received the first number of a new philological journal entitled "*Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung, auf dem gebiete des Deutschen, Griechischen und Lateinischen*," herausgegeben von Dr. J. Aufrecht, Priv. Doc. a. d. Universität zu Berlin, and Dr. A. Kuhn, Lehrer am Cöln. Gymnasium." (Berlin, F. Dümmeler; New-York, Westermann, Brothers.) The first number gives good promise, both in matter and appearance, of a useful and attractive journal. The space is about equally divided between the three languages, German, Greek, and Latin; and this proportion is to be kept up in future numbers. Among the contributors to this number, besides the editors, may be found the names of Förstermann, Curtius, Benary, and Jac. Grimm; and among the collaborators engaged for

the future service of the journal, are Bopp, Diefenbach, Haase, Hartung, Lassen, Zumpt, and others. The cost of the journal, in this country, will be about \$3 50 per annum.

A REMARKABLE production of the past year is *Ἱστορία τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ποιητῶν καὶ Συγγραφέων*, ἐπὶ Κ. Ἀσωπίου. Τόμ. πρῶτος, A-Z. Ἐν Ἀθήναις, 1850, 960 pp., 8vo. The author, Constantine Asopios, is Professor of Greek Literature in the Otto University at Athens. The work, when completed, will embrace the history of Greek Literature from the earliest times up to the year 1453.

To show how comprehensive are the attempts of modern philosophy, we give the title and contents of a new German treatise, viz.:—"System der Wissenschaft: ein philosophischen Encheiridion von Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, 1850, pp. 621, 8vo." The contents are as follows:—I. REASON: the science of the logical Idea (*Dialectics*), in three parts: (1.) Being (*Metaphysics*): (2.) Conception (*Logic*): (3.) Idea (*Ideology*).—II. NATURE: the Philosophy of Nature (*Physics*): (1.) Matter (*Mechanics*): (2.) Power (*Dynamics*): (3.) Life (*Organics*).—III. SPIRIT: (1.) the Subjective Spirit (*Psychology*): (2.) the Objective Spirit (*Ethics*): (3.) the Absolute Spirit (*Theology*).

WE notice the completion, at last, of Dr. Traill's translation of Josephus' Jewish War, edited by Isaac Taylor. The work is in two volumes, price about \$10.

AMONG the new works in Classical and Miscellaneous Literature announced on the Continent are the following:—

Bibliographisches Handbuch der philosophischen Literatur der Deutschen v. der Mitte des 18. Jahrh. bis auf die neueste Zeit. Von Dr. Chr. Ant. Geissler. Nach J. Sem. Ersch in systemat. Ordnung bearb. u. m. den nöthigen Registern versehen. 3. Aufl. Leipzig, 1850. 283 pp. 8vo.

Histoire de la philosophie; par l'abbé J. B. Bourgeat. Philosophie orientale. Paris, Hachette. 1850. 8vo.

Grundzüge d. Systems der Philosophie od. Encyclopädie der philosoph. Wissenschaften von Dr. K. Ph. Fischer, Prof. 2.

Bd.: Die Wissenschaft des subjectiven u. objectiven Geistes. 1. Abth. Erlangen, Palm. 1850. 272 pp. 8vo.

Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie. Allgemeine Einleitung, Psychologie, Logik. Von Dr. R. Joh. Lichtenfels. 1850. 267 pp. 8vo.

System der speculativen Ethik, oder Philosophie der Familie, des Staates u. der religiösen Sitte. Von H. Mor. Chalybäus. 2 Bde. Leipzig. 1850. 1143 pp.

Schleiermachers Sittenlehre ausführlich dargestellt u. beurtheilt mit e. einleitenden Exposition d. histor. Entwicklungsganges der Sittenlehre überhaupt. Eine v. d. K. Dän. Gesellschaft zu Kopenhagen gekrönte Preisschrift. Von Dr. Frz. Vorländer. 1851. 348 pp. 8vo.

Vom Staatsleben nach platonischen, aristotelischen und christlichen Grundsätzen. Eine staatswissenschaftliche Abhandlung von P. H. Stühr. 1. Thl. Berlin. 1850. 327 pp. 8vo.

Gottfried Hermann's pädagogischer Einfluss. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik des altclassischen Humanisten von Dr. K. Fr. Ameis, Prof. u. Prorektor am Gymnasium zu Mühlhausen. Jena. 1850. 115 pp. 8vo.

Corpus inscriptionum graecarum. Auctoritate et impensis acad. litterar. regiae Boruss. ex materia collecta ab Aug. Boeckhio ed. Jo. Franzins. Vol. III. Fasc. III. Berolini. 1850. Pp. 689-1032. gr. Fol.

Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten. Von Dr. K. Fr. Hermann, Prof. zu Göttingen. 3. Thl., die Privatalterthümer enthaltend. 1. Hälfte. Heidelberg. 1850. 210 pp. 8vo.

Griechische Mythologie. Von Dr. Em. Braun. In 3 Büchern. 2. Buch. 1. Hälfte. Hamburg u. Gotha. 1850. Pp. 211-442.

Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Von Dr. Ed. Munk. 2. Thl.: Geschichte der griechischen Prosa. Berlin. 1850. 669 pp. 8vo.

Histoire de la littérature Grecque; par Alex. Pierron. Paris. 1850. 12mo.

Demosthenes, ausgewählte Reden. Erklärung von Ant. Westermann. (In 3 Bänden.) 2. Bänden: [XVIII.] Rede vom Kranze. [XX.] Rede gegen Leptines. Leipzig. 1850. 218 pp. 8vo.

Platonis opera omnia uno volumine comprehensa. Ad fidem optimor. libror. denuo recognovit et una cum scholiis graecis emendatus ed. Gfr. Stallbaumius, Prof. et Gymn. Rector. Edit. stereot. Lipsiae. 1850. 728 pp. Large 8vo.

Organismus der lateinischen Sprache oder: Darstellung der Weltanschauung des röm. Volkes in seinen Sprachformen. Von Dr. Ant. Schmitt. 2 Theile. Mit 6 Formentaf. 2. Aufl. Mainz. 1851. 310 pp. 8vo.

Among the new works announced in Great Britain are the following:—Sketches of the Poetical Literature of the past Half-Century, in six Lectures, delivered at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, by D. M. Moir (DELTA), foolscap 8vo. :—Sir John Richardson's Journal of his Boat Voyage through Rupert's Land, and along the Central Arctic Coasts, in Search of the Discovery Ships under Sir John Franklin, 2 vols. 8vo., Map, coloured Plates, and Woodcuts:—A History of Greek and Roman Classical Literature, with an introduction on each of the languages, biographical notices, an account of the periods in which each principal author lived and wrote, so far as literature was affected by such history, and observations on the works themselves, by R. W. Browne, Professor of Classics at King's College, London, 2 vols., 8vo. :—The One Primeval Language, traced experimentally through ancient inscriptions, in alphabetical characters of lost powers from the four Continents, including the voice of Israel from the rocks of Sinai, and the vestiges of patriarchal tradition from the Monuments of Egypt, Etruria, and Southern Arabia, with illustrative Plates, a Harmonized Table of Alphabets, Glossaries, and Translations, by the Rev. Charles Forster, B.D. :—Schiller's Complete Poems, including all his early suppressed Pieces, together with the Poems introduced in his Dramatic Works, attempted in English, by Edgar Alfred Bowring:—A Handbook of the English Language, by R. G. Latham, M.D., late Professor of English Language and Literature in University College, London, 1 vol., 12mo. :—Letters on the Physics of the Globe, by H. Buff, Professor of Physics in the University of Giessen, edited by Dr. A. W. Hofman, Professor in the Royal College of Chemistry, London, foolscap 8vo. :—The Naturalist in Jamaica, by P. H. Gosse, Esq., author of Popular British Ornithology, &c., post 8vo., with coloured Plates:—Wesley and Methodism, by Isaac Taylor, author of Natural History of Enthusiasm, &c., post 8vo. :—The Italian Volunteers and Lombard Rifle Brigade in 1848-1849, from the Italian of Emilio Dandolo, post 8vo., Map and Plan:—Examples of the Architecture of

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